



Daily Report

Sub-Saharan Africa

FBIS-AFR-90-080
Wednesday
25 April 1990

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Officials Attend African News Agency Inauguration

EA2004041190 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1430 GMT
19 Apr 90

[Summary from poor reception] Celebrations have been held in Khartoum to mark the inauguration of the HORN OF AFRICA NEWS AGENCY. The celebrations were attended by various officials together with a number of diplomats of fraternal countries accredited to Khartoum. The headquarters of the HORN OF AFRICA NEWS AGENCY will be in Mogadishu and the agency will have branches throughout the world, including France, Britain, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ethiopia, Eritrea [last two as received], Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Tunisia, and Sudan.

* African Scholars View East European Events

* Lessons for Africa

34000528 Harare SOUTHERN AFRICA POLITICAL
& ECONOMIC MONTHLY in English Feb 90 p 2

[Text] The developments in Eastern Europe are of such historical and epochal significance that it would have been most surprising if radical African scholarship had not stopped to ponder on at least some of the initial implications and consequences for the world in general, and for Africa in particular. For, radical African *academia*, not to mention the theory and practice of liberation politics, has emerged and developed *pari passu* with the history and development of Marxism-Leninism and Socialism. No doubt, there have been varied and even opportunistic and incorrect interpretations of Marxism-Leninism in the course of the period ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. This is not surprising, given the complexity of the relationship between theory and practice in any historical process. Nonetheless, Marxism-Leninism has, in its broadest and most comprehensive thrust, been naturally attractive to those of the Third World—as to the down-trodden and wretched of our earth generally—who were exposed to its political teachings. It has shaken the world, inspired and fuelled revolutions—including anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggles—throughout most of this century; inveighed and pervaded the best possible and most progressive political, economic and social reforms that Western capitalism has had to concede yet. Accordingly, it is to be expected that Marxism-Leninism and its goal of *Revolutionary Socialism*—as a means of redressing the growing gross imbalance between the *haves* and *have-nots* in our world—will remain the spectre that it has been: haunting those smug in the comfort of power, wealth and privilege, while providing, for that majority of deprived and exploited humanity, the best available philosophy and agency through which to explain and transform that social reality that is today our world.

As the dust begins to settle, it is becoming increasingly evident that Eastern Europe has not been—and is not—

one social formation; that there are important differences between the various countries some of which have made great strides towards the socialist goal; and that, far from an outright rejection of Marxism-Leninism and Socialism, these current developments represent the most vigorous and intense *review* of the Socialist process; and that the emphasis now will be on how to ensure that *democracy*—and the *democratic process* itself—becomes an *essential* and *integral* part of *socialist construction*. There is reason to conclude that the era of *perestroika* and *glasnost* represents a gigantic step on the *Road to Socialism*; and Mikhail Gorbachev represents the brave new breed, born out of the positive results of the first phase of *socialist construction*. With the *Cold War* now virtually over for the time being, there is the hope and the prospect that *socialist construction* will be relatively free from that imperialist reaction that hitherto forced the Soviet Union and its allies in Socialism into an *apparent* defensive *bloc*, compressed into a *cul-de-sac* of ideological degeneration and moribund "*communism*". As Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has said about the thaw in the *Cold War* in the context of the recent developments in Eastern Europe: "*When the ice breaks up, it can be very dangerous.*" For certain, the developments in Eastern Europe could be just the other side of a coin that represents the totality of the historical process which will leave no one untouched. And how mythical to suggest that *capitalism* is synonymous with *democracy* when, through capitalism, the majority of humanity has been deprived, exploited and even rendered sub-human! What the proponents of capitalism call *democracy* is therefore nothing but a *kind of democracy*, a holding operation, a managerial tool through which to reduce and postpone the explosions and revolts that are indeed inevitable, particularly at the *periphery* (Third World) where capitalist accumulation (on a world scale) has wrought the worst misery and suffering.

This brings us to the *second* lesson about the developments in Eastern Europe: the parallel between the "*vanguard Party*" of "*Communist*" Eastern Europe and the *One-Party State* in Africa. The most progressive of the architects of the *One-Party State* have tried to draw on the model of the *vanguard party* and therefore with the same objective of attaining socialism. The combined historical experience of both the *Vanguard Party* in Eastern Europe and the *One-Party State* in Africa all point to the need to ask seriously whether, in the current historical conjuncture, such forms of *class rule* could constitute a viable and democratic agency for a progressive advance towards socialism. If not, and it appears to be so, then both the *Vanguard Party* in Eastern Europe and the *One-Party State* in Africa require an intensive review. The current developments in Eastern Europe demonstrate that it is never too late to stop and ponder; and that in doing so, there appears to be a fairer chance now for a renewed thrust towards genuine socialist democracy. Likewise, in Africa, this process has to begin with an assessment of that *ideology of national unity* which, in many cases, seeks to conceal the very issues that cause disunity and discontent in the post-colonial

state, and in the pursuit of which all opposing views are suppressed and even outlawed. Needless to add, under such (neo-colonial) conditions and circumstances, even the *multi-party system* becomes a farce, a smoke-screen behind which to try and conceal the anti-democratic excesses of a ruling clique. But the question is whether a neo-colonial Africa has that capacity for self-reflection and self-rectification. This is the issue that should pre-occupy all progressive scholars in this current conjuncture.

* Impact on Africa

34000528 Harare SOUTHERN AFRICA POLITICAL & ECONOMIC MONTHLY in English Feb 90 pp 3-5

[Article by Dani Wadada Nabudere: "A Changing Eastern Europe: Chance for Africa"]

[Text] The changes that are currently underway in the USSR and Eastern Europe are of such epochal dimensions that they undermine our view of the world as we have known it since the end of the last World War. One British Conservative Member of Parliament has equated these changes to those which took place in the wake of the collapse of the Roman Empire. As we know, those developments led to the disintegration of the then "civilised world" around Rome, the appearance of a "dark age", and the emergence of a highly decentralised political order in Europe.

These new changes that have appeared with such sharpness have been felt most in the former socialist sector of the world and have led to dramatic events such as the resignations of whole politburos and even actual execution of a leader in Romania. This has led some political forces in the West to gloat over the "collapse of communism" and Marxism. This attitude is born out of the fact that while the eastern economies are in a chaotic situation, the Western capitalist economies seem to be "prospering".

Such a judgement of the situation is in fact superficial. The Western economies have themselves been undergoing tremendous transformations and restructurings since 1979, and the ill-effects of these economic changes have been felt most in the Third World and particularly Africa, which form part of the Western capitalist system. The economic crisis faced by most Third World countries is far worse than that known in the East, so much so that it could be said that the upheavals in these countries are being used by the West to obscure the *real* global crisis in the Third World countries and Africa in particular.

The rapid transformations in the USSR and Eastern Europe in fact reflect the "over-ripeness" of both social systems capitalist and socialist. Although the sentiment in the East is one of trying to re-establish capitalist relations in the former socialist states, such sentiment reflects the hostility to the over-bureaucratized economic and social system that has been regimented in the last

thirty years in these countries. The disillusionment with capitalist exploitation will soon become apparent—and indeed there are already signs of these fears in Poland, East Germany and Hungary apart from the USSR itself.

All this suggests that those forces pressuring for change will try to seek out alternative solutions to the "socialist" system and such pressures will join those pressures such as "green forces" in the West which too seek alternative, sustainable models of society. Such forces are emerging with a sense of urgency in the Third World where people's own organisations are mushrooming as a reaction against the structural adjustment policies of the Western capitalist system. In short, society is pressuring to move to *something new* and not to the Western "free market" systems. We have no space to develop this point here, but it is crucial.

The Impact on Africa

The events that have occurred in Eastern Europe over the last three months however, are crucial in that they have a *direct* impact on Africa. Firstly, they provide the Western capitalist states with the first weapon to confuse the real issues of the African crisis and present them as "victory" for the "free markets". Failures of Western paradigms and models of "development" are being attributed to the failed "socialist" models in the East. In a recent speech to the Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe on August 2, 1989, the former US ambassador to Zimbabwe, Jeffrey Davidow, declared:

What has become apparent to an increasing number of African leaders is that quasi-socialist panaceas—which were bought lock, stock and barrel from Moscow, Beijing, or some other University neighbourhoods in London or Paris, two or three decades ago—have been counterproductive at best and disastrous at their worst. The economic decline of Africa has been precipitous, but there is (now) good evidence that new lessons are being learned. (SAPEM, September, 1989, P.46).

Yet it is clear that the economic decline in Africa is directly attributable to the policies of the three multilateral institutions—IMF, IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] and GATT—which help transnational capital of US, European and Japanese monopolies in Africa. Such devastating policies are currently reflected in the unpopular structural adjustment policies. Therefore the attempt to use the crisis of "socialism" in the East to impose "free market" strategies merely fuels the crisis in Africa, rather than address the fundamental causes of it and cannot be helpful even in the short-run. Hence the pressures to *something new* will continue in Africa.

Secondly, this ideological "breach in the wall" of socialism in the East, will also reinforce the above tendency in that the new ideologues of reform in the East will produce their own new ideologies and explanations to their own crisis with Third World countries—African in particular. Already we detect this in the USSR. By

1980, before Gorbachev came to the scene, new explanations of Soviet policy failures in Africa were being found. The so-called "socialist-oriented" states were being questioned. Andropov brought out this criticism in 1983 when he cautioned:

It is one thing to proclaim socialism as one's own aim and quite another to build it.

The disillusionment with countries such as Ethiopia which the USSR had encouraged to establish "vanguard parties" was in fact an illusion of their own creation in that they had opportunistically backed some petty bourgeois and military regimes because these regimes claimed to be "Marxist-Leninist". But the "failure" of the opportunistic policies of the USSR has become the basis of an ideological thrust which sees Africa as afflicted by "tribal conflicts" because of the militarist repressions of opponents in the countries of "socialist orientation" such as Ethiopia. They are also now advising Africa to work "within the present international division of labour" under Western capitalism because they themselves want to deepen their relations in the world market. Many of these "Marxist-Leninist" regimes have either been abandoned (Ethiopia) or declared themselves no longer Marxist-Leninist (Benin). All this is happening at a bureaucratic level.

US as Sole Superpower

Thirdly, the East-West rapprochement will intensify the aggressiveness and direct involvement of the US in African affairs. The withdrawal of the USSR from global confrontation with the US will create a feeling of "we are the only ones" on the part of the US. This in itself is a sign of weakness. The US will feel free to be unchallenged everywhere which will increase its intransigence and aggressiveness (witness Panama), yet by the same token it will find itself *being nowhere*. Since it will appear to have no immediate significant challenges, it will tend to roam wild "everywhere" which means spreading itself thin on the ground with the result that it will be nowhere. This will happen in the general background of the US becoming a declining power. This will also tend to lead to the emergence of *mini-powers* which it may itself prop up or confront.

This development will be both positive and dangerous. It is positive in that it gives a chance to the popular forces to activate and take initiatives of their own at localised levels in this thinly hegemonised space. It is a danger because it makes US imperialism more reckless and more unresponsive to democratic pressures. To the extent that the USSR and a re-united Europe will be active participants in this new situation, and given the conflicts which are likely to continue in Africa, the USSR, Europe and the US will wish to maintain these conflicts at a *low-intensity manageable* level. This is evident in the observation made by the new US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman J. Cohen, to the Senate Sub-Committee:

These internal wars are normally very bitter, and are even worse when the basis of conflict is race, religion or ethnicity...to the extent that we can play a role I would hope that we could minimise considerations of ideology, and concentrate mainly on national reconciliation and conflict resolution.

He adds that they will also do this by "providing relief for victims as we have done so generously in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia". In this context, the US is now trying a hand at "conflict resolution" through the efforts of former US President, Jimmy Carter, in Ethiopia and Sudan. We should expect more of this in the future. The USSR also sees its role in a somewhat similar way. The NGOS will become an important aspect of this new *imperialism of low-intensity management at grass root level*.

The North-South Issue

Fourthly, the disappearance of the East-West divide will mean that the North-South issue will become fiercer and hence the necessity for the strategy outlined above. Despite efforts being made to "marginalise" the issue by *marginalising Africa* and Africans in *international arenas*, this issue will not disappear. On the contrary, it will intensify. In order to justify their new designs of imperialist exploitation, they will find new explanations—bordering on a *new racism* to shove away their international responsibilities. Africa will be seen as a continent of failure which requires a new Western (civilised) compassion. It will be argued that Africa—"South of the Sahara and North of Limpopo"—is unviable. No investment is useful, nor are *new loans* required. Only "outright grants" are necessary by way of "emergency relief" or "rehabilitation". The words "recovery" and "development" will disappear from the multilateral and bilateral "donor" vocabulary. Instead, the argument will be that particular vulnerable groups should be targeted and "assisted". Already this is self-evident from the new Lome Convention (IV), and new World Bank strategies.

Fifthly, as part of the above, the need to define a "new enemy" will arise. The "white-non-white" issue will be played up to explain Japanese "over success". Japan, having been the only non-white country to "succeed" capitalistically, has brought her into focus in the Western enemy images now that the USSR and Eastern Europe are being re-admitted into the "Common European House". Although the Japanese economy is closely intertwined with Western economies, both the US and Europe are fearful of Japanese "success". In order to create psychologically "valid" explanations to this Japanese success story to the Western popular mind, it is now being ideologised that whereas US capitalism is based on "open markets" and "laissez-faire", Japanese approach is based on "group-competitive communism" (see *Weekend World in Financial Gazette*, Dec. 22, 1989). Thus, the enemy image of "communism" passes on to Japan: the enemy image of "monolithic communism" is replaced with the terrible Japanese image of "competitive communism".

This image may also determine Japanese politics in the non-Western societies as well as its economic links. At the moment, Japan is making a drive to increase its role in Africa and other parts of the Third World. As this linkage increases, the US concern will also increase. In Japan itself, voices of "enough is enough" are being heard in response to this Western pressure against it. Africa has to look at these developments carefully in developing her linkages to avoid being marginalised and placed in the shadows of the US and Europe.

New Enemy Images

Similarly, Islam is being targeted as "enemy" under the guise of attacking "Islamic fundamentalism". In fact, the objective is to reduce the anti-imperialist impact of Islam as a non-European world religion. Islam has a deep religious root in Africa and forms part and parcel of African religions. Any attack on Islam is therefore also an attack on Africa. Christian Africans must be clear about this point despite the conflicts that exist between the Arab and non-Arab components on the continent. Africa must deepen its links with the Islamic world.

Anti-Islamism will also arise in the USSR as the nationalist conflict in the Trans-Caucasia deepens. Already weapons are being passed across the borders between Afghanistan and Kazakhstan in the USSR. It thus appears that Islam is going to be a factor in the disintegration of the USSR and a reaction against it in the USSR will reinforce anti-Islamic tendencies in Europe and the US. The recent incidents on the Iran-USSR border testify to this fact.

Impact on Southern Africa

Finally, but not least, the East-West convergence will have immediate effect on the situation in Southern Africa, and South Africa in particular. The overthrow of proletarian power in the former socialist countries by the bureaucrat stratum in these countries has destroyed the socialist economies and hence the revolt by the workers in these countries is justified. For years, however, the corrupt bureaucrat monopoly bourgeoisie in the USSR and the former people's democracies have posed as "internationalists" and "natural allies" of the African liberation movements. They did this for social-imperialistic purposes in their expansion of Soviet spheres of influence. This has been exposed by Gorbachev who represents the technocratic faction of this bourgeoisie.

In pursuance of their hegemonic objectives, the Soviet bureaucrat bourgeoisie had adopted a dual stance of collaboration and rivalry under the cover of "detente" initiated by Brezhnev with Nixon. The collapse of US imperialism in Indo-China encouraged the USSR to confront the US globally. In Africa, this confrontation took the form of open support to Angola after the defeat of the Portuguese. They also gave support to the

ANC(SA) [African National Congress (South Africa)] as the "authentic" national liberation movement, alongside others in the region.

But since this support was not based on proletarian internationalism but opportunism, it has become a game of superpower bargaining and the USSR has had to drop support to Cuba, Angola and the ANC in return to non-interference in Eastern Europe. The US imperialists find themselves "unchallenged" in the region, but in recognition of the Soviet collaboration in "handing over the ANC" to them, they are prepared to entertain the USSR's "vital interests" as well. Both superpowers now wish to see a "negotiated settlement" in South Africa to end apartheid and to have a "balance of interests".

However, the recognition of a Soviet role in the region has not stopped the US from continuing to give weapons to the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] forces to undermine the Angolan MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government. Nor has it stopped the US from collaborating with South Africa while they talk about the need for change. In fact, both the US and USSR see the region's white population as the main stabilising force in the region. For this reason, both the USSR and US wish to see "white power" preserved within the region.

Whither Africa

Despite all the difficulties that Africa has experienced and which will stand before her in the future, *Africa has survived*. European enslavement and colonisation were overcome. Now Africa confronts US dominated neo-colonialism. The events occurring in Eastern Europe will definitely complicate the situation in the world and may affect Africa adversely. But there is also opportunity which arises from these developments.

There is a lot of talk about the "marginalisation of Africa" in the sense that Eastern Europe will absorb most of the "aid" that Africa was being given before. This means that neo-colonialism will not be maintained at the same level. Neo-colonialism in Africa is in trouble.

What Africans need to do is to take the bull by the horns in the next phase of the African revolution. Africa has to try to *stand on its own feet*, and this means Africa must discover a path for its own development. The critical situation on the continent clearly demands that very fundamental changes must take place if the people are to survive the severe crisis facing the continent.

The struggle under way in South Africa (Azania) offers Africa a chance to confront the last vestiges of imperialism on the continent. Imperialism focuses its attention on South Africa precisely because it offers the people of Africa a strong base of resistance. This is why both superpowers wish to see "white power" maintained in some form in this country. But the forces of African liberation have moved southwards and are now deeply entrenched in the determination of the people of Azania to smash "white power". This people's power offers

Africa the basis for a rejuvenation which will give her a new momentum under *revolutionary pan-Africanism* in the second phase of the Africa revolution. This is where the *real challenge* lies for all the people of Africa: take advantage of the crisis of imperialism (neo-colonialism) and bureaucrat "socialism" to *unite forces* and move along new revolutionary lines to break the chains of slavery.

* Global Context

34000528 Harare SOUTHERN AFRICA POLITICAL & ECONOMIC MONTHLY in English Feb 90 pp 6-9

[Article by Issa Shivji, Department of Law, University of Dar es Salaam: "A Changing Eastern Europe: Lessons for Africa; The following article is adapted from a paper presented by the author at a Seminar on the Developments in Eastern Europe"]

[Text] Undoubtedly, we are witnessing momentous events in the world today and while these events are very important, it is also possible to lose one's historical bearings in the euphoria, particularly in the euphoria which is created by the Western media. While the events are extremely important, it is also important for us to situate them within a certain historical context and for lack of information and for other reasons, it is very difficult at this stage to take any definitive, and even less, demagogic, views or positions on these issues. Unlike the usual tradition of academics who always rise after events and analyse them, it is important that we should be able to discuss and think aloud about events while they are taking place.

It seems to me that our function here is to give some sort of structure to our discussion, to raise issues and hopefully also to try to insert the events within a certain historical context. I think we can look at these events along four dimensions or in four aspects. One is the international dimension—the global aspect of these events, particularly in terms of potential re-alignment of superpowers or potential re-organisation of hegemonies and, at the same time, the potential development of new types of anti-hegemonies.

The second level is the socialist dimension, that is, the socialist question. The third dimension is the national question. The fourth one is what the effect of these events on our own immediate environment will be. What lessons and parallels can be drawn for Africa?

Once you talk about the international dimension, you inevitably begin from the question of the world and peace. It is very important for us to remind ourselves that the present period beginning with the Second World War, has been the period of longest peace in Europe in the last one hundred and fifty years, a period of something like 40-45 years of peace on the continent. Since the Second World War, we have witnessed the emergence of a bi-polar world under the two hegemonies of the US and the USSR.

The Global Context

On the continent of Europe itself, the spheres are quite neatly demarcated and mutually accepted, that is, the terms which are mutually accepted as the terms of the hegemony powers in which others shall not seriously interfere. At the same time, while there is a mutual restraint and acceptance of strength in Europe, the arena of contention between the two superpowers has been the periphery, the Third World, and this means that while there is peace in Europe, there is war in the Third World.

Since World War II, we have had numerous battles and wars in the Third World. I have said that this peace in Europe has a number of factors and deterrents. An important one is, of course, a divided Germany. It seems to me that a divided Germany has been an important factor, an important deterrent in terms of war in that part of the world. In the Third World, there are divided countries, but these divided countries, unlike in Europe, have not been a factor of peace; they are, in fact, engendered sources of regional conflicts: divided Korea, Vietnam (before the successful revolution), China and Taiwan, India, Palestine is not exactly divided but somewhat very analogous to that type of situation and all these situations are engendered so-called "conflicts" in the Third World.

While there are troops stationed in Europe, these troops are stationary troops. While there are troops and military bases in the Third World, they are not stationary at all. These are combative troops which are used whenever there is any conflict—commandos coming in, as in Congo, Granada, and so on. There are combative troops, rapid deployment forces and so on, unlike the European situation.

The second important factor or deterrent is, of course, the arms race. You have the arms race in Europe and you have the arms repression in the Third World, both of them significantly contributing to the economies, particularly the US economy. In fact, there has been a lot of evidence that since the war, the US economy has been heavily dependent on arms and armaments.

And, of course, there are ideological deterrents: cold war propaganda in Europe, ideological propaganda based on the Cold War. In the Third World divisions have engendered regional conflicts, in an attempt by imperialism to create their own hegemonies where the US or USSR had engendered resistance of the people. On the one hand, compradorisation of states, and on the other hand, resistance of the large masses of oppressed people. Therefore, there are different modes of resistance which I shall touch on very shortly.

During the heyday of global hegemony in the bi-polar world, the resistance in the Third World often took the form of armed struggle or guerrilla struggle. Here, the model of inspiration was the Chinese War of Liberation. In the Korean war, in the Vietnam war, in the Kampuchean revolution, the Nicaraguan Revolution, in the Mozambican liberation, Zimbabwe, etc., the Chinese

were always an example of inspiration for this one form of struggle, that is, armed struggle or guerrilla warfare, particularly in the fifties, sixties up to the seventies.

Meanwhile, of course, there have been other developments in this bi-polar world. There was the rise of the new centres, particularly Japan, arising as equal giants making a fundamental breach in the hegemony of imperialism under the US, and there was China breaking away from the so-called socialist camp in the sixties, making a breach in this other hegemony.

At the same time, of course, Germany came on the world scene, posing as an economic power. This went hand in hand with the economic crisis affecting the capitalist economy—the crash of the early seventies, the crash of the early eighties, and so on.

At the same time, in the Third World, there was an important trend or change in the mode of resistance. In the second phase, if one may call it, there was a series of mass insurrections, a series of mass uprisings: Iran, Philippines, Burma, Ethiopia, these were really mass uprisings, new forms of resistance on the part of the people. Of course, these did not get as much media coverage as the present events in Eastern Europe are getting. But these are important developments that we have witnessed in the Third World.

Now, if the Chinese war of liberation in terms of armed guerrilla struggle was an inspiration in the Third World for many of the guerrilla movements that I have talked about, the precursor of the mass uprisings that we have seen, I want to argue was also in China—the Cultural Revolution. Many people do not connect the mass developments, mass uprisings and mass politics in the Third World with the cultural Revolution, partly because while the guerrilla war achieved that independence inspiration, the Cultural Revolution probably failed and is never quoted as an inspiration. I will say more about this later.

Re-Organisation of Hegemonies?

Given this background, are we then now witnessing a re-organisation of hegemonies? Are we witnessing re-alignment of superpowers? Are we witnessing an emergence of new superpowers? And it is within this context that these events were happening. Should we locate them? In other words, these events are a transition from one form of organisation of hegemonies to another form of organisation of hegemonies on the international level. It is very difficult, at this stage, to predict what sort of re-alignment will take place. There is a possible one between the Soviet Union and the US, there is the rise of Japan, there is China, the possible reunification of Germany. So, what is it that we are witnessing? And these are, of course, questions that I do not think we can immediately answer. But it seems to me that when we are discussing these issues, we ought to place them in this international context.

Let me now come to the People's Republic of China. I want to situate the June demonstration and repression within what Ernest Wamba would call a certain mode of politics. I want to look at the socialist dimension and focus on the mode of politics, the way the relationship between the state and civil society, the way civil society relates to the state, the relations or the political relation within civil society and the various mediations in these relations.

Now, looking at this mode of politics, I want to begin with the great debate between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union between roughly 1959 and 1962. Some of the questions that were raised were centrally political questions, questions which can be called "questions relating to the mode of politics". There were questions relating to the party, questions relating to state, questions relating to the relationship between the masses and the party and questions relating to the party and class.

The Sino-Soviet Debate

The letter written by the Communist Party of China to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over these issues is very sharp, very clean, very neat and many of you would want, at some point to read it. I would argue that it was in the Leninist tradition, strongly in the Leninist paradigm. Very simply put, masses divided into classes, classes are led by political parties who are the advanced detachment of classes, and within these parties there are articulate groups who constitute leaders, who form the centre. From the political party, it is the vanguard party whose membership is of professional revolutionaries and cadres and these are the leaders of the party.

The party functions on the principle of democratic centralism, which means decisions made by the top organs must be faithfully followed by the lower organs, top down. This is, of course, very schematically put but, basically, that was the paradigm which was argued in the Communist Party of China's letter. It seems to me that to a certain extent, at the risk of some over-simplifying, this model is a kind of mirror image of western party systems of the so-called western democracies.

The western democracies or party systems do not function in a very different light either. In fact, in both cases, the mainstream politics are essentially dominated by parties and the so-called multi-party systems, strictly speaking, are not multi-party. They are two-party systems, basically. There are two dominant parties in most of these important so-called western democracies and, if it is two parties, you have the elite who control these parties and the masses. The so-called "silent majority" are basically the recipients, the passive observers of major political decisions in both cases.

The same goes for the so-called one-party systems in the other models. Of course, there are one or two differences—one difference lies in how these systems treat or

relate to the opposition in the fringes, not in the mainstream, but in the fringes—the small radical groups and all sorts of groupings in western countries. These are tolerated while in the other system there are very forcefully nipped in the bud. Not that any of them make a major dent in the system for they are not part of the mainstream politics.

Student Societies

The other one, of course, is the organisation of student societies. Both systems allow the organisation of student societies, trade unions and other groups. In the socialist system trade unions are part of the state structure. But even where trade unions are not part of state structures, you cannot imagine them playing a fundamental political role. I feel it is almost inconceivable to think of a Solidarity in a Western European country. The thing that came closest to that was probably the May 1968 revolt of the students and workers in Paris. As you know, De Gaulle was very close to repressing it with his army which he was going to recall from Germany. So, to a certain extent, one system is a mirror image of the other—the western democratic system and the central democratic system in the East.

This is how the question was raised at least in the debate in 1959-62 between the USSR and China and, since the break with the Soviet Union, there has been a fundamental re-thinking in China particularly in Mao's thought and writing. It is important to emphasise this because this is what comes to be crystallised in the Cultural Revolution. Although the language and the paradigm seem to be the same Leninist, it seems to me that there are fundamental departures from the Leninist model or at least fundamental departures from the model that is put forward by China in its letter to the Communist Party of the USSR. I would like to give you a flavour of this departure from some of the quotations of Mao himself where I want to argue that the central question in Mao's thinking after the break with the Soviet Union which culminated in the Cultural Revolution was said to centre around the question of democracy, but democracy beyond as it is understood by the Communist Movement. For example, on democracy in mass line in 1962, in a talk to party cadres, Mao says:

Now there are some discussions and putting forward ideas which differ from those of the leaders and leading organisations. As soon as problems are discussed, they suppress the activism of the masses and do not allow them to speak out. This attitude is extremely evil. Democratic centralism is written into our party constitution and state constitution but they both apply. Comrades, we are revolutionaries, if you really committed mistakes of the kind which are harmful to the people's cause, then we should stick to opinions of the masses and of comrades and carry out self-examination. This sort of self-examination should be repeated several times over, if once is not enough, and people are not satisfied. Then it should be done a second time, if they are still not satisfied. It should be done a third time, until nobody has any more criticisms.

On Democratic Centralism

Now you will notice that he is talking about some sort of mass line of a mass democracy but he is still using the language of democratic centralism and yet the centralism that is functioning in Mao's though is different. I would argue, from the centralism that was understood. For example, he says:

First of all, it is a centralisation of correct ideas on the basis of which unity of understanding policy, planning, and action are achieved. This is called centralised unification. If people still do not express them, or are angry but still have not vented their anger, how can centralised unification be established. If there is not democracy, we cannot possibly summarise experience correctly.

This seems to me a very fundamental difference in the conception of centralisation in which the lower organs take orders from the higher organs.

The other thought which is pre-occupying Mao at this time is the whole question of bureaucracy. This is very important because later on in the cultural revolution, the question of bureaucracy becomes the backbone for the argument that is the basis for the rise of a new class inserted within the state apparatus. Again, around the same period, Mao puts the whole question of democracy in the following way. He says:

There are some comrades who cannot bear to listen to ideas contrary to their own and cannot bear to be criticised. This is very wrong. During this conference, one province held a meeting which started off in a very lively manner but as soon as the provincial party secretary arrived, a hush fell on the proceedings and nobody spoke. Comrade Provincial Party Secretary, what is the purpose of your attendance at meetings? Why don't you stay in your own room and think about problems when this kind of atmosphere is engendered, and people do not dare to speak in your presence, then it is up to you to keep away. (A good advice) If you have made mistakes, then you should carry out self-criticism, let others speak! Let others criticise you! On 3rd June last year, during the last day of the Party Conference called by the Central Committee, I talked about my own shortcomings and mistakes. I said I wanted the comrades to convey what I said to the various provinces and districts. I found out later than many districts did not get my message as if my mistakes could be hidden and ought to be hidden. Comrades, they must not be hidden. Any mistakes that the centre has made ought to be by direct responsibility, and I also have an indirect share in the blame because I am the Chairman of the Central Committee.

Noone Is Sacrosanct From Criticism

Already, Mao here is propounding the idea that no one is sacrosanct from criticism or from mistakes, and these mistakes. Again, this is an important idea and it becomes the source of a very important directive in the Cultural Revolution. The Party itself is not sacrosanct. If there are mistakes in the Party, then the Party itself should be

bombarded. Then on the same point, comes out another quotation about the whole question of the leadership itself being criticised:

If others consider you have not done enough, then let them say so. If what they say is right, you will accept their opinion. When we allow others to speak, should we be active or passive in our attitude? Of course, it is better to be active. What can we do if we are forced onto the defensive? In the past we were undemocratic, and so we find ourselves on the defensive, no matter, let everybody criticise us. As for me, I will not go out during the day, I will not go to the theatre at night, please come and criticise me day and night.

On the Civil Society

On the whole question of the civil society, the politics within civil society, how civil society should act within itself in terms of politics and how one should engender maximum democracy, again, Mao had already begun to develop his ideas on this. I would like to give you just one thought from 1964 and this is how it goes:

Maximum democracy for all sorts of ideas will take place. Let them go in for capitalism, society is very complex. If one only goes in for socialism and not for capitalism, is not that too simple? Wouldn't we then lack the unity of opposites, and be merely one-sided? Let them do it, let them attack us madly, demonstrate in the streets, take up arms to rebel. I approve all of these things. Society is very complex, there is not a single commune, a single-cell, a single department of the Central Committee which one cannot divide into two.

I think these are the ideas which began to be crystalised not only at an ideological, theoretical, level but even at a practical level in the Cultural Revolution, issues began to be raised in a very sharp manner in the Cultural Revolution, where I think, the thing which was probably most prominent was the whole question of mass politics, of mass action. For example, on this issue in 1966, at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Mao said:

I said to you all, youth is the great army of the great Cultural Revolution. It must be mobilised to the full. After my return to Beijing, I felt very unhappy and some colleges even had their gates shut. There were even some which suppressed the student movement. Who is it who suppressed the student movement? Only the Fay Yang war lords. It is anti-Marxist for communists to fear the student movement. Some people talk daily about the mass line and serving the bourgeoisie line and serve the bourgeoisie. The Central Committee of the Youth League should stand on the side of the student movement but instead it stands on the side of suppression of the student movement who opposes the great Cultural Revolution: the American imperialism, the Soviet revisionists, the Japanese revisionists and the reactionaries.

Already, Mao is beginning to talk in terms of the masses themselves revolting and not waiting for the Party to take the lead.

As I said, the ideas which were crystalised in the Cultural Revolution were issues which came to the fore and were revolving around democracy, democracy going beyond its usual bourgeois form but also going beyond the democratic centrist form Mao was talking of democracy not simply within the party but even outside the party and in relation to the party. For example, one of the very important propositions of the Cultural Revolution was that the bourgeois is in the party itself. Now, that was the fundamental departure, because hitherto, in Leninist paradigm, the party was seen as the advanced stage of the proletariat.

The Bourgeoisie and the Vanguard Party

Now, how can you talk about the bourgeoisie being in the party? It seems to me that strikes at the very root of the whole conception of the vanguard party. During this period, what pre-occupied Mao most was the whole question of capitalist restoration, having analysed the experience of the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, although the Cultural Revolution failed, or at least failed by what it had set itself for, we do begin to witness, I would argue, the rise of the Deng, Zhao and Ping trends towards capitalist restoration in China.

What form will the capitalist restoration take? Will it be the revisionist form of the Soviet Union or will it be the liberal bourgeoisie form of the western countries which in effect would mean an agrarian under-developed economy like China, a compradorisation of China under imperialist hegemony as seen in many Soviet countries. These have been the two major currents, and to a certain extent, these currents are reflected and culminated in the June Demonstration.

Roughly beginning in 1981, very fast economic reforms gave rise to intense differentiation, starting in the countryside—the rise of the rural bourgeoisie, the opening up to foreign capital, the coming in of foreign enterprises, joint ventures, also opening up doors for massive corruption and embezzlement. These were some of the contradictions which came out in the June Demonstration. The June Demonstration, of course, was a mass demonstration of students with different currents within this demonstration. But it is important to see the kind of demands which were being made.

Specific Demands

While there was a broad demand for democracy, there were very specific demands, demands relating to education, that the education system was increasingly catering for the rich. The children of the rich were going to the universities, the children of the rich were going to school and the poor were being left out. That was an important demand in the June Demonstration. The demands related to the freedom of expression, the freedom to criticise, the freedom of information, that the Party and the state, having a monopoly of this, was suppressing

information. There was also the demand for accountability, that the Party leaders were involved in corruption, because they were not accountable to the people. These were some of the demands of the June Demonstration.

I am arguing that the June Demonstration, which was suppressed, cannot be seen in isolation, but should be seen as an historical event, should be seen in relation to the previous debates that had taken place, to the previous developments and also should be seen in the context of what I am arguing has been the capitalist restoration in China. The suppression of the June Demonstration and what has happened since, or at least the pronouncements that have been made, seem to indicate that, at least, in the immediate future, it is the centralist line that seems to be winning.

I want to once again say that what is happening are very important events. We should not lose sight of history and historical context: what kind of lessons and what kind of parallels we can draw from these events to our own immediate environment for the continent of Africa.

* Economic Context

34000528 Harare SOUTHERN AFRICA POLITICAL & ECONOMIC MONTHLY in English Feb 90
pp 10-11

[Article by Dani Wadada Nabudere: "A Changing Eastern Europe: Africa Cornered"]

[Text] The rapid political changes taking place in the former socialist countries are also leading to a radical transformation in the economic relations in those countries. Almost all these countries are seeking links with the Western capitalist countries in the form of joint ventures and/or direct investments. Such changes imply radically new forms of economic arrangements between Africa and Eastern Europe as well as the USSR.

Yet these changes that are foreshadowed in these recent developments are not new. What is new is the determination to bring about a more radical rupture with the past. To be sure, attempts at introducing "reforms" to the socialist system of planning go back to the Khrushchev era which began in 1956. They were pursued further with a new determination under Brezhnev and now under Gorbachev. Gorbachev's drive has succeeded in dismantling the system of central planning in the rest of the former socialist world, although within the USSR itself pitched battles are still being waged over the issue by the "conservatives".

What is significant about these reforms right from their inception in the early 1960s was the attempt to introduce the profit motive in production. This was at first referred to as the "capital charge" which was in effect a money rate of interest. At the same time greater control of the wage fund was made a prerequisite to the reforms alongside a change in the price system. By 1975, the

reformers were bold enough to advocate the re-introduction of "commodity relations" between the state and collective sectors of the economy as well as within the state sector itself

But there was a resistance to these changes in certain quarters of the bureaucracy and also from the structure of the economy itself. As a result there were counter-reforms and further 'reforms' and it was these counter-measures that increased the bureaucratisation of the economy. The experience of these reforms up to 1979-80 was that the piecemeal re-introduction of capitalist levers to the central planning system was incompatible with the socialist system of planning in the USSR. This in itself proved the solidity of the socialist system of planning which had been introduced under Stalin, although in Hungary greater attempts were made at introducing capitalist elements in the economy.

Foreign Trade

These capitalist elements were, however, greatly felt in the field of foreign economic relations. Brezhnev had stated:

Foreign economic activity must be based increasingly on a combination of production and commercial functions so as to react quickly to the requirements and possibilities of the world market and to use them to the uttermost in the interests of our economic development.

In order to obtain these "uttermost" benefits from the capitalist world market, Soviet and Comecon pricing to the external markets was adjusted to world market prices. In this way, it was hoped that the external economic sector would help re-orient the internal sector to world economic conditions. This did not happen.

Under Gorbachev, the process of "opening up" has accelerated alongside internal reform. But even here the internal economic relations and structures are still resistant. Again as before, the external sector is viewed as the dynamising sector to the internal sector. In the case of Poland, this is seen as attracting vast amounts of foreign capital to change the internal sector. In Hungary, this too appears to be the approach and in the case of East Germany, vast amounts of capital are expected from West Germany.

Relations With Africa

Historically relations between the Comecon countries and Africa have taken the path which reflected the internal economic reforms. Relations have veered from 'aid', trade, investment and joint (tripartite) production. The first attempt took the form of trade agreements. These were at first bartering arrangements. The determination of prices, however, proved problematic and in some instances quite negative.

But soon it was decided to determine prices according to "world market prices". This again was impossible since the Soviet rouble and other Comecon currencies were

inconvertible and therefore incomparable in real terms with those of Africa, which were themselves dependent on major Western currencies. The result was that many countries complained that Soviet prices were *above* world market prices, which therefore obtained a greater surplus product from African countries.

The *second* step involved *scientific and technical cooperation* agreements. These were supposed to "transfer technology" on better terms than those offered by the capitalist countries. At first, it was said that the transfer was "free" without charges. But as the Comecon countries intensified their own technological deals with the West, they were required to charge for any transfer of such technology. This development completely changed the rationale of the economic links with the Third World countries.

The *third* step in the relations with African countries in the economic field was the *industrial cooperation* arrangement under which Comecon countries began to utilise the institutional experience gained with their links with the Western countries: that of the *joint venture*. This enabled Soviet and Comecon investments to enter production in African countries. This latest activity led to even "warmer" relations in the *fourth* stage—that of *tripartite* production arrangements. Under this arrangement, there was a joint production agreement between Third World countries, the Western companies and Comecon enterprises in a three-cornered arrangements. The Comecon and Western "partners" provided the money-capital and equipment and the Third World provided the land and the labour. Each earned a profit at an agreed rate.

These earlier developments clearly show that the Comecon countries had moved a good step towards adopting Western capitalist techniques in their economic links with Africa.

The New Policy

Under Gorbachev and the new regime in the East, these techniques are now openly acknowledged as the most "natural" ones. The Soviet Union already advocates the inter-dependence of the world economy and USSR integration in the "international division of labour" is seen as the immediate objective. Hungary is a member of the IMF and Poland is on the way. The USSR has applied to join GATT and the IMF. All the other former socialist states will soon follow suit.

The relations of these countries with Africa are therefore clearly predictable. On the debt issues, the USSR has advised African countries not to take "irresponsible" steps towards debt repayments. They have adopted a

"debt relief programme" of their own. In an article by Dr. Sergei Shatalov, released by *Novosti* and reproduced in *The Sunday Mail* of 28 May, 1989 (*SAPEM*, May, 1989), it was stated that the Soviet Union supported "growth-oriented" adjustment policies of the IMF-World Bank.

The Soviet Union wants the existing international markets to function efficiently and therefore wishes to purchase all their primary productions through the major international commodity exchanges. Bilateral trade deals will therefore be minimised.

Soviet and Comecon banks have good experience now in international money markets. Hungary has opened a stock exchange in Budapest and the USSR has some stock market going. These developments will soon be joined with the drive to make the Comecon currencies convertible with Western currencies. This will further strengthen the expected Soviet entry into world markets. Already, the Western countries have created a special fund to enable Polish *zylots* to be convertible.

At a time when Africa is barely surviving under world market conditions, Comecon entry into the structures of the world market will have the immediate result of pushing Africa and other Third World states into a corner. This too will tend to encourage the former "natural allies" of African liberation to make "quick killings" of their own in cornered African markets.

We can therefore expect these countries to have a wholly negative impact on African development. Already, the South African apartheid regime is making extensive economic contracts with the Comecon countries. Trade delegations are already being exchanged and contacts at high levels are being encouraged. Recently, it is said that South Africa has been recruiting East German and Polish technical professional people to work in its industry. A Polish delegation was recently brought down in Zambia in an unauthorised overflight to the embarrassment of all concerned. It has been reported that South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, visited Hungary to recruit skilled workers from that country. *The Herald* of January 4, 1990, has reported also that South Africa has managed to attract five hundred immigrants from the German Democratic Republic and "many more from Poland".

From the above, it can be seen that Africa has to look elsewhere for friends, if there are any available in the 1990s. Otherwise the alternatives are quite clear: either stagnate in the morass of neo-imperialist exploitation and domination or continue the struggle to its conclusion. There are no middle answers. The Western economies do not offer any solutions to the crisis either, as we have seen.

Chad

Sudan's Foreign Minister Brings Al-Bashir Letter

EA2004223490 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1500 GMT
20 Apr 90

[Text] Khartoum, 20 April (SUNA)—Chadian President Hissein Habre has received a letter from Lieutenant General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, chairman of the Revolution Command Council, on relations between the two countries. This took place when President Habre met Foreign Minister Mr. Ali Sahlul in Ndjamená yesterday. During the meeting, the two reviewed relations between the two countries.

The foreign minister arrived in Ndjamená on Wednesday, when the delegation accompanying him held a round of talks with the Chadian side led by Acheikh ibn Oumar, minister of external relations, touching on relations between the two countries and issues of common interest.

FANT Destroys 'Sudanese Islamic Forces' Bases

AB2404194990 Ndjamená Domestic Service in French
1900 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] The Chadian National Armed Forces [FANT] over the weekend destroyed the rear bases of the Sudanese Islamic forces. The operation took place during a mopping up mission. Our reporter Abba Likaya reports on this umpteenth victory of the FANT over the mercenaries and the Sudanese Islamic forces:

[Begin Likaya recording] With the FANT and through the FANT, we shall win. The FANT has made this quote of the president of the Republic their motto. [Words indistinct] they must continue to assume their noble mission [words indistinct] along Chadian-Sudanese border.

On 20 April, while pursuing the mercenaries of the Islamic Legion, the FANT destroyed two bases of the enemy at the border with Sudan. [Words indistinct] in these two bases, one can find everything: (?sophisticated) equipment, BU's, ammunition, foodstuffs, and drugs. [passage indistinct] [end recording]

* Pelletier Discusses Cooperation, Investments

90AF0017A Ndjamená AL-WATAN in French
10-16 Mar 90 p 8

[Report on 3 March Tele-Chad press conference of Jacques Pelletier, French minister for cooperation and development, by J.C. Nekim: "France Will Not Withdraw From Africa"]

[Text] French-Chadian cooperation is going smoothly. This observation was made by French Minister of Cooperation and Development Jacques Pelletier at a press conference held at Tele-Chad on 3 March. In addition to announcing that France would cancel the debt of 25

billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs owed by Chad, Pelletier revealed that his ministry allocates 30 percent of its budget to aid for Chad. The French cooperation minister then said that, contrary to what Africans believe, France and Europe will not disengage from Africa or Chad due to recent upheavals in East Europe. In conclusion, Pelletier encouraged African countries to turn on the charm to maintain and attract foreign investors.

[Nekim] Mr. Minister, how is French-Chadian cooperation going? What progress has been made on projects undertaken by France to help Chad?

[Pelletier] Chad and France are having a love affair. I was most anxious to come to Chad to meet with my minister colleagues and the president in order to see how to strengthen our cooperation. I would say that such cooperation is going smoothly on the civilian and military levels. Our Chadian partners have found that our cooperation is good. There naturally are problems here and there, but on the whole the Chadians are happy with French-Chadian cooperation. I can tell you that French technical assistants and the French cooperation mission are very happy with the atmosphere and very close ties they have to Chadians.

There are three main priorities in French-Chadian cooperation: training, rural development, and health. As far as training is concerned, some projects have been under way for a long time. They are continuing and when these are finished, there will be others. Training is marked by perseverance. Next, rural development in Chad is very important. France has participated and is still participating in the reorganization of the cotton sector with World Bank aid. I think this is a good project and while we have not yet attained all our objectives, with President Hissein Habre's cooperation we are justified in thinking that our cooperation will have led to very tangible improvement in cotton production.

Health is a very important field in which Chad has great needs. We have several projects in this area and I hope things will move quickly.

[Nekim] Mr. Minister, what kind of help is France giving Chad in this phase of international crisis and what is France's position on the debt?

[Pelletier] Regarding the debt, it is very important for the African countries and Chad. I told President Hissein Habre this morning of the implementation of measures announced by President Francois Mitterrand in Dakar, measures contained in a bill before the French Parliament in December. It concerned the cancellation of Chad's debt of 537 million French francs or a little over 25 billion CFA francs. It is a major effort that will greatly relieve the Chadian budget. The aid we give Chad has steadily risen and is quite substantial.

Regarding military cooperation, we give 30 percent of our budgeted funds to Chad. There has been a major increase in cooperation over the past three years and we

provide aid to the Chadian budget, which is still difficult to balance at the end of the year. Moreover, a delegation is scheduled to arrive soon for talks with the Ministry of Finance in order to see what Chad's budget needs are for 1990. I promised President Hissain Habre that France will not abandon Chad. Obviously, it will always be there to help relieve the difficulties encountered. We are not at war, but peace has not been signed either and a military effort consequently remains to be made that unavoidably affects civilian spending. I think France and other countries will try to help you get through this difficult period. President Habre has asked me and my colleagues, the minister of planning and cooperation in particular, to make an effort to mobilize other financial backers to help Chad. We shall do so at the Geneva round table to be held in a few weeks. Insofar as possible, we shall try to obtain an increase in European aid to Chad.

In Africa and Chad, people are afraid of two things: the single market in 1993 and upheavals in East Europe. The Africans say to us: "But in 1993 you will withdraw to your own shores. You will build a more united Europe and you will abandon us." I can tell you that is false. The second fear is that we shall reserve too much money for the Eastern Bloc countries that have just regained their freedom and who are in need of aid. I can tell you that as far as France is concerned, aid to development is steadily increasing and there is no disengagement at all. Moreover, the French president has repeatedly stated that the aid we give to Eastern Bloc countries should be additional, not taken away from aid to Third World countries. Funds allocated for Lome Convention IV are rising. There is no disengagement on the part of France or Europe, and Third World countries, particularly in Africa, will remain one of our priorities.

[Nekim] The survey conducted by the French Investment Council shows that 52 percent of all French enterprises want to continue, while 48 percent want to get out. What can African countries do to hang on to those who want out?

[Pelletier] For the past few years, particularly with the crisis, certain groups have withdrawn: big international concerns with subsidiaries in several large countries. These subsidiaries were relocated in Europe or other regions of the world, it is true. In contrast, I think the PME's and PMI's [small- and medium-size enterprises and industries] have not pulled out to the extent anticipated and I also think there is still room for new enterprises. My ministry is trying to create awareness of that fact. Not long ago we decided to set up a guarantee fund for PME's wishing to invest in Africa in order to guarantee part of their investments. That will perhaps be a big incentive for them. In addition, the African countries themselves must make an effort. The fiscal and legal environment in countries considered must be attractive to companies.

Sao Tome and Principe

President Discusses Reforms, OAU Candidacy

MB2104085690 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese
1900 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Sao Tomean President Manuel Pinto da Costa today gave an exclusive interview to our station's Planetarium program, during which he dealt with ongoing reforms in his country, namely the democratization process:

[Begin Da Costa recording] A number of important events will take place, namely legislative and presidential elections and the (?ordinary) election for the MPLSTP [Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe] (?assembly). The MLSTP must undergo internal change to adapt itself to the new situation and to be in a position to continue to play a role, though in a different manner.

The party will compete in a peaceful and civilized manner with other forces. The MLSTP is willing to support those forces wishing to participate in political activities in a civilized, peaceful, and constructive manner. We believe in the existence of other forces as long as they espouse constructive goals, instead of personal and destructive goals. This principle is important to the strengthening of democracy in Sao Tome and Principe, and it ensures peace and stability in our country.

Stability is the largest asset our people have. Any action likely to create instability in our country will have extremely disastrous consequences to the general development of our country. Therefore, every Sao Tomean who loves his fatherland should use all his energies so that stability, peace, harmony, understanding, openness, and tolerance may prevail in Sao Tome and Principe. We believe that a man's action is the reflection of his beliefs. If we are determined to oppose an individual, we should do it in a constructive manner. If we are destructive, we will only cause confrontation, which will not lead to peace and [words indistinct]. [end recording]

Manuel Pinto da Costa then discussed reports on his intent to run for OAU chairman:

[Begin Da Costa recording] A number of central African heads of state, as well as heads of state from other parts of Africa, have expressed the wish that the president of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe should run for OAU chairman. We feel very honored about it, and we are (?considering the possibility).

However, Sao Tome and Principe has not taken the lead in this regard. The initiative came from African leaders who told us of their willingness to support Sao Tome and Principe's candidacy.

Many African heads of state became OAU chairmen, and the president of Sao Tome and Principe is an

African president. I do not see why the president of Sao Tome and Principe should not succeed in his candidacy. [end recording]

Zaire

Anti-Mobutu Demonstrations Reported in Kinshasa

AB2004111890 London BBC World Service in English
0730 GMT 20 Apr 90

[From the "Network Africa" program]

[Text] Tension is said to be high in Zaire's capital, Kinshasa, as the forces of law and order continue their high-profile operations to ensure that no more demonstrations against President Mobutu's government take place. The demonstrations started two Saturdays ago: Buses and cars were stoned by students. The students called for another demonstration last Saturday [14 April], but the security forces stepped in first. A number of houses were raided and many arrests were made. The government controlled radio and television have remained largely silent about these events. Many of the arrested people and most of the students who demonstrated are reported to be members of a Zairian opposition group, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, the UDPS. Now the leader of the UDPS, Mr Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, is reported to be under house arrest in Kinshasa. Fidelis Wayi called up the external headquarters of the UDPS in Brussels and he asked Foreign Affairs spokesman Oma Nkamba if the demonstrations that have taken place were indeed organized by the UDPS.

[Begin recording] [Nkamba in French fading into English translation] Yes, there are student members of the UDPS, even some members of the Armed Forces, and we have been provided with names too, such as Oni Samba Gutie, Onibele Alexis, Mojo Kureni, Enonga Malomba Jean. And the whereabouts of the students arrested is still unfortunately unknown.

[Wayi] Is it only in Kinshasa that you have been organizing these demonstrations, Mr. Nkamba, or is it happening all over the country?

[Nkamba] Well, demonstrators have certainly been out in the main squares of many towns. In Lubumbashi, the flag which is imposed on the people by Mobutu's regime was ripped to pieces and the same thing was happening all over the country—in Kananga, Tamulundo, and Katumba. In Mbuji Mayi, the local people stoned the mayor's office. All this points to the people's wish to see a democratic regime replacing Mobutu.

[Wayi] What kind of regime are you hoping to achieve? Are you after results like those achieved recently in Eastern Europe?

[Nkamba] Well, the ultimate aim of all Zairian opposition groups is the removal of Mobutu and Mobutuism and replacing him with a democratic multiparty system and free elections.

[Wayi] What are you going to do about the fact that many of the opposition parties are actually at odds with one another? Is this not going to thwart your aim?

[Nkamba] No, you have a false picture. It is simply not true to say that we are all at each other's throat. Different groups have a common aim even if we have some different approaches, but we unite against state terrorism for this common cause as we saw at the Brussels demonstration last Friday. [end recording]

Mobutu Addresses Nation on Reforms 24 Apr

AB2404114090 Paris AFP in French 1039 GMT
24 Apr 90

[Text] Kinshasa, 24 Apr (AFP)—In his message to the nation this morning, Zairian Head of State Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko announced the establishment of the multiparty system in Zaire and authorized the creation of three political parties in his country in the first phase. He also announced that the Popular Movement of the Revolution was no longer a "party state" but simply a party like the others.

The Zairian head of state also announced the resignation of the government, the establishment of plurality in trade unionism, and the launching of an information campaign. He also announced that he was ceasing to be head of government—this function will be held by a prime minister—in order to preside over political parties like a "referee, or better still, to serve as a last resort."

(According to AZAP monitored in Brussels and quoted by BELGA, Marshal Mobutu announced the "imminent" appointment of an interim prime minister followed, he added, by the formation of a transition government for a period running up to 30 April 1991. The Constitution will be revised to allow for the establishment of the "Third Republic," created as of today, Mr. Mobutu also said.)

Multiparty System Announced

AB2404143090 Libreville Africa No. 1 in French
1230 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Excerpts] The leading event in Africa today is President Mobutu's nationwide address this morning. The Zairian head of state, who has just ended a tour of his country to receive suggestions from the masses, has published his conclusions on the Zairian people's aspirations. Lucien Parfait Nzogou, Africa No. 1's special correspondent in Kinshasa, gives the highlights of the president's message delivered at Nsele, 40 km north of Kinshasa:

[Begin Nzogou recording] President Mobutu announced the introduction of a multiparty system in Zaire with the

creation of two new parties in addition to the ruling Popular Movement of the Revolution [MPR]. [passage omitted]

The Zairian head of state, who has given up his function as head of government, cannot be subject to criticism or control. Mobutu Sese Seko, who has taken leave of the MPR, will actually serve as the last recourse for the nation. The transition period will run from 30 April 1990 to 30 April 1991. This is to enable the political parties to gain experience and to revise the Constitution in two phases. The use of the term citizen is no longer mandatory in Zaire neither is the wearing of the traditional dress known as abacost. [end recording]

Now let us listen to President Mobutu announcing reforms aimed at the establishment of the Third Republic:

[Begin Mobutu recording] As of today, 24 April 1990, based on the popular consultations from which (?6128) memoranda emerged, I solemnly announce the following to the Zairian people:

1. The introduction of a three-party multiparty system in Zaire; an end to the institutionalization of the MPR, and the abolition of its leading role as a consequence; the clearcut separation between the party and the state; the rehabilitation of the three traditional powers—the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary—as the only constitutional organs; the depoliticization of the civil service, the police, the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie, and security services; the establishment of free trade unions;
2. The appointment of a first state commissioner, or prime minister—as you wish. This will be followed by the setting-up of an interim government;
3. The revision of the present Constitution in order to adapt it to the transition period;
4. The establishment of a commission charged with drafting the Constitution of the Third Republic; this constitution will be approved by a referendum;
5. And last, the preparation of a draft bill governing political parties in our country and their funding.

Very dear compatriots, today, 24 April 1990, a new page of the political history of our country has just been turned and I have great hopes for the future of our new institutions, which are necessary for the achievement of meaningful progress. Whatever our shortcomings, inherent in all human action, we should admit that the ideals that have always guided us since 24 November 1965 have enabled us to achieve (?peace), national unity, and territorial integrity, and we are proud to feel at home anywhere in the country. [end recording]

'New Political Policies' Noted

AB2404175490 Dakar PANA in French 1400 GMT
24 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Kinshasa, 24 Apr (AZAP/PANA)—Zairian leader Mobutu Sese Seko, one can say, has kept his promise by actually announcing this morning in Kinshasa new political policies as well as decisions that have, as he had promised, completely disrupted the Zairian political landscape. [passage omitted]

According to the Zairian leader, more than a million fellow countrymen took part directly in this debate, producing 6,128 memoranda, the contents of which were being analyzed until 21 April 1990. Some 5,310 memoranda (87 percent) proposed keeping the People's Movement of the Revolution, MPR, as the only party as well as far-reaching reforms in the national political system. Some 818 memoranda (13 percent) highly recommended the reintroduction of a multiparty system, which had been in effect before the 24 November 1965 military takeover.

Contrary to his pledge to respect the opinion of the Zairian majority, President Mobutu, left alone with his conscience, believed that he should go beyond the wishes of this majority. He stated that his attitude was due to his conviction that his country, "although free from being dictated to by anyone, should not for this reason be content to adopt rigid positions or take pleasure in remaining immobile." [passage omitted]

Therefore, Marshal Mobutu said he will take leave of the MPR, of which he was founding chairman until his address, and which will be one of the three authorized political parties. As such, the MPR has to choose a new head charged with carrying out the necessary changes of organs and officials.

In addition, the head of state is no longer head of the executive power (government) that will be headed by a prime minister. Marshal Mobutu, in his message, touched on some aspects that might appear minor, such as certain conventions adopted by Zairians in their political and institutional language. Thus, such words as excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, ministers, parliamentarians, and so on have been reintroduced. The wearing of suits and ties has been authorized, with the abacost remaining the national dress and the only attire that President Mobutu has personally chosen to wear. The use of foreign first names has, however, remained banned. President Mobutu indeed believes that readopting genuinely Zairian names constitutes an invaluable cultural gain that cannot be put into question. The government will have to draw up a bold youth policy based on both training and employment, the Zairian leader also said.

The path of political openness on which he has set the people should also, according to the Zairian leader, be an opportunity to further win the heart of the Zairian youth so that it will be a true force for change.

Concerning the three authorized parties, it is understood that alongside the MPR, as President Mobutu mentioned, there will be the UDPS, Union for Democracy and Social Progress, as well as a third party allegedly created by some elements who have formed a left wing. This wing is considered to be the hard and intransigent one of the MPR Central Committee.

Reaction to Mobutu's Speech

AB2404203390 London BBC World Service in English
1709 GMT 24 Apr 90

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Today is the day when Zaire's President Mobutu promised to make a major speech to the nation. It followed antigovernment demonstrations earlier this month, after which the president promised to consult Zairians for their views on 25 years of one-party rule. President Mobutu clearly was not too impressed with some of the views expressed by the public, but anyway, today, he spoke, and his speech was broadcast live on television. Antoine Muyambala watched it across the river in Brazzaville, and from there he telexed us this report:

[Begin studio announcer recording] President Mobutu announced that there is going to be a multiparty political system in Zaire. The ruling MPR [Popular Movement of the Revolution] party, which he created in 1965, would give up its political monopoly, and three political parties will be permitted. Mobutu's words were greeted by lively applause from those who had come to the Palace of the People at N'sele, the presidential city some 25 miles from Kinshasa, to hear the head of state's speech.

President Mobutu declared with emotion: I am taking leave of the sole party so that it can choose a new leader, but he added that he will remain the head of state for the time being. Mr. Mobutu said that he chose a multiparty system despite the support of the majority of the people for the ruling party. He said that of 6,128 appeals sent to him, 87 percent had called for the MPR to remain the sole party, but he said, faced with his own conscience, he had opted for a multiparty system, in accordance with the wishes of the other 13 percent. A prime minister, he said, will be named in a few days' time. A one-year transition period will start at the end of this month. President Mobutu said that this will allow the new political groupings to serve their apprenticeship in democracy. It is not yet officially known which two parties will compete alongside the ruling MPR, but a number already exists, among them the National Movement for the Liberation of the Congo [MNCL], a party which identifies itself with the memory of Patrice Lumumba, the Workers and Peasants Party, and the Union for Democracy and Social Progress [UDPS].

The latter, led by a former dissident member of Parliament, Etienne Tisekedi, has been active in recent antigovernment demonstrations. The party's leader, Tisekedi wa Mulumba, is under house arrest in the

capital, Kinshasa. Other political reforms announced today include the liberalization of the trade union sector, scrapping the monopoly currently held by Untza, the National Union of Zairian Workers. Also, legislative, executive, and judicial powers will from now on be separated. President Mobutu's speech also dealt a blow to the Zairoise [Zairian] ideology of authenticity. He said, and I quote: The wearing of ties, forbidden since 1972, will once more become a matter of choice, but the head of state added that as far as he himself was concerned, he would never wear a tie again. He said: I feel good in my Zairois skin. [end recording]

That telexed report is from Antoine Muyambala in Brazzaville, and we are getting reports from Kinshasa of street demonstrations by people chanting, singing, and waving tree branches in support of President Mobutu's announced reforms. At a press conference after his speech, President Mobutu also announced the release today of opposition UDPS Leader Tsisekedi wa Mulumba. And as you have heard, Zaire should have contested politics within the next year.

Well the UDPS is by no means the only group to have been active in opposition to President Mobutu. Just last week, the MNCL, which operates from exile, elected a new leader, Lambert Mendes. On the line to Brussels, Robin White asked him how he reacts to President Mobutu's speech:

[Begin recording] [Mendes] For us, we fought all these years for democracy, and what was announced today by President Mobutu is, for us, something like a first step. We do not believe that this is why we fought, because to say that the political parties should be limited at three parties only is something we cannot tolerate.

[White] Would you accept though, that this is a step in the right direction?

[Mendes] What I am saying is that for us, we are expecting to build our activities without any allowance from Mobutu, because we do not believe that the political freedom can be given as a gift by President Mobutu. It is something we fought for, and we are going to go ahead.

[White] Will you yourself now go back to Zaire?

[Mendes] We have grand meetings next month, I think June, to decide what to do, but right now, some people among the responsible [officials] of our party are on their way back home to organize our local institutions of the MNC-Lumumba.

[White] So some people are already going back?

[Mendes] Yes, they are already back, they are there now.

[White] What will your personal conditions be for returning home?

[Mendes] The condition to return home is the.... [changes thought] We have already sent some documents to Mobutu asking for the release of political prisoners, and up to now, we are not aware. Myself, I have a lot of people of my family who were taken as hostages by

Mobutu—they are there in prison, and people like Mr Tsisekedi of the UDPF, they are there also in prison. So this is the best sign Mobutu can send to us to show that things have already changed.

[White] But do you think if you were to go back tomorrow that you would be arrested, or what do you think would happen?

[Mendes] Anything can happen with Mr. Mobutu.

[White] But why don't you for once give the man credit? He does seem have moved some way toward you?

[Mendes] I think the best way of asking people what they want is to organize elections. Why can he not organize elections if he is really someone to be confided [in] by us? For us, he must ask people by election what people want.

[White] Yes, but he said in a year there will be elections.

[Mendes] But how can we organize this election? Why can't we be associated to the organization of this election, as political forces? But I cannot see that we can trust what Mobutu said today. [end recording]

Further on Mobutu Speech

AB2404182790 Dakar PANA in English 1740 GMT
24 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Kinshasa, 24 April (AZAP/PANA)—The Zairian head of state, Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, on Tuesday announced wide-ranging political measures to accompany the Third Republic, which became effective on 24 April 1990.

In a nation-wide address, Mobutu said the Third Republic would be characterised by the existence of three political parties. He rejected the proliferation of political parties in the Anglo-Saxon manner.

The ruling People's Movement for the Revolution, (MPR) which was created on 20 May 1967, ceases to be the state party and becomes a "private affair." Thus its leading role and its organs (Congress, Central Committee and Political Bureau) lose its constitutional character.

Instead, the three traditional powers (legislative, executive and judiciary) have been rehabilitated as the only constitutional organs.

The Zairian head of state, who also decided the return of trade union pluralism and the establishment of a transitional period from 24 April 1990 to 24 April 1991, also announced the imminent nomination of a prime minister who will form a transition government. The present government has been dissolved, he said. [passage omitted]

He told the nation that a commission shall be created to draft the constitution of the Third Republic which [words indistinct] to a referendum.

However, the consultation organs will continue to function until the next elections, "in accordance with the expressed wish of the Zairian people."

These organs include the Legislative Council (parliament), regional assemblies, area peoples committees and village councils.

At the same time, President Mobutu announced the depoliticisation of the Armed Forces, the police and security forces and the civil service. He also said a law to guide the three political parties was being drawn to spell out their financing mechanism and to define the role of the head of state.

According to him, the head of state will be above political parties so as to be "an arbiter or the last resort." As a result, he announced that he was leaving the leadership of MPR, of which he was founder president, and which will be one of the authorised political parties.

The MPR will therefore have to look for a new leader whose duty will be to re-organise its structures and to find the necessary human resources.

On the other hand, the head of state ceases to be head of the executive whose head will be the new prime minister. [passage omitted]

Mobutu Comments Further

AB2404214390 Libreville Africa No. 1 in French
1830 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] At a news conference after his address to the nation, President Mobutu Sese Seko was asked whether he had made a coup d'etat against himself by relinquishing some functions. No, he said. Let us listen to President Mobutu's answer:

[Begin Mobutu recording] (?I made) changes that have given birth to the Third Republic. In my humble opinion, the change of republic is a great historic event. Just do not forget that I am 60 and at this age, wisdom prevails. Well, at this age, I should start relinquishing some functions gradually, check whether things are proceeding well, and (?if necessary), leave everything, if the younger generation wants to take over. That is all. [end recording]

New Head of Government Named

AB2504130490 Paris AFP in French 1232 GMT
25 Apr 90

[Text] Kinshasa, 25 Apr (AFP)—Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko today appointed 48-year-old Professor Lunda Bululu as head of the interim government which will be charged with implementing the changes announced by the head of state yesterday. Mr. Lunda Bululu is a trained jurist who has a doctorate degree from the Brussels Free University. He is married with two children. For many years he served as legal advisor in the president's office. Since 1985, he has been secretary general of the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC).

Pending the revision of the Constitution, the new head of government will still be referred to as the "first state

commissioner." His appointment marks the beginning of consultations aimed at forming the first government of the Third Republic.

Deaths Reported in Air Force Plane Crash

AB2004114190 Kinshasa Domestic Service in French
0500 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Excerpt] An air disaster occurred on 19 April at [words indistinct] a (?C-130) plane of the Zairian Air Force crashed three minutes after take-off at the Ndjili [Kinshasa] International Airport. The final toll of the disaster is not yet known. [Words indistinct] with (Bulumba Mulumba):

[Begin (Mulumba) recording] On 19 April 1990, the [words indistinct] of the Zairian Air Force, a (?C-130) plane [words indistinct] Kinshasa Gbadolite [Mobutu's home village in northern Zaire] departed from the airport [words indistinct] Ndjili at 09(?57), will not reach its destination. Only three minutes after take-off, that is to say after having gone at least (?15) km, it crashed not far from the (Magani) agropastoral concession belonging to [words indistinct] company [words indistinct].

A macabre sight, a sight which cures you of [words indistinct] bodies consumed by the fire resulting from the explosion [passage indistinct].

Only two out of the seven crew members survived [words indistinct]. Among those who died was Wing Commander (?Ide), the captain, [words indistinct] a great loss for the Zairian Air Force. Passengers, mainly soldiers' relatives, were also on board. At present, we have no details of their numbers. All that can be said is that there will be at least two survivors.

According to details issued by the Zairian Air Force staff headquarters, the plane [word indistinct] normal flight but it was a technical failure (words indistinct) an engine failure which is the cause of the accident.

Indeed after take-off, the plane came down three minutes later by the [words indistinct] and it was the beginning of the tragedy for the crew and passengers on board. The pilot [words indistinct] spread over a distance of 300 meters [words indistinct], accident which plunges several Zairian families into mourning. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Death Toll Reported

EA2104165390 Kinshasa Domestic Service in French
0500 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Excerpts] An unfortunate end: That is how we can describe the tragic fate of Lieutenant Colonel Nzo and his crew last Thursday in a C-130 of the Zairian Air Force. The aircraft crashed near (Kinkole) some minutes after take-off from Ndjili Airport. [passage omitted]

The toll of the air disaster is known: according to authorized military medical sources, 23 were killed and

three survived. The five crew members who perished in the air crash were the captain, Lieutenant Colonel Nzo; the first copilot, Major Babu Arinzana; the second copilot, Captain Sumba; the technician, citizen Mabuba; and the stewardess, citizen Kofi. [Word indistinct] passengers, including four civilians and two soldiers, also lost their lives [passage indistinct].

New PRC Envoy Promises Strengthened Cooperation

EA2204220990 Mbuji-Mayi Zaire Domestic Service
in French 1630 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] (Li Peyi) is the new PRC ambassador in Zaire, but he is not a stranger to our country; he knows it very well. In fact, between 1978 and 1980, he was the first secretary of his embassy in Kinshasa. Talking to the press, Mr. (Li) promised to strengthen cooperation between China and Zaire in the sectors of culture, politics, and economics.

Political Situation in Kinshasa Viewed

AB2104174790 London BBC World Service in English
0730 GMT 21 Apr 90

[From the "Saturdays Only" program; hosted by Akwei Amosu]

[Excerpt] In Zaire, for the first time in many years, there are signs that the country's citizens have caught the East European fever and are clamoring for political change. Early this month, there were big demonstrations on the streets of Kinshasa. This threatened to recur last weekend, but the security forces stepped in and slammed the lid back down on the protest. There is still a lot of tension there though, as people wait for a speech by President Mobutu scheduled for next Tuesday, when he is going to outline his plan for political reform.

Well, there has been almost no news out of Kinshasa itself about the situation this week, but yesterday I spoke to a Zairian businessman, Mayasi Dembe, who arrived in Holland from Kinshasa only a few days ago. I asked him what the atmosphere in the capital was like when he left:

[Begin recording] [Dembe] In Kinshasa, there is really political tension during three or four weeks because President Mobutu has organized a popular consultation in every region of Zaire, and people are waiting for a decision about these popular consultations, because during these consultations, every people, everybody can ask President Mobutu about all of his policies.

[Amosu] You said that there was quite a lot of tension in Kinshasa. Can you describe the mood of the people, ordinary people in the city?

[Dembe] In the city, the people are waiting for the action of students because students in Zaire are very strong, and when there are political problems in Zaire, people are waiting for what the students are going to do. That is the

first problem. And the second problem is that everywhere in Kinshasa, people talk about politics now, because President Mobutu has authorized people to ask him questions about all of the regime in Zaire. And all: in the bar, in the city, in the family, people talk about politics.

[Amosu] But I understand, Mr. Dembe, that there have been a number of arrests of people who belong to the opposition parties. Is political debate really so free?

[Dembe] No, I do not think that there were people who were arrested in Zaire after this regular consultation. I do not think that people were arrested. There was some actions by the students, and the Garde Civile, the political security, have stopped the manifestation [strike] of students in Kinshasa. But there was not really people who were arrested.

[Amosu] What do you think people in the city and in the country in general really want from President Mobutu next Tuesday?

[Dembe] That is the big question, because President Mobutu has announced for next Tuesday important changes in the country. But nobody can say what may be these changes, because the people asked President Mobutu to go away, people asked [for] multipartism, people like it that President Mobutu's MPR [Popular Movement for the Revolution], the lone party, must be abolished, and that is really the main revendication of the people. Impossible for President Mobutu to abolish the MPR. It is impossible for President Mobutu to go away. [end recording]

[Amosu] That was Mayasi Dembe in Holland. Well, to get some idea of the background to the political upheaval, I spoke to Belgian academic Jacques Vandelinden in the Free University of Brussels. I asked him what life was like for the ordinary Zairois [Zairian] citizen:

[Begin recording] [Vandelinden] People in the countryside are in a difficult situation, but it is certainly not as bad as it is in towns, and especially in the capital, Kinshasa. Kinshasa has (?developed) to the point that it now includes, well, I suppose a bit more than 2 million inhabitants, of which a good many are unemployed and have to rely upon, well, let us say either corruption or crime to survive, and are kept quiet because of a good security network, I mean police security, and fear.

[Amosu] So you are saying that people actually face a neat deal of economic hardship. Why is that?

[Vandelinden] The Zairian economy is in shambles for a lot of reasons which can be analyzed, and the Zairian money has no value whatsoever, and people just cannot live on what they earn because of the fundamental economic deterioration of the country.

[Amosu] Is that why there has been this political upheaval now? Are people protesting about their economic situation?

[Vandelinden] I believe they protest about their economic situation, but this has been going on for years. Why did it come out now? I have on that direct and strong evidence from people in Zaire that the events in Eastern Europe, and especially the crumbling down of the one-party state, have created a movement among all those which think about Zaire, but are unable to protest, because I know what protest means.

[Amosu] This is also a political protest.

[Vandelinden] I think it is a political protest. I mean, it is quite clear that in a regime which is so personalized as the Zairian one, at the same time that anything good can be attributed to the ruler, at the same time, if things go wrong, one turns back to the ruler.

[Amosu] President Mobutu has a reputation for enormous wealth. Is that one reason why there are protests?

[Vandelinden] I do not think so. I do not think so. I think the problem of this enormous wealth is something on which I would say Europeans or Americans tend to focus, but I do not think that hurts them. I mean, I think it is part of the normal set-up of a ruler in Africa.

[Amosu] But there have been a great many accusations against President Mobutu that there is a great deal of corruption in his government.

[Vandelinden] That is absolutely true. I mean, seen from all points of view, there is a great deal of corruption. But you must not forget: who creates the corrupted person? I mean, who corrupts the high-level people in order to get contracts, in order to get, you know, favors for investments or anything like that? The outside world. [end recording]

[Amosu] Professor Vandelinden is not alone in feeling that the criticism of the Mobutu government is at least partly misdirected. Businessman Mayasi Dembe is at pains to put in a good word for President Mobutu. I asked him what he saw as the president's most important contribution to Zaire's recent history:

[Begin recording] [Dembe] I think really that President Mobutu is a providential man for Zaire in this time, because during many years, from 1965 till maybe 1978, there was many, many struggles, many wars, many rebellions in all parts of Zaire: in Shaba, in Bandundu, in Kisangani, in Baraka. There was many, many troubles in Zaire, and President Mobutu, he has stopped it. I think that the major asset of President Mobutu is the peace in Zaire...

[Amosu, interrupting] And what about President Mobutu's promotion of African authenticity as a policy of the country?

[Dembe] Everybody in Zaire has now the name from Zaire, from his country, and this concept of authenticity has generated a national consciousness in Zaire. [end recording]

[Amosu] Mayassi Dembe speaking yesterday from Holland. Such positive sentiments notwithstanding, it does seem as though in some quarters, at least, notably abroad, patience with the government is running out. [passage omitted]

***Mobutu Rejects Perestroika; Urges Power Sharing**
90AF0013A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE
in French Feb 90 pp 92-96

[By Jean-Pierre Bejot: "Zaire: No African Perestroika"]

[Text] What a year! President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire has certainly been one of Africa's top newsmakers over the last 12 months. A year ago, on 14 January 1989, when he and his wife, Mama Bobi Ladawa, received us at his Mont Ngaliema residence, he had just reaffirmed the broad outlines of his policy. At N'Sele, the day before our meeting, he had given a hard-hitting speech on the Belgo-Zairian crisis.

The chosen date for the 10th extraordinary session of the Central Committee of the People's Movement of the Revolution (MPR) had not been picked at random. Africa loves symbols; statesmen understand their utility. And no one in Brussels or Kinshasa could have forgotten that on 13 January 1959, 30 years ago to the day, Belgium had finally announced its agreement to grant independence to the Belgian Congo. Nor could anyone have forgotten that the Belgian declaration followed by only a few days the outbreak of bloody rioting in Leopoldville. "It was time to reaffirm our independence, our freedom of thought and action, and our dignity," the Zairian president had said.

A year later, although nothing has yet been definitively resolved, the two countries have at least taken their dispute to the negotiating table. Even if the talks take an acrimonious turn from time to time.

Many observers thought the situation of no more than anecdotal interest: a quarrel between former colony and ex-colonialist, nothing more. But that assessment too easily glossed over the fact that Mobutu, confronting the most serious economic and social crisis since the end of the civil war, had his sights set on something beyond the banks of the river Scheldt.

In addition to formulating "a new philosophy of relations between the two countries," the head of state intended to challenge the entire structure of international economic and political relations. And to give fair warning to those of his countrymen who had not yet realized that things had changed. Make no mistake about it: his foreign policy rhetoric was also in large part for internal consumption.

A year later when Mobutu received us again at Mont Ngaliema, he came across as firmly resolved to restructure both domestic and international relations—and hence reaffirm his leadership role on the continent.

So on 4 October at the United Nations it came as no surprise when President Mobutu made an appeal on behalf of all Africa for establishment of a "real program of international solidarity for African development."

Then he traveled from New York to Boston, where despite considerable opposition and under oftentimes adverse conditions—which he forthrightly faced—he tried to explain his view of the current situation. Upon his return, we met with him at his Paris residence on Avenue Foch. There he answered all our questions with no evasions. Several weeks later, our journalists were in Zaire for a protracted in-depth investigation to assess the scope of the country's many problems.

During our talks with political leaders and economic experts in Zaire, we found people very accessible, full of ideas, and really willing to change. In both the ministries and the business community, they were quite open about the paralysis that has afflicted the country in recent years. Everyone agrees the performance record has been poor. The head of state himself has denounced irresponsible behavior. Why is the country still so underdeveloped, after all the costly investments it has made? After 24 years in power he admits that one of his most important programs has been a failure. "I refer to zairianization," he said, "the main object of which was to create a Zairian middle class and to reduce foreign influence on the country's economy, especially in the area of small business. Alas, implementation has been very disappointing."

After Disillusionment, Determination

In other words, to put it bluntly, the head of state is disillusioned with many members of the Zairian political and economic elite, who have turned out to be more interested in feathering their own nests than enriching the country. When Mobutu, reviewing the performance of several critical sectors of the economy, realized (with the help of experts from the World Bank) what bad shape the public-sector enterprises were in, he took resolute and rigorous action.

A vast restructuring plan was drawn up. Some who had installed themselves in cushy sinecures in the public sector were given their walking papers. Younger officials, who in the past had often been critical of the president's policies, were put in positions of responsibility. Now the new generation would have a chance to show what it could do.

Things might have stopped there. But President Mobutu decided to go even further. On 11 January of this year came the "great upheaval." Seventeen state commissars and nine state secretaries were removed from the executive council. Eighteen new officials were brought into the government. Two new ministries were created: middle class and craftsmen's affairs, and environmental affairs. In addition, new people were appointed at the top levels of the MPR, the country's only political party. Marshall Mobutu made 34 appointments, including chief of the general staff of Zaire's armed forces. Also

swept out were the presidents of the audit office and the judiciary council, four governors, and six managers of state-owned enterprises.

He was not to be satisfied with halfway measures. Three days later, on 14 January, when the chief of state thanked the various official bodies for their New Year's greetings, he "dotted the i's." The high point of his remarks: an announcement of the upcoming extraordinary session of the MPR Central Committee. The committee, he said, would be devoted to "political, economic and social strategies for the country's development." Special emphasis would be given to "respect for human rights" and the "process of decentralization."

What he said about human rights came as no surprise. President Mobutu has been working assiduously on that problem for several years now.

Zaire, having been much criticized in this domain, intends from now on to be open and aboveboard. This is constantly affirmed and reiterated. In that regard, the government now includes a deputy prime minister responsible for social and cultural affairs, the state minister for citizens' rights and freedoms. He is assisted by a state secretary for rights and freedoms.

Abuses by the Security Forces Will Be Punished

Much remains to be accomplished in this domain. President Mobutu himself has denounced the "acts of abuse, provocation, harassment, and arbitrariness committed by various government employees and officials of the security and law enforcement agencies, acts that have victimized both Zairians and foreigners on occasion." He, therefore, announced a strengthening of supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, and gave the judiciary new authority so as to guarantee its independence from the executive branch.

The biggest news was his decision to promote a "decentralization" policy. The head of state explained it this way: "More than just an economic strategy or a technology for management of the governmental sphere, it also forms a veritable foundation for the practice of democracy, the promotion and expression of individual liberties, and the safeguarding of the citizen's economic and social rights."

A concept that is not without significance at a time when Eastern Europe, in the midst of glasnost and perestroika, is groping toward a new path. The growing popular clamor from the Urals to the Danube is even being heard on the banks of the Zaire River.

Development Instead of Armament

The demand for democracy in Eastern Europe has been perceived by many African leaders as a threat. They say the West will be inclined to turn its attention (and its financial resources) toward Moscow, Berlin, Budapest... rather than Dakar, Abidjan, Douala, or Brazzaville. In

Kinshasa, on the opposite bank of the Zaire River, the atmosphere is more one of hope than of menace.

President Mobutu sees in it "the attenuation, if not the end, of the spectre of the cold war...the end of ideologies that served as instruments of confrontation and mistrust between states...a golden opportunity to end the arms race and work for development."

The Zairian head of state was thus the first to give an overall assessment of Europe's political restructuring (he gave the same speech several days later to representatives of the diplomatic corps). He also found some lessons in it for Africa. And as usual, not the lessons one might expect. For example, he had scathing words for those "who strip off their ideological clothing because it is criticized...who envisage the introduction of Western multipartyism...who talk about promoting the emergence of factions within their parties."

Developments in such capitals as Brazzaville, Cotonou, Dakar, and especially Libreville have led Mobutu to ask the fundamental question: "Must Africa always follow behind the ideas of others?" And to denounce the hypocrisy of some of the behavior and illusions pertaining to that attempted imitation. A liberal opening consonant with the Western model is supposedly a prerequisite (but not the only prerequisite) for loans from Western countries. But Mobutu challenges this assumption. "I have noted," he says, "that the very few African countries, which have adopted the multiparty system, are subjected to the same treatment and even the same constraints as the others, and have not benefited from the kind of support the Western countries are currently providing to Eastern Europe."

How is this to be explained? "Their demonstration of solidarity [with Eastern Europe], a solidarity that moreover seems to us completely natural, is based much more on ties of consanguinity, history, geography, and culture than on sympathy for the winds of freedom that are blowing so forcefully across that part of Europe."

Far from denouncing what he sees as in essence perfectly natural behavior, President Mobutu finds in it lessons for Africa. The first is that Africa must develop its own resources to solve its own problems. "This fact should wake Africans up and inspire them to realize that our continent's salvation depends on unity and the harmonization of our development policies, with a view to greater economic and even political integration in the future."

Finding Geopolitical Equilibrium

If it is a lesson for Africa as a whole, it is also a lesson for Zaire: for it exemplifies the concept of "decentralization," which envisages "political pluralism," taking into account "everyone's interests as well as their political, cultural, ethnic, and geophysical circumstances, in short, our internal geopolitical realities."

The task is not easy. The head of state himself has denounced all those officials at the national and regional

level who for several years now have been fighting this change because "of the divergence of interests that makes the vital quest for geopolitical balance so difficult." This lesson should be understood. President Mobutu means to bring it to realization. The personnel shifts, the institutional changes, the new governmental organs established—all are so many tangible signs of his resolve. We note, for example, the installation of the permanent consultative council on development, which will hold its first ordinary session between now and the end of March 1990.

Now in his 25th year in power, what President Mobutu wants, over and above what he says in his speeches, is to make the country and the continent focus on their responsibilities. African countries must find their own unique path to development; they must leave the beaten track and get away from revisionism. It is a path of economic rigor, political pluralism in a context of decentralization, and intra-African cooperation. It remains to be seen whether his words will be understood by the Zairian people and by his peers, the other African presidents.

Djibouti**Ethiopian Shoots at UNHCR Representative***AB2404210490 Paris AFP in English 1443 GMT
24 Apr 90*

[Text] Djibouti, April 24 (AFP)—A refugee from Ethiopia tried unsuccessfully Tuesday to kill the representative here of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Shinga Vele Lukika of Zaire, the official said.

Mr. Lukika was getting out of his car with his assistant, Lorenzo Pasquali, when the Ethiopian opened fire on him from 15 metres (yards) away with a machine pistol, but missed, he told AFP.

The gunman, who had got into the courtyard outside the UNHCR office, was grabbed by a guard and several other people helped disarm him, but he managed to put a bullet through the guard's shirt in the struggle. The refugee, named as Alemu Bekele Abebe, 30, later tried to slit his throat with a razor blade. He was taken to the hospital and his life was reportedly not in danger.

Mr. Lukika said the would-be assassin was registered with the UNHCR and had probably acted out of despair. He had been in Djibouti, which borders on northern Ethiopia, since 1978 and was unable to find another country to take him in.

"More than 1,400 Ethiopian refugees who have refused to go home in voluntary repatriation programmes are registered with the HCR office here and have refugee cards," Mr. Lukika said. "But there is also a large number of clandestine immigrants or unregistered refugees, not even counting those who come from Somalia," he added.

Regions of both Ethiopia and Somalia which border on Djibouti are torn by civil war and have been frequently menaced by famine.

Ethiopia**Radio Reports Menz Cleared of 'Bandit Groups'***EA2404192590 Addis Ababa Domestic Service
in Amharic 1700 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Excerpt] During the week, the people of Menz Gera Midir Province, by standing alongside the revolutionary army in the area, cleared the area by eliminating the bandit groups there. Alemneh Wase, who was in the area during the week, has the details.

[Alemneh] The people have unflinching loyalty for the unity of their country and the flag, and they have performed an act of heroic bravery by ambushing and confronting the infiltrating Weyanes [Tigray People's Liberation Front, TPLF], saying: Menz will be a graveyard for the Weyanes, and not a place for them to live. When the Weyanes were advancing from the Merhabete

and Key Afer area toward Mehal Meda, the people of Keya Afer (Gabriel Church fought gallantly against them and inflicted huge losses in men and material by pursuing the remnants of the group for two days.

By their praiseworthy actions against the Weyanes—staying away from the Weyanes' meeting which is used for propaganda activities, not picking up the wounded supporters of the enemy, and not giving shelter and food—the people have crushed the activities of the enemy. They have also thwarted the Weyanes' attempt to conscript youths for the purpose of deploying them in the Shabbiyah [Eritrean People's Liberation Front] war aimed at the secession of Eritrea.

An enormous enemy force was destroyed during this engagement. A large number of bandits and weapons were also captured. [passage omitted]

*** Eritrean People's Liberation Front Declarations***** Relief Activities***34000565 London ADULIS in English Mar 90 p 4*

[Text] The whole world is acutely aware of the devastating drought and famine that is afflicting the Eritrean people and the people of northern Ethiopia. The ordeal will remain serious and be aggravated with time until and unless there is a good harvest next year.

Aware of this grave reality, the EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front] had earnestly sought, during and parallel with the preliminary peace talks with the Ethiopian regime, to reach an agreement of goodwill to facilitate food distribution to save lives. The matter was however glossed over and no measures taken due to the Dergue's callous attitude, which has wilfully underrated and minimised the disaster. The numerous pleas and proposals made by concerned relief agencies in the subsequent period in order to ensure the speedy delivery of food aid have ironically intoxicated the Dergue which is insisting that all relief supplies be channelled through and distributed by itself alone.

The underlying motive behind this demand is its desire to control all relief supplies and use them as a weapon to subdue the population. The Dergue aims to use food aid as a means of forced conscription. This arrangement would result in death by starvation and the dispersal of the population outside its control. But above all, it would reinforce, under the guise of relief, the Dergue's military capability and create a situation conducive for launching a large-scale offensive. The Dergue's official statements and practical measures make it quite clear that these are at the root of its policy.

Although the EPLF had demonstrated its profound commitment to peace by submitting positive proposals during the peace talks, the process has reached a deadlock as a result of the obstructive opposition of the Dergue to the participation of observers. While the

EPLF underlined its goodwill by presenting concrete and positive proposals, the Dergue's arrogance and transparent ploys prevented agreement on confidence building measures. Above all, the Dergue was given leeway to bolster its military capabilities when the scourge of famine was afflicting the Eritrean people.

Under these circumstances, the EPLF had no option but to take pre-emptive military action to reverse the dangerous situation and wage the liberation struggle. It thus undertook military action along the Asmara-Massawa road and in the Eritrean port of Massawa. Before taking this measure, however, the EPLF made it categorically clear to concerned aid agencies and interested parties that the Dergue's insistence on channelling all relief aid only through Massawa was fraught with danger as it was clearly designed to enhance its military preparations. The EPLF offensive has confirmed that the area had indeed been turned into a huge warehouse of weapons, a troop deployment zone, and a theatre for military activity.

The Dergue is now shedding crocodile tears and conducting diplomatic and propaganda campaigns to portray the EPLF as unconcerned about the plight of its own people. However, no one will be deceived by this duplicity. The sole concern of the Dergue is the maintenance of its repressive regime. As such, it is becoming increasingly necessary to remove this repressive regime, to realise peace and prosperity.

On this occasion, the EPLF again appeals, as before, to all concerned bodies and relief agencies to channel food aid through the reliable route and reaffirms its belief that the conditions being created by the current military action will facilitate the effective delivery and distribution of relief aid to the affected areas.

Eritrean People's Liberation Front
14 February 1990

* Trade Regulations

34000565 London ADULIS in English Mar 90 p 9

[Text] At a time when the Eritrean people have become victims of exile and displacement and their productive capacity has become paralysed by insecurity due to a long war of aggression;

At a time when the natural disaster of drought coupled with the paralysis of the productive capacity of the Eritrean people has rendered human survival very precarious;

Under the circumstances of the war-governed trading system that is prevailing in our country and in the absence of a national currency and a financial system in which it is impossible to monitor imports and exports;

At a time when the Dergue's regime is appropriating the wealth of our land and the potential of our people while wantonly destroying the areas it cannot reach to prolong its colonial presence and when it is striving to subdue our people, especially those living in the areas under its control, by holding them hostage and vulnerable to starvation and the shortage of consumer goods;

The possibility of securing an efficient and smooth trading climate, let alone an idyllic trading system, is both difficult and burdensome.

The EPLF, aware of all these facts, and above all determined to alleviate the economic hardships and living standards of our people, considers the promotion of a commercial atmosphere that ensures the availability of basic consumer goods as a primary objective. Accordingly, it calls on all the citizens engaged in commercial activities, as well as those with the potential to do so, to carry out their trade with the payment of nominal taxes to realize the aforesaid objectives.

Eritrean People's Liberation Front
24 February 1990

* Nationalization of Urban Land

34000565 London ADULIS in English Mar 90 p 9

[Text] Recognizing that the nationalization of urban land and housing carried out by the colonial Dergue's regime is irrelevant, illicit and unfair;

Aware that problems of housing and living standards cannot be solved by coercion without the consent and participation of the population;

Aware that the reconstruction of premises and installations in the Eritrean towns that have been and are being destroyed by the war and the barbaric shelling of the Dergue's regime cannot be fully accomplished without investment by the citizens;

Noting that rates regulating house rents and the relationship between owners and tenants should be specified by law;

The EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front] announces the annulment of the nationalization of urban land and housing undertaken by the colonial regime. The EPLF further announces that all urban land and premises shall be reinstituted to their rightful owners and invites the latter to reclaim their property by submitting the necessary documents and evidences. Finally, it calls on them to assert their national duties by participating in the preservation, renewal and development of the towns.

Eritrean People's Liberation Front
24 February 1990

Kenya

Moi Announces Increase in Civil Service Salaries

EA2104134290 Nairobi Domestic Service in English
1000 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Excerpt] H.E. [His Excellency] President Daniel arap Moi today announced that the salaries of civil servants

in job groups A to G will be increased by between eight and 10 percent, with effect from July this year.

President Moi said that the government had decided to increase the salaries due to the high cost of living. The president further said that the salary review for the rest of the civil servants will be done as from July.

President Moi also instructed the minister for labor to convene a meeting of the Wages' Advisory Council and present him a report within two weeks. President Moi was speaking in Ol Kalou in Nyandarua, when he led the nation in a national tree-planting exercise. [passage omitted]

Oil Exploration Agreement With Amoco, Shell

EA2004112390 Nairobi KNA in English 1155 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Nairobi, 19 Apr (KNA)—The Kenya Government today signed the first additional oil exploration period of two years for block 10 with Amoco and Shell exploration companies. The agreement was signed on behalf of the government by the minister for energy Mr. Nicholas Biwott, while Mr. Jack Rosshirt and Mr. York Dether signed for the two companies, respectively. The agreement, which covers the years 1990 to 1992, will cost an additional Kshs [Kenya shillings] 300,000,000 for seismic work and drilling of two oil wells. Already the Amoco company has spent Kshs 900,000,000 for its initial exploration contract with the government. The contract indicates that there is evidence of oil, but of no commercial value.

Signing the agreement Mr. Biwott thanked the two companies for their assistance in trying to make the country self-sufficient in its energy resources, adding that this will enhance the development of rural industries.

Mr. Biwott said that the amount of data already collected by Amoco, together with what they will obtain in the seismic work, will enhance the company's chances of getting more prospective drillable structures which, on drilling, may result in the discovery of oil.

The minister revealed that the government is planning a third round promotion in June in which it will offer new blocks covering all the sedimentary (basins) in Kenya including the Rift Valley and Nyanza Basins. He assured the two companies that the government is ready to assist them at all times to ensure that petroleum operations in that block are undertaken with minimum problems.

Tanzania

Students Return to Classes After Strike

EA2004094190 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service in Swahili 1300 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Dar es Salaam—The minister for education, Comrade Amrani Mayagila, has confirmed that Dar es

Salaam University students returned to classes this morning at the end of their 12-day boycott. Comrade Mayagila said the situation at the university and at Sokoine University, Morogoro, is now quiet.

Two days ago the government called on University of Dar es Salaam students to return to classes immediately or face stern measures. The government gave the warning after the students resolved to continue their boycott even after President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, implored them to return to their classes and pledged to meet them and hold talks with them regarding their grievances. President Mwinyi is the chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam.

The Political Committee of the Armed Forces of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force and National Youth Service [JKT] met in Dar es Salaam yesterday to discuss, apart from its agenda, the students' strike at the University of Dar es Salaam and the doctors' strike at Muhimbili Hospital in Dar es Salaam. A statement issued by that committee yesterday strongly condemned the decision by the students on 16 April to refuse to resume classes, despite being ordered to do so by President Mwinyi. The statement, which was issued before the students resolved [word indistinct] classes, hailed the doctors of Muhimbili Hospital for complying with President Mwinyi's orders to resume work at the hospital.

Cuban Vice President in Dar es Salaam 23 Apr

EA2404213090 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service in Swahili 0330 GMT 24 Apr 90

[From the "Current Affairs" program press review]

[Text] The vice president of Cuba, Comrade Juan Almeida Bosque, arrived in Dar es Salaam yesterday from Zambia for a week's visit to the country. This news is in our papers.

The Cuban vice president, who is accompanied by his country's deputy minister for foreign affairs [title as heard], Comrade Giraldo Mazola Collazo, was received by the minister of state in the Office of the President in charge of special duties, Comrade Paul Bomani and other government and party leaders on arrival at Dar es Salaam International Airport.

Party Secretary General on 'Sick Leave'

EA2104171490 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service in Swahili 1000 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Dar es Salaam—The secretary general of the Revolutionary Party, CCM, Comrade Rashidi Kawawa, has gone on sick leave. A statement issued in Dar es Salaam today by the office of the secretary general says that Comrade Kawawa has been advised by doctors to rest until his condition improves.

Police Detain 10 Alleged ANC Members at Airport

*MB2404134990 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1349 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] Johannesburg, April 24, SAPA—Ten people, apparently disaffected members of the African National Congress, were arrested by police on their arrival at Johannesburg's Jan Smuts Airport on Tuesday afternoon.

An SA Police spokesman told SAPA six men, two women, and two children arrived on an Air Malawi flight and were immediately detained for questioning under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act. The 10 are apparently from Tanzania.

The spokesman indicated their detention was simply a facility to allow them to be questioned and should not be viewed in a more sinister light. An earlier report noted that today's arrivals are expected to join another group of five returned exiles, also claiming maltreatment by the ANC.

The first five were not detained. The dissidents are expected to start a movement opposed to the ANC.

Further on Detainees

*MB2404165490 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 1600 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] Ten people who apparently are dissident members of the African National Congress have been arrested at Jan Smuts Airport in terms of Section 29 of the Internal Security Act.

The police media liaison chief, Colonel Steve van Rooyen, told our political staff that six men, two women, and two children had been taken away for questioning. The group arrived in South Africa from Tanzania this afternoon on an Air Malawi aircraft.

The police suspect that one of the members of the group, Mr. (Mwezi) Twala, was a former commander of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. He led a protest against the ANC in Angola in 1984. Reports say that Mr. Twala and his rebels were kept in penal settlements and tortured before escaping.

ANC Convenes Committee in Natal Region

*MB2404135190 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1208 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] Durban, April 24, SAPA—The ANC [African National Congress] would do everything in its power, even if it meant talking to Inkatha, to stop violence in Natal, a member of the convening committee of the African National Congress in the southern Natal region, Dr. Diliza Mji, said on Tuesday.

Answering a question during a news conference to announce the official launch of the organisation's southern Natal region in Durban, Dr. Mji said the time was not right for the ANC to talk to Inkatha, SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation] radio news reports.

He said it was very difficult to bring the people to the peace table while some of their relatives were being allegedly shot dead by the kwaZulu Police.

The convenor of the southern Natal region of the ANC and publicity secretary of the UDF [United Democratic Front], Mr. Patrick Lekota, announced the nine-member convening committee of the southern Natal region, which among other things, will strategise and oversee the process of branch formation between now and the holding of a regional conference in December this year.

The committee is made up of the Natal president of the UDF, Mr. Archie Gumede, Dr. Mji, Mr. Sibusiso Ndebele, Mr. Billy Nair, Mr. Cleopas Ndlovu, Mr. Virgil Bonhomme, Mr. Alec Irwin, Mrs. Florence Mkhize, and Mr. Lekota himself. He said the 10th member of this committee would be announced soon.

Vlok Bars SAP Officers From Political Parties

*MB2404140990 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1401 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] Parliament, April 24, SAPA—Members of the South African Police, as well as new recruits, would henceforth not be allowed to be members of any political party, movement, or organisation, the minister of law and order, Mr. Adriaan Vlok, announced on Tuesday.

Speaking during the debate on the law and order budget vote, he said the necessary legislative amendments, if necessary, would be effected as soon as possible. The SAP was an instrument in the service of the whole population of South Africa and was not there to be claimed for any party political aims. It would be an evil day were the SAP to start interfering in party politics.

The ban on membership applied to any registered or unregistered party or movement, body, or organisation which in any way publicly propagated, announced—or worked against—political aims.

The new ruling in no way interfered with the civil right of police to vote for the political party of their choice and in fact were encouraged to vote in elections and not to be fence-sitters. The decision had not been taken lightly, but only after thorough consideration of all the pros and cons.

The South African community was highly politicised and everything indicated that this would probably continue for some time. However, the SAP was in favour of initiatives to bring about greater democratic freedoms in South Africa as this would help ensure lasting peace and stability. This did not mean that the SAP was not obliged

to watch and note the activities of political parties carefully. This was, however, done with discretion and only insofar as it had a bearing on possible crimes being committed and laws transgressed; the maintenance of public order; and the security of the public or the state.

Vlok Reports ANC Associate's Arrest for Murder

*MB2404164190 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1632 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] Parliament April 24 SAPA—A trained "terrorist", apparently attached to the ANC [African National Congress], had been arrested in Natal in connection with the murder of Constable McDade near New Hanover on April 15, the minister of law and order, Mr. Adriaan Vlok, said on Tuesday.

Speaking in debate on the police budget vote, he said that Mr. Buyani Jamaica, alias Jeremiah Madlala, was arrested on April 22 after a joint operation by the security branch, the murder and robbery squad, and the operational branch of the SAP [South African Police] in the Bulwer area.

Eighteen mini-limpet mines, one Stechkin machine pistol with ammunition, 17 hand grenades, and two AK-47 firearms with eight loaded magazines totalling 240 rounds, had also been found.

A large quantity of publications and other documents which formed part of the police investigation had been found in Mr. Jamaica's possession. "Provisional investigation indicates that this terrorist is attached to the ANC."

New Bill Enables President To Grant Indemnity

*MB2404115390 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1152 GMT 24 Apr 90*

[Text] Parliament April 24 SAPA—A bill was published on Tuesday [24 April] enabling the state president, Mr. F.W. De Klerk, to grant indemnity to any person against civil or criminal proceedings for any act he wished to specify.

The indemnity bill, tabled in Parliament yesterday, says in its long title that indemnity against criminal charges and arrest had become necessary "for the sake of reconciliation and for the finding of peaceful solutions."

The bill provided for the granting of "temporary or permanent indemnity against arrest, detention, prosecution and legal process."

World events and domestic realities had created opportunities for reconciliation and a joint search for common goals and peaceful solutions in South Africa, the bill says.

"And whereas the course of events have resulted in criminal charges against and the arrest of a number of

persons being possible or pending," the power to grant indemnity to such persons had become necessary.

The four effective clauses of the bill provide that:

—the state president may grant any person unconditional or conditional immunity, if he views it necessary for "the promotion of peaceful constitutional solutions or the unimpeded and efficient administration of justice," by notice in the government gazette;

No proceedings, criminal or civil, shall then, during the period stipulated in the gazette, be instituted against such a person for any act done or omitted prior to the date of the notice, nor shall such a person be detained in terms of any law for any such act or omission;

—the state president may grant unconditional or conditional indemnity to any person or category of people in respect of any event or category of events specified in the notice;

No proceedings, criminal or civil, or any detention may then follow in respect of such events;

—the state president may make regulations regarding any matter to which the bill relates if he deems it necessary to achieve the legislation's objectives, and, any such regulation which may result in expenditure shall be made in consultation with the ministers of finance and justice;

—the sections would be in force for one year unless the state president extended the period by proclamation in the gazette although a second and subsequent extensions would require the agreement of all three houses of parliament.

24 Apr Press Review on Current Problems, Issues

MB2404120390

[Editorial Report]

THE CITIZEN

NP-Inkatha Alliance Possible—Referring to the possibility of an alliance between the National Party (NP) and Inkatha Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English on 23 April says in its page 6 editorial: "The fact that Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi is a man who is moderate, has always been against violence, is prepared to accommodate White fears in a new constitution, and is in favour of the free enterprise system makes him a suitable partner. If there has to be a Black State President, many argue, then Chief Buthelezi would be the man most Whites would respect and accept." THE CITIZEN also believes "one important thing that makes an NP-Inkatha alliance possible is the government's newfound interest in the Natal-kwaZulu Indaba plan for a regional government for Natal."

THE STAR

'Negativism' About Chances of Economic Growth—Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 24 April in a page 14 editorial states: "Clearly most South Africans want peace, not violence. What is not clear is whether moderates can mobilise sufficiently to get what they want. More likely, they will sit back and wait until they find it necessary to blame either President de Klerk or Mr. Mandela—or both—for letting the country slide into chaos." "The common goals and common needs of all South Africans are quickly lost in a miasma of mistrust and political rhetoric. Even when Mr. de Klerk or Mr. Mandela emphasises that 'conflict will destroy South Africa' and agrees that 'economic growth is essential,' the immediate response is to question their motives and point up their differences. This negativism is, ironically, matched by a new optimism abroad about South Africa's chances of economic growth."

BUSINESS DAY

Trade Union Demands—"As this country reverts to more normal politics, businessmen will find it less and less tenable to counter the problem of rising costs, and of general inflation, by exhorting employees and trade unions to restrain their demands for better pay," declares Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 24 April in a page 6 editorial. "The pent-up resentment of an economic system which was skewed in favour of whites, and hence of employers and owners, is too great to be deflected by exhortation. The demands for redress are insistent and inescapable, and managers who do not recognise this political reality are likely to find themselves endlessly embroiled in industrial disputes."

SOWETAN

Inkatha-ANC Meeting Urgent—Referring to the necklacing of two children aged 14 and nine Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 24 April says in a page 6 editorial "Worse than this horror is the silence of the major political actors in this feud." "Politicians who use children as cannon fodder do not deserve respect." SOWETAN believes Inkatha and the African National Congress [ANC] "must get together to find solutions to this violence." "That meeting might be more urgent and more important than the meeting between the ANC and De Klerk next week."

THE NATAL WITNESS

Left's 'Authoritarian' Intimidation—Pietermaritzburg THE NATAL WITNESS in English on 10 April in a page 8 editorial comments on the proposed stayaway in Pietermaritzburg on 9 April protesting the Sebokeng shootings, saying "from the economic point of view, its motivation is at the best foolish and at the worst malign." But there is "an even darker side than the economic loss involved. Many workers, more interested in earning their daily bread than in making political statements, do not absent themselves voluntarily. They are intimidated to stay at home." "It is a sad, but

inescapable fact, that despite its protestations of sweetness and light, and profession of democracy, the left is cast in every bit as authoritarian a mould as the government against which it protests."

CITY PRESS

Call for Law, Not Inquiries—The page 12 editorial in Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English for 22 April says "we have lost count of the number of commissions of inquiry set up by government during the past few months." "While we have no problems with any inquiry set up by government, we feel more innocent lives are lost daily at the hands of irresponsible gun-crazy people whose duties should be to protect life and limb. It is unacceptable to hear President de Klerk speak of more reforms while our people are killed by his police."

Right Wing 'Frankenstein'—Khulu Sibiyi writes in his "My Way" column on the same page the South African Government "has created a Frankenstein monster in the form of rightwing elements—and now all of us are called upon to destroy it." "The rightwing element now rearing its ugly head did not come about by mistake. It was created by apartheid and those policies are still very much entrenched in our statute books." "If government needs our help in destroying this monster, it should get rid of all these laws."

THE NAMIBIAN

Editorial Notes 'Divisions' in Namibian Society—"The bloody shoot-out that took place in the old white township of Oshakati between the Namibian Police and alleged former PLAN [People's Liberation Army of Namibia] combatants this week is tragic and unfortunate," states the page 7 editorial in Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English on 20 April. "The fact that so many people have shown themselves ready to jump to hasty conclusions and to automatically point an accusing finger at PLAN before the facts are known is a sad reflection on the divisions that still exist in our society. It again shows how superficially many of those who profess to be working towards reconciliation actually adhere to the principle."

* Minister on Government Strategies, Concerns

34000567A Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English
Mar 90 pp 43-44, 46

[Interview with Constitutional Development Minister Gerrit Viljoen by Paul Bell: "Calculated Risks"; first three paragraphs are LEADERSHIP introduction]

[Text] In the era of P. W. Botha, constitutional development was not an easy portfolio: the responsible minister had a brief which involved creating mechanisms to give the appearance of sharing power, while in fact not sharing power at all. Under such circumstances, one might forgive former minister Chris Heunis for his poor articulation of a policy that was deliberately unintelligible.

The portfolio is even more difficult today, but at least the incumbent, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, is able to say what he means (within political reason)—if only because the new State President, F. W. de Klerk, has a policy he can make fairly clear: government is preparing the way for majority rule; at issue is how to give meaningful protection to white minority rights and preserve enough political influence to give whites some confidence in the future.

Viljoen spoke to Paul Bell about government's key concerns and strategies as it moves closer to negotiation with black leaders.

[Bell] You and other members of the government have occasionally described your strategy as "risk management". How do you define the risk at this stage, and how are you managing it?

[Viljoen] The first risk is that the steps we have taken have certain possible effects in the security field, especially since the ANC [African National Congress] has not given an unqualified commitment to the cessation of violence. In fact, the opposite has taken place, in the form of continuing rhetoric with reference to the armed struggle.

This creates a political risk for the government in that it had previously committed itself not to start any negotiations with leaders or organisations that had not committed themselves unambiguously to a peaceful process. Government does not consider the present discussions as negotiations, so without being technical, we believe we have not broken our undertaking not to start negotiations unless there is a clear commitment to a peaceful process.

Nevertheless, in this climate-creating phase, this continued "war talk"—as the State President would describe it—does create a risk.

Another risk is that of a right-wing backlash, and the possible undermining of the government's own support base.

In both respects—the war talk, and the threat of a backlash—I think we have successfully handled the risks that have been created by our steps; in terms of the first, by way of discussions with representatives of the ANC; in terms of the second, by providing information and argument to our own support base.

In fact, I believe we have succeeded in strengthening the understanding that, if we don't take these risks in a calculated way, there are likely to be bigger dangers ahead; that by doing nothing, we would create a more dangerous, more conflict-laden atmosphere.

There is also the international context. I don't think we would have been able to take this kind of risk-management decision a year or a year and a half ago. A major change has since been brought about in the position of the ANC: on the one hand, by the military and diplomatic successes in the south-western region of

Africa—forcing the shift of the ANC's bases further northwards, complicating its logistics and generally disorganising its effort; on the other hand, by the historic events in eastern Europe which have led to the political and economic collapse of communism as a system, and undermined the support the ANC received from that area.

All this has created a more favourable situation within which to calculate and accept the risks which result from the unbanning of organisations and the release of ANC leaders.

[LEADERSHIP] In this risk-management process, one assumes the cabinet monitors the situation virtually daily.

[Viljoen] Oh yes, we have an ongoing monitoring system and a small group of ministers directly connected with both the political and the security side of the risk-management situation, considering the steps that have to be taken on a day-to-day and week-to-week basis.

[LEADERSHIP] In the past month, government has had an opportunity to get some measure of the ANC. How confident do you feel about the prospect of negotiating with the ANC, regarding it in effect as your principal opposite number in the process?

[Viljoen] The recent steps have resulted in an atmosphere much more conducive to the prospect of bringing about negotiation among all the meaningful political organisations of South Africa, including extra-parliamentary organisations like the ANC and others in its sphere of influence. The climate has changed in the sense that everybody accepts that the only reasonable and convincing approach is that of peaceful negotiations, and that the armed struggle is essentially not much more than rhetoric.

There is really no armed struggle of any significance. When people talk of continuing the armed struggle, others have asked, as well they may, "What armed struggle?"

There is, however, an uneasiness and a concern among many South Africans about the ongoing rhetoric on the armed struggle, the mere fact of which suggests to people who have a potential conflict agenda that an armed struggle may well be used in their case as well—for instance, the different factions in the fighting and slaughter in Natal; young hotheads who try to promote unrest and instability in education; and people in the townships trying to destroy the influence of existing local government structures.

All these elements are inevitably encouraged by continuing references to the maintenance of the armed struggle, keeping it available as a supplementary method in the overall struggle. From that they deduce that they might as well use an armed struggle too.

Therefore, this rhetoric has a very adverse effect on the overall level of violence, intimidation and unrest in

black communities. In this regard, in fact, there have recently been reasons for concern at the rising levels of unrest in certain areas.

[LEADERSHIP] So before government could be confident of any developing relationship with the ANC in moving towards negotiation, the armed struggle would have to go.

[Viljoen] I feel very strongly about that. Initially it was just a matter of rhetoric, but more and more I get the feeling that the recent flare-up of violence and unrest has been influenced by this rhetoric. The local leader is concerned with his particular situation; he's not thinking about overall national problems. When the armed struggle is mentioned, he also applies it to his specific situation.

[LEADERSHIP] Would you say this makes nonsense of Mr Mandela going to Natal and appealing for an end to the violence, while continuing to maintain that the armed struggle must continue?

[Viljoen] Absolutely; this is a completely contradictory approach.

[LEADERSHIP] There has nevertheless been a very interesting conciliatory offering from Mr Mandela in his statement that the ANC would respect different cultures and even permit communities to administer their own schools.

[Viljoen] That has been positive, but the most positive statement that has been made is Mr Mandela's reference to the two conflicting claims that have to be accommodated through what he called "a reconciliation of give-and-take". He referred on the one hand to the claim of black South Africans to universal franchise—to the point of majority government, and on the other hand to white concerns that there should be what he called structural protection for whites in a new constitution—protection against their being dominated by the majority.

He declared his readiness to negotiate this question and to find a solution on a basis acceptable to both black and white. Virtually every word in this statement is important and very encouraging.

[LEADERSHIP] Is government confident that it can retain majority white support and in fact, "deliver" whites in the negotiation process?

[Viljoen] Yes. That feedback from the constituencies is that there is no large-scale movement away from the governing party. There is concern and uncertainty about the effects on security of government's measures, as well as a degree of uncertainty about the details of a constitutional solution. Both of these aspects are dealt with by government in an understanding way. But at this stage we see no reason to fear any noticeable shift in the support base of government.

We also believe that the sooner we take steps that may be of a contentious nature, the better. This way, before

government ultimately gets back to the electorate to get its support for a new constitution, as it has pledged to do, voters will have had sufficient opportunity to see that new measures can work, that new approaches have not brought down the heavens on South Africa, and that the solution is in fact acceptable and practical.

[LEADERSHIP] So that remains a bottom-line commitment for government, that voters within the present tricameral constitutional arrangement will have an opportunity to voice their opinions in this regard.

[Viljoen] Either in an election or a referendum.

[LEADERSHIP] Surely a referendum would seem more likely.

[Viljoen] Yes, I think so too. The State President gave a very clear commitment on that, in view of the fact that we haven't worked out all the detail, and have obtained a mandate mainly on the broad outlines of our plan. We have a moral obligation, which we have undertaken, to go back to the electorate as soon as the detail has been worked out.

[LEADERSHIP] The Conservative Party [CP] makes much play of its intention to embarrass government into an election by exposing the fact, as the CP has it, that it has no mandate to do what it is doing. You appear to be making it very clear that the CP will not have that electoral opportunity.

[Viljoen] We believe the CP is becoming nervous because it is becoming increasingly irrelevant. A point that has not received sufficient emphasis is the complete impracticality and unacceptability of the solution which it proposes, namely partition. In the time available, we will be hammering away at just this point.

Their solution cannot work and if they have to admit, as Dr Treurnicht recently had to, that the presence of blacks in so-called white South Africa is a permanent fact which cannot be undone, then the whole basis of their approach falls away. Then they simply have to move towards the approach of the National Party [NP], accepting South Africa as one state with one nationalism, a common nationhood and a common franchise.

[LEADERSHIP] You have said there will never again be a whites-only election, or elections for the tricameral Parliament as presently constituted. This appears to mean that blacks will have the vote by September 1994 or March 1995, i.e., the time limit on your constitutional obligation to hold a further election. Both the ANC and the CP would want to know, as do we all, what that vote means; whether, in fact, government will accede to one man, one vote as a primary building block in a new constitution.

[Viljoen] We accept that every person should have the vote. At the same time, we insist that there should be structural provisions in the new constitution to ensure—for those minority groups that wish to have it—protection against being dominated; in other words, a

guarantee for meaningful participation in decision-making, which is really of vital importance.

We believe a model can be worked out to accommodate both the need for universal franchise and the meaningful protection of political participation for those groups that feel they need it at this stage in our history.

[LEADERSHIP] Minority vetoes have become minority domination. Is that a mechanism of which you would be wary?

[Viljoen] Yes. An absolute veto would have to be accompanied by some type of conflict-resolving structure, some kind of arbitration structure which could offer a way out where there is no unanimity in an area where that is required.

We would like to plan on the basis of a depoliticised conflict-resolving mechanism, for instance a council of influential South Africans, drawn not primarily from the political sphere but from other spheres in which they have a status which goes beyond that of their more limited group affinity.

[LEADERSHIP] You have also said that by the end of the decade, the NP would at best be playing a significant role in a majority government. What measure of control or influence over government would you hope to secure for the party and whites generally in the long term?

[Viljoen] To answer that, one would have to go into our specific plans in some detail, which I would not like to do at this stage. But I think the influence of whites would not reside solely in how they are structured as a group within the new constitutional set-up. They would, I believe, also have an influence in terms of the broader political behaviour of the electorate as a whole.

Both in a group context, and in the broader context of the population as a whole, whites would play a meaningful role. Leaders in all sections of the population accept the need for whites to build, with other groups, a viable new South Africa.

[LEADERSHIP] Do you believe the ANC is serious about nationalising mines and banks, or do you see that as a bargaining chip?

[Viljoen] Well, they must have been serious when they formulated this policy in the Freedom Charter. At the same time, it is clear from their recent statements that there is a certain amount of uncertainty and uneasiness on the part of their spokesmen, and that a lot of hard thinking still has to be done, although some of the ideologues among them apparently have certain fixed ideas on an economic system from which they would not willingly depart.

I think there are general signs of a pragmatic approach. In the weeks and months ahead, debate and discussion about economic matters will be as important as that on political matters, and a lot of clarification is necessary.

In their recent statements, it has become clear that the ANC has a major concern with ways and means of bringing about a more equal distribution of wealth. I would rather see it as an equal distribution of opportunities.

In this connection, there is a lot of concern particularly about the privatisation of state assets and state-controlled corporations. I believe privatisation is the correct method; it is likely to increase the profitability of the organisations concerned, and therefore—through tax—the revenue of the state. This will enhance the state's financial ability to uplift the quality of life of the less privileged.

The concern among black political organisations that there be dramatic improvements in the quality of life of the people they represent, is a real one. One should approach it with sympathy. Any constitutional reform must go hand in hand with socio-economic reform.

The rhetoric and emphasis on nationalisation has this goal in mind, but in fact, it is likely to affect adversely the production of wealth and thereby diminish the revenue available to the state.

[LEADERSHIP] So should government not give its opposite numbers an opportunity to examine these key economic institutions more closely?

[Viljoen] That would be a very practical approach. Although the decisions at the negotiating table will be basically political, the conference should also provide greater insight into how constitutional reform will be linked to reform in other spheres, such as the economy and education. This could well be done by working groups set up to assist the negotiators.

[LEADERSHIP] Main obstacles to negotiation remain the state of emergency and the definition and release of political prisoners. If they can be resolved, is it government's intention to start the negotiation phase speedily?

[Viljoen] Yes. I consider that if these obstacles can be addressed satisfactorily, the move to negotiation will be prompt. The State President has acknowledged these two matters as ones which affect the normalisation of the political process.

He has indicated that he is really keen to lift the state of emergency, but that circumstances and conditions must be such that it would be a responsible act to do so. Thus he has appealed to all those who influence the day-to-day situation on the ground, to contribute in word and deed towards a climate which will justify this.

With regard to the definition of political prisoners, he has indicated his willingness to discuss that matter with the representatives of the ANC, and they have indicated their acceptance of this invitation. We hope this will happen in the next couple of weeks.

[LEADERSHIP] Has government accepted finally that its earlier idea to identify black leaders prior to negotiation, by means of an election, must be shelved?

[Viljoen] Government still thinks it is a sensible approach to have an election for those South Africans who haven't in the past had the privilege of participating in national elections, to indicate who their leaders should be in the negotiating process.

But there is resistance to this from those who resent the distinction between black people inside and outside the self-governing territories, and also from those who simply reject the concept of group or racially based elections. Therefore government is not pressing this approach.

*** Willem de Klerk on Future of Political Parties**

34000567B Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English
Mar 90 pp 51-52, 54

[Article by Willem de Klerk, professor of communications at the Rand Afrikaans University, former editor of RAPPORT, and brother of State President F. W. de Klerk: "Return of the Nats"]

[Text] After February 2, 1990, the three white political parties will never be the same. The National Party [NP] has taken a dramatic leap forward. The essence of its new approach is that the ANC [African National Congress] and its affiliates have been recognised as part of the political solution for South Africa, and that it has irrevocably committed itself to reaching a compromise. The compromise the NP has now opted for in principle is that a non-racial dispensation must be created at all levels of society.

The ties with apartheid have finally been severed. All that remains is to clear away apartheid in the negotiation process and to reach a compromise on the protection of minorities. The fact is that white domination has been relinquished and a choice made in favour of a non-racial, representative democracy...the NP will never be the same again.

The Conservative Party [CP] is suddenly faced with the stark fact that any possible compromise between it and the NP is now a thing of the past. The idea was nurtured in CP circles that the NP would not dare to break totally with apartheid. The CP would—still under protest, of course—have found living space for their ideals and social patterns in neo-apartheid order which the NP would negotiate. They have now realised with a shock that all racial boundaries are eventually going to disappear. That is why they are preparing themselves for the mobilisation of white resistance on a scale unprecedented in our history...the CP will never be the same again.

The Democratic Party [DP] has been bereft of its pulling power, like having a rug whipped from under its feet, because the NP is increasingly adopting its approach.

Indeed, the NP has partially hijacked the DP vision. The DP is confronted with the dilemma that it has not yet overcome its growing pains and can easily lose its appeal if it does not clearly define its future role...the DP will never be the same again.

How will these parties develop in future? I would not trust any scenario at the moment, because unpredictability is a central characteristic of our politics.

There are seven forces that will determine the nature of our politics in the following year and further on until the year 2000. They are:

The politics of transition towards a new order, accompanied by instability and crisis management; the politics of negotiation, an ongoing process which will be continuously exposed to delays and confrontations; the politics of compromise, in which consensus must be found on five issues in particular about which divergent viewpoints exist—group rights, the nature of democracy, the organisation of the state, the economic system and the speed of transition; the politics of persuasion, through which the black and white population must be prepared for compromise; internationalised politics, by means of which our relations with our subcontinent and the West must be normalised; deadline politics, because our whole transition must be squeezed into a mere few years; and the politics of risk, because we will be moving on the knife-edge—we may once again get bogged down in a cul-de-sac, progress step by step, or events may spiral out of control.

It is only against the background of these political forces that one can speculate about the future of existing white political parties. And this, in turn, will depend on how the parties will manage these forces. I want to examine the future of these parties from three perspectives—firstly, their possible development; secondly, their probable development; and lastly, what I believe their ideal development would be.

They may develop in divergent ways. If it keeps up the pace, the NP can succeed with its programme of reform. It could manage the transition by maintaining an equilibrium between change and stability, and between generally representative government and the protection of minorities. Step by step the negotiation process could result in consensus and compromise within an acceptable time-scale. Such progress will in turn open doors internationally and overcome internal scepticism, because people will see positive things happening. This is the scenario of NP success, or a reasonable degree of success. Should this occur, the NP will strongly attract DP supporters. The DP will then shrink to a circle of left-wing radicals, communists, socialists and "holy" liberals who will continue to campaign against Afrikaners, capitalists or whoever.

In terms of this success scenario, the NP could also attract considerable CP support. The CP's claim is that non-racialism will lead to chaos, ruin and misery. But if

the NP succeeds with its policy of constructive cooperation with the ANC, and a new dispensation begins to succeed in which whites do not feel threatened and are able to maintain their standards, they will see fewer and fewer spectres. Nothing succeeds like success, and many Afrikaner CP members are level-headed people who will choose success before confrontation. The CP may then lose substantial support and shrink by a good 10 percent, thus retaining the support of only 20 percent of whites. This is the group that is anchored in right-wing extremism, racism and traditionalism, and dreams of white exclusivity.

The opposite of the NP's success scenario is, of course, also possible. It may fail in two ways: the NP may stop at neo-apartheid, or it may be overwhelmed by the tide of black aspirations which will increasingly force it into surrender.

Should the NP stop at neo-apartheid (viz, race groups as the basis for the state and the constitution, maintenance of group areas and population registration, maintenance of covert discrimination, intensified security legislation) then the seven political forces referred to above will turn against it: instability during the transition period will increase; negotiations may collapse; compromises may be mutually rejected; international isolation may increase; the economy may be grounded; deadlines may lapse and risks grow greater.

Such a neo-apartheid-type failure, resulting in an intensified revolution, will in effect destroy the NP. The middle ground it will have tried to occupy will be washed away and the whites will regroup in two parties—the CP and the DP. My guess is that the two parties will then be of more or less equal strength. The DP will have to carry the day with renewed negotiations, compromises and settlement, and the CP will accommodate the white revolution.

The NP may also fail if it were to be overwhelmed by black demands and acquire the image of a loser which cannot protect white interests. In such a case, the CP will grow in leaps and bounds, and the remainder of the NP will merge with the DP. The CP could then assume power, and drag South Africa deeper into the abyss.

All these possibilities exist, although at this stage they are only conjecture.

The next question is what the probable developments regarding the three white political parties will be. I honestly believe the NP will continue to concentrate on creating a climate for negotiations by complying, as far as is possible, with all reasonable preconditions for negotiations. The NP will persevere with ad hoc contact with various groups and do its best to let pre-negotiations succeed before the end of 1990, so the official negotiations may take final shape by mid-1991. It will maintain law and order in a responsible but sensitive way. In addition, it will promptly address the following matters: the repeal of all discriminatory legislation; the drafting of a bill of rights; the formulation of

various constitutional options; the amendment of group definitions in order to facilitate a convincing departure from the concept of race; and the revival of the economy, aided by the greater opening of doors internationally and in southern Africa.

It won't all be plain sailing. It will be a process of progress and retrogression, conflict and compromise, sporadic instability by means of demonstrations, demands, strikes, reproaches and threats. Cul-de-sacs will be reached, which will have to be laboriously hacked open again. And it is still an open question whether the NP will succeed in effectively formulating and marketing its standpoint on the protection of minorities to whites and the ANC. Besides that, the NP will carry the great burden of the right-wing onslaught. But it will never again swing to the right. It has written off the right-wing option.

I believe, therefore, that the NP—in spite of probable setbacks and deadlocks—will flourish for at least the next two years. In these two years it should win back a considerable number of DP supporters, while also losing supporters to the CP. But it will maintain its position as a large centre party.

If, after these two years, the NP were to break through with meaningful successes on all levels (and nobody can predict at this stage whether this will be the case), it will further consolidate its position as the dominant party. The heart will have been knocked out of the DP; the CP, as a minority group, will become more and more fanatical.

The most probable development regarding the CP will be its radicalisation. It will consolidate the right wing. The party may show a growth of 5-7 percent, as the NP will definitely lose support to the right. (As stated earlier, this trend could only be halted if the NP were to achieve success.) The CP will increasingly change its strategy towards attempts to enforce an election, staging protests and boycotts, creating confrontation where it has the power to do so, and fomenting an atmosphere of white revolution on different levels of society. This may degenerate into an ugly situation that can get out of hand, in that certain white factions may turn to terrorism and violence. The CP and its family of related organisations can disrupt the country, but will not succeed in bringing it to its knees.

The DP will probably concentrate more strongly on a complete non-racial democracy, instead of the compromise the NP will probably advocate. It will probably advocate a one-man, one-vote democracy and a geographic federation, and its supporters will attempt to consolidate around liberal political values. The differences between DP and NP policy will be articulated very strongly. In spite of its efforts, I believe the DP will lose considerable support and prominence, at least over the next two years. If some leading DP figures were to join the ANC (talk of which is doing the rounds), an open split is not inconceivable. It is, in any case, the party with

the smallest growth potential in the immediate future. If the NP should fail after two years (as discussed previously), the DP's turn will come again.

Then there is a third perspective. What would be the ideal development regarding the three white political parties?

My personal view is that the NP should not be hampered in its initiatives. The DP should discard all petty politics, and, as a creative opposition, encourage the NP to continue with its breakthroughs, both in substance and in tempo. The DP should regard itself as being in an unstructured alliance with the NP, and in this capacity it should, both confidentially and in public, give advice, spell out options, motivate extra-parliamentary groups to venture into negotiations, and continue to test the NP's new direction. The DP should be a catalyst, a bridge builder, a support for government in its attempts to institute negotiations.

When actual negotiations begin, the DP could promote its own models and subject NP models to critical scrutiny. The DP will retain its dignity and best fulfil its function if it were to help government to establish its projected political reorientation over the next two years—through critical argument and even confrontation, naturally, but always within the framework of an unstructured alliance. There is a time for everything. The time has now come for the DP to fertilise and promote the new plant that is growing in our politics, via the NP initiatives. The sparks can fly again later, should government get cold feet.

Such a strategy will also result in the DP losing some of its more radical support, but the remainder will be a creative core that could make a real contribution to the politics of the future. I am convinced that many DP members will agree with this view.

I wish the CP would agree with me when I say that the ideal development for it would be to build out the option of partition in a more intelligent and dignified way. By its radical actions it is destroying its own policy options. Partition may be an open option of last resort. But then it would also have to be subjected to negotiation and reasonable, realistic compromise. It would have to be stripped of racism and defiant self-advancement. It should be placed on the negotiating table as a constitutional model, in a calm and reasoned way. The atmosphere of incitement in which the CP now moves, may become its own pitfall. And its planned destabilisation will only serve to delay the process of change under the NP's initiatives, to the detriment of everyone. It will not, however, be able to halt this process.

I wish the CP would stop its obstructive tactics. It should really congratulate government and the ANC as soon as the process of negotiation is under way. It should then declare that it would also like to sit at the table to bargain for partition and seek to win compromises towards partition. That would be responsible politics.

Until now, we have largely considered the future of white party politics in the short to medium term, during a run-up to possible negotiations, and within the broad context of the existing political order.

However, a key question we need to ask, is: what impact will structural political changes—negotiations, the possible adoption of a new constitution and a transition to a new order—have on the existing white parties and other parties in the tricameral Parliament? And what could or is likely to happen to the NP, DP, CP and other parties in a post-apartheid society?

The implications of this dimension were recently brought home by the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, when he declared that no further elections would be held in terms of the existing constitution. In other words, there will probably never be another white-dominated general election.

Suppose the negotiations get under way properly before government's existing five-year term expires. The most logical development would then be for the negotiating forum concerned to issue a document in which it clearly outlines its proposed model for a settlement. This could result in a referendum, in which voters will be asked to support or reject the proposed model. But this will be no party political poll—it will rather be a real plebiscite; a comprehensive vote by all South African citizens.

The NP could then conceivably become a non-racial party which solicits support on the basis of certain political principles and policies only. The CP and the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] will then probably remain as the only racial parties. The DP could conceivably continue as a separate party, on the basis of remaining policy differences with the NP. The Labour Party, UDF [United Democratic Front], ANC and other groupings could regroup themselves into new parties—there is speculation that two large parties, one moderate and one radical, could emerge.

All these parties—except the CP and the PAC—could therefore lose their ethnic accents and, as the DTA [Democratic Turnhalle Alliance] has done in Namibia, search for new alliances in an attempt to mobilise broader support.

South Africa will then probably enter the era of coalitions of different non-racial parties. A further possible development could be their consolidation into two large, non-racial parties—the one, socialist-authoritarian, the other, capitalist-democratic. They would dominate South African politics. Parties such as the CP (which would then represent a mere 6 percent of voters) would be relegated to irrelevance, along with other splinter groups.

This, then, is the final possibility, one which we may call total restructuring. It is a possible development, even a probable one—and the most desirable of all.

*** Buthelezi Discusses Inkatha-ANC Rift**

34000567C Cape Town LEADERSHIP in English
Mar 90 pp 73-74, 76

[Interview with Chief Minister of KwaZulu Mangosuthu Buthelezi by John Collings in Ulundi: "Fraternal Grievings"; first five paragraphs are LEADERSHIP introduction]

[Text] These are unusually challenging days for Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu and president of Inkatha. A one-time member of the African National Congress [ANC], he has for many years called for its unbanning and for the release of Nelson Mandela.

However, a deep rift eventually developed between him and Inkatha, on the one hand, and the ANC on the other. He has been a strident critic of the organisation and its leaders, and has also set himself apart from the anti-apartheid movement in general by strongly opposing sanctions against South Africa. Ultimately, he appeared to set up Inkatha as an alternative liberation movement to the ANC.

This rift has had tragic consequences—the black-on-black violence in Natal, fought under the banners of Inkatha and the UDF [United Democratic Front], that has claimed several thousand lives during the past three years.

The De Klerk initiatives have met a number of Buthelezi's political demands. At the same time, the release of Mandela and the new ascendancy of the ANC have placed him under increased pressure. The contrary effects of these developments can be discerned in this interview. On the one hand, Buthelezi warmly welcomes the release of Nelson Mandela. On the other, he seems to remain deeply hostile towards the ANC and the internal movements associated with it.

Meanwhile, the violence in Natal has continued to escalate to the point where Buthelezi acknowledges simply that it is "out of control". He spoke to John Collings in the KwaZulu capital of Ulundi.

[Collings] What were your feelings when you heard President De Klerk's speech on February 2?

[Buthelezi] I just couldn't believe my ears. Never in my wildest dreams could I have imagined that he would go as far as he did.

[Collings] And your reaction to Nelson Mandela's release?

[Buthelezi] I was overwhelmed. There were tears in my eyes, just as there were when I spoke to him on the telephone. I look forward to the day when, as he says he will, he will come down and see my wife, whom he knew as a young girl, and me.

[Collings] Do you think the pace set by the State President, and the amount of press coverage given to the

ANC, have raised the expectations of the youth to levels that the ANC leadership knows cannot possibly be met?

[Buthelezi] I must confess that I'm very worried about that. Many people have nurtured illusions that will never come about. Once the euphoria passes, we will return to the real world where the problems remain the same—the chasms, the glaring inequities in our society, lack of employment, bad facilities in our schools.

All that together is, I fear, material for chaos, and it really worries me what will happen when people realise they are still not where they want to be.

[Collings] What about future relations between the ANC and the UDF and Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions]? Will the UDF disband itself now that the ANC has been unbanned?

[Buthelezi] I have my doubts about that. In discussions with us here about peace talks, the UDF proposed that the ANC should be separately represented at the talks, and when I queried that, they said that the UDF and the ANC are different organisations.

[Collings] Do you think Cosatu will want to become openly involved in pre-settlement politics?

[Buthelezi] I wouldn't be surprised. Its stance has been largely political; it hasn't confined itself to workers' problems. The reason for that was, of course, that some of the political leaders were in prison, and Cosatu had to unwillingly take on a political task.

[Collings] But perhaps in time developed a taste for it?

[Buthelezi] I fear so. When I hear Mr Ramaphosa, for whom I have a high regard as a person, saying that Dr Mandela is not the leader of the ANC but just one of the leaders; and when I see him on my television set moving up in front of Dr Mandela—then it would be very foolish of me to suppose that he will abandon a political role just because the ANC leaders are now out of jail.

[Collings] What future role do you think Mandela is likely to play within the ANC?

[Buthelezi] I would have thought that, given the illness of Oliver Tambo, the mantle of leadership would automatically have fallen on him—not only because he is a martyr, but also because of his leadership skills.

[Collings] What effect will the relationship he seems to have developed with President De Klerk have in this regard?

[Buthelezi] At his first press conference after his release he took a strong ANC line in talking about nationalisation, in embracing sanctions, and saying that he was a loyal servant of the ANC. I think he wanted to make it clear to everyone that he hadn't made any deal with the government.

[Collings] Do you think he will be one of the negotiators at the table, or will he remain in the background?

[Buthelezi] It will be tragic if this country is deprived of his skills. He is a very deft negotiator.

[Collings] When did the break between Inkatha and the ANC occur, and what caused it?

[Buthelezi] It happened in 1979 when I and 16 of my colleagues met with Mr Tambo and some of his colleagues in London to discuss issues on which we differed: violence and sanctions. They were supposed to come back to me a month after that meeting, during which time they would have considered some points that I had raised with them, but they never did.

Instead, to my surprise, the ANC launched an attack on me, accusing me of breaking the confidentiality of the meeting, which I had not. I have never revealed what was said at the meeting. Later, the ANC tried to prevent me from visiting Lamontville [near Durban], saying that my presence there would cause violence. That was the first that had ever been heard of violence.

[Collings] If, in the ANC's eyes, the negotiations process gets under way well enough to make the threat of violence and sanctions unnecessary, what policy differences would exist between Inkatha and the ANC?

[Buthelezi] None whatsoever. My own feeling is that, if violence and sanctions are abandoned as weapons, then there would be no reason for us not to close ranks. But you saw the statement of Mr Terror Lekota of the UDF the other day—he said that their intention was to kill me, not physically, but politically. And Cosatu is affiliated to the ANC, which has prohibited any negotiations with me, saying instead that Inkatha must be smashed.

[Collings] Why would they want to see Inkatha smashed?

[Buthelezi] An internal document of the ANC in 1985 observed that I am not a stooge of the government—externally, of course, they say I am—but that I play a counter-revolutionary role and they must destroy my social base. The ANC watched Mr Neto shoot his way back into Angola, and Mr Samora Machel do the same in Mozambique, and something like that happened in Zimbabwe, so they thought the same could be achieved in South Africa. And with its recognition by the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and the United Nations, the ANC came to regard itself in the same way as Swapo [South-West African People's Organization] did, as a government in exile that must return and seize power.

[Collings] And you are seen as a large obstacle to that happening?

[Buthelezi] Precisely.

[Collings] Are you firm in your rejection of "nationalisation"?

[Buthelezi] When I was a young black nationalist, I believed that free enterprise was exploitative and should be leavened with a pinch of African communalism. I

visited the guru of African socialism, Julius Nyerere, twice and on the second occasion he admitted he had made mistakes.

For someone who has been thrust into the position where I am responsible for people who need to have their children educated, to have roofs over their heads and to feed and clothe themselves and their families—people whose numbers are growing at the rate of three percent a year—these things have made me shed all the illusions that I nursed as a young man. I know of no other economic system that is such a potent force for development, and creates as many jobs, as the free enterprise system. But blacks must be allowed into it.

[Collings] Constitutionally, do you still support the idea of a minority veto?

[Buthelezi] That idea was produced in the context of a regional solution [bringing together "white" Natal and KwaZulu legislatively]. Nationally, I have always said it's a matter of debate and negotiation what checks and balances will be used to guarantee the cultural identities of people. My ideal is one person, one vote in a unitary state. But I have always said we cannot afford to destroy the country in seeking that. Others have seen compromise as a dirty word. I never have, and so I am very heartened and encouraged that Dr Mandela has spoken of compromises.

[Collings] What can be done to close the breach between Inkatha and the ANC?

[Buthelezi] I am very worried that the violence it has produced is becoming as endemic as that in Lebanon. Indeed, the release of Dr Mandela was seen by some—on what grounds I don't know—as a reason for escalating it.

[Collings] What do you believe is the root cause of the violence in Natal?

[Buthelezi] The UDF has said that it wants to destroy Inkatha. Also, the ANC has said in its broadcasts from Zambia that it wants to make this country ungovernable. It called for young people to band together and kill all those it termed "collaborators", which included anyone who didn't accept its strategy of violence. The UDF and Cosatu have also stated that they believe in making the country, the townships, ungovernable. You don't achieve that by playing marbles, but through violence.

That is how the culture of violence was introduced. Inkatha became involved in it; it escalated; there has been a certain amount of vengeance-taking. The whole thing has become like Northern Ireland and Lebanon. It is out of control.

There is another dimension to it, also, that is not given as much prominence in the media. That is the socio-economic damage. The chickens are coming home to roost for those who have been advocating sanctions against this country. South Africa has not been able to

provide as many jobs as are needed, so there are many young unemployed people, and some of them are matriculated.

There is also the large number of people who, with the removal of the pass laws, have flocked to the cities and form large squatter areas there. Gangster leaders are produced in them. But no one ever talks about the crime they produce, only about the violence between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF/Cosatu.

[Collings] Can there be any real hope that you, together with Dr Mandela and others, can solve the problem?

[Buthe/ezzi] I don't know whether Dr Mandela, with the reverence that we all have for him, will be able just to fly over the area and that will be the end of the problem. But I hope that he can at least reduce it.

[Collings] You have opposed the state of emergency from the time it was announced, but can the problem of the violence in Natal be overcome if the state of emergency is not maintained there?

[Buthe/ezzi] In principle, I remain against the state of emergency. But people in the townships ask me to ask the government for troops to protect them, and I cannot ignore them. Government cannot, of course, send in troops unless there is a declared state of emergency. I am in a cleft stick on the matter.

[Collings] Do you think the ANC might see the need for the state of emergency to be maintained in Natal, and not use it to refuse to come to the negotiation table?

[Buthe/ezzi] It's difficult to say. It could bring the whole thing grinding to halt. But I wouldn't rule out Dr Mandela being able to solve that one, given his statesmanship. But whether the others in the ANC would allow him to exercise it is another thing.

[Collings] How optimistic are you about the next five years?

[Buthe/ezzi] I've been ridiculed as a simpleton because I've never abandoned hope. I know there will be problems—I'm not naive—but my hopes are higher with the stage we've reached now.

* ANC Threatened by Violence in Townships

34000562A Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL
 in English 16 Mar 90 pp 45-46

[Article: "The Mob Factor"]

[Text] "Who controls the townships?" The answer must surely be: "The mob."

Government and the ANC [African National Congress] seem equally concerned about the continuing violence. It's a political threat to both President FW de Klerk and the ANC. The organisation's influence in many areas is being seriously questioned as repeated calls by its leaders for peace and a return to school are ignored.

The leaders of the mobs (if indeed there are leaders) are often as difficult to identify as their aims. No one seems to know who they are or what they hope to achieve. In an effort to break the back of the current wave of violence police have detained more than 150 alleged instigators.

But violence continues.

The concern of mainstream extra parliamentary leaders was highlighted in a weekend TV interview with UDF [United Democratic Front] publicity secretary Patrick Lekota. In effect, he branded people involved in political violence as traitors to the liberation cause. He called them enemies who must be identified. He also acknowledged that there were limits within which political protest could take place.

This indicates growing concern in ANC/UDF circles that the unrest is beyond their control, notwithstanding their claims to have played a part in restoring relative calm to Ciskei.

Law & Order Minister Adriaan Vlok told parliament last week that the unrest situation was "extremely fluid" but under control as far as is humanly possible.

Vlok also acknowledges public concern that the "shocking" events of the mid-Eighties are on the verge of being repeated. "I can understand it, but I appeal to one and all to stay calm and go on with their daily lives and not allow themselves to be intimidated. The police are in control of the situation and will do all in their power to protect the public."

That's easy to say when one doesn't live in a township, particularly if it's controlled by "the youth." Vlok sees them as a serious obstacle to ending the unrest.

Many of the youngsters are the Lost Generation. Their crude political views were forged in the unrest fires of the mid-Eighties. Their allegiance to the mainstream of the ANC is doubtful.

There's another element. UCT [University of Cape Town] political scientist Robert Schrire says there is "an enormous forgotten class" of uneducated and unemployed people who see life's opportunities passing them by. They've used the liberalising political climate to vent anger and frustration by rioting and looting. In the 1984-1985 violence the major political players seemed to have an influential organisational role. This is now lacking.

Schrire says part of the problem is that in the past two years neither government nor the ANC has addressed the basic concerns of this extremely large—and growing—class. Concerns such as education, jobs and housing come before political allegiances and ideologies.

Schrire sees the situation as bad news for the ANC in the sense that it could be the biggest loser if the reform initiative is aborted and the white government remains in power. For this reason, he believes, there will be tacit ANC support for government action to stop the violence.

But there will also have to be a far greater effort from both sides to address the real grievances of the impoverished township communities.

It's clear that government expects the ANC and other organisations to play a more active role in "responsible" politics and ending of the violence. Vlok argues that no one is now locked out of political participation. Tough action will continue to be taken against people instigating and leading unrest, he says.

The latest detentions are part of that action, as was the massive police presence in central Cape Town this week when a few dozen demonstrators tried to protest against food prices. Most were arrested.

The DP [Democratic Party] supports government action to maintain law and order. Co-leader Denis Worrall warns that history shows reform doesn't hold off revolution but, in fact, brings it closer. That's why it's so important for government to keep its nerve.

Worrall believes most is required than simply the maintenance of law and order by hard-pressed policemen. Negotiations will take a long time. Interim practical steps are necessary to stimulate investment, growth and job-creation.

* Whites React to Violence in Natal

34000562B Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 16 Mar 90 pp 47-48

[Article: "Sleepy No More"]

[Text] Many Natal whites have been complacent. They have regarded the political violence as a "black-on-black" problem. Now the violence has come to the streets of central Maritzburg, dividing the downtown section into Inkatha and UDF [United Democratic Front] areas and seriously affecting small businesses.

There have been sporadic clashes in central Maritzburg before, but never on this scale. Traders estimate that business has dropped off by as much as 80 percent. Some claim they have been told by Inkatha members and "comrades" to close their shops at weekends, when most of the fighting takes place.

Since the violence moved to the city just over two weeks ago, at least six people have been killed in the streets.

Mayor Mark Cornell is dismayed at the continuing violence and the effect it is having on the economic base of the city. It is hampering trading, transport, employment and security. Cornell has made an urgent appeal to FW de Klerk to do something.

The new development has also boosted the crime rate, which is already high with the large number of refugees living in Maritzburg and massive unemployment. Some shopowners believe that thugs and criminals are now

aligning themselves with the two opposing camps, agreeing to only commit crime in areas controlled by the "enemy".

Last weekend, there was a disturbing new development. A minibus which allegedly contained three white men attacked UDF-supporting families in the Maritzburg township of Imbali. Now there are fears that some whites are also starting actively to take sides.

* Threat of Sanctions Said To Be Easing

34000562C Johannesburg *FINANCIAL MAIL*
in English 16 Mar 90 p 87

[Article by Maureen Sullivan: "Fissures in the Facade"]

[Text] When British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher lifted the UK's voluntary bans on investment in SA [South Africa] last month, as well as the scientific, economic, cultural and tourism sanctions, boycott battle lines were redrawn.

Even one of the architects of sanctions, US congressman Ron Dellums, says it's time to pause in imposing tougher legislation because of the "new dynamic" in SA.

When the EEC voted on sanctions Portugal sided with the UK—another crack in the wall.

They are not alone in reacting favourably to the kinder, gentler SA. Since President FW de Klerk's speech and the release of Nelson Mandela last month, foreign businesses have shown renewed interest in SA. Local businesses that have had foreign markets closed to them are preparing for when they can once again trade more freely.

"Inquiries about SA have stepped up incredibly" at the US State Department's commercial desk in Washington, says Wayne Mitchell, executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce in SA. Most of the interest has come from heavy industry, mainly in the fields of mining, agricultural equipment, high-tech industries and locomotives, he adds.

SA Britain Trade Association chairman Blitz Bieber was in the UK last month and was thrilled by the positive reaction he got. "This is a major opportunity. We look forward to the normalisation of trade."

For foreign companies that weathered fierce divestment campaigns at home, De Klerk's moves have been a vindication. "We may be a bit smug in saying our decision was right," says Russell Pollard, a director of Colgate Palmolive, an American soap and toothpaste company that has 700 employees in SA. "but what happened is what we always hoped and believed would happen."

However, like a huge ocean liner, sanctions pressures can't simply reverse at a moment's notice. The most vociferous pro-sanctions voices are getting more shrill as

they sense the end of an era. They won't be magnanimous about this thawing of relations, especially when the ANC [African National Congress] continues to call for tougher measures.

The London-based Anti-Apartheid Movement says: "Companies like Barclays know that if they tried to get back into SA we would come down on them like a ton of bricks."

It's not the multinationals that the sanctioners have to worry about; there's not much chance they'll be back. It's the little guys who see the opportunities. The signs of a change in attitude are there:

- After a two-year hiatus the London Chamber of Commerce & Industry will resume its annual trade mission to SA this month. Representatives of a dozen businesses, ranging from footwear and greeting cards to dental ceramics, will visit Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town.

SA Foreign Trade Organisation's Ann Moore says trade missions are down to about 25 percent of what they were before sanctions. A few new ones have been scheduled recently;

Columbia University, a bastion of Ivy League liberalism in New York City, plans to review its policy of divesting its shares in companies doing business in SA, which has been in effect since 1987; and

Merrill Lynch, the huge US stockbroking company, decided in November not to do business with SA, its corporations or residents. Will it be back? "It is conceivable," says spokesman Bill Clark.

At home, the industries that would be affected by a loosening in sanctions are ready to take up where they left off. One of the most talked about concessions is the reinstatement of SA Airways' landing rights at US airports. SAA [South African Airways] has heard the proposal but won't say what its contingency plans are.

The ban on agricultural exports to the US may also be lifted as a nod to De Klerk's reforms, which could mean SA wine on US shelves once again. The lucrative US market was shut off to wine co-operative KWV before it had the chance to make inroads. KWV was also shut out of Canada, its most important export market. "We are ready at any moment to take up where we left off," says a KWV spokesman.

"We still have contacts. Our lines of channelling are still open."

SA Tourism Board executive director Spencer Thomas says the UK's voluntary ban on tourism to SA did not make a substantial difference though he acknowledges that lifting it "might have a psychological effect on a couple of UK operators."

Satour was forced to close its offices in Australia and Canada but the number of visitors from those countries

is growing. Last year there were 20 percent more Australians than in 1988 and 17 percent more Canadians.

But don't expect Australia or Canada to lift their tough sanctions immediately. They compete directly with SA in many industries and, with their economies troubled, have too much at stake to open trade lines so soon.

The Nordic nations—Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland—recently voted to maintain sanctions. Their social democratic governments can't be expected to do anything else at this point. The UN last month voted 35-2 for wider international sanctions. No surprise there.

However, Thatcher won't back down on her carrot approach and, despite the efforts of hardliners such as Ted Kennedy and Howard Wolpe, there's no longer much chance that the US Congress will toughen sanctions in the short-term. "Our struggle will be to keep the present sanctions in place," Congressman Dellums said during his trip to Africa this month.

So, despite Mandela's pleas for more international pressure, it looks as if De Klerk has bought himself some time. Meg Voorhes, of the Investor Responsibility Research Centre, a Washington group, says: "I don't think anyone is willing to stick their neck out now for sanctions."

* Survey of Businessmen on Economic Restructuring

34000549A Johannesburg BLACK ENTERPRISE
in English Mar 90 pp 10-12, 14, 16

[Article by Ted Scales: "Economic Freedom for All?"]

[Text] The need to restructure the economy is not in dispute. The debate is really about how this should be done, who will do it and with what resources?

On the one hand, Nelson Mandela has stated that ANC [African National Congress] policy is to nationalise key sectors, including the mines, as a means of restructuring the economy and uplifting the black majority.

On the other hand the government is committed to a policy of deregulation and privatisation. Said President De Klerk in Parliament on February 2: "Government's basic point of departure is to reduce the role of the public sector in the economy and give the private sector maximum opportunity for optimal performance".

Nevertheless in a tone of conciliation, various ANC sources have indicated clearly that "nationalisation" is one of the options that will be the subject of negotiations.

Said Mr Mandela in a Weekly Mail exclusive interview: "...The whole question of how we move towards generating resources so that the injustices of the past are addressed is something that has to be worked out. The pace and approach on this whole question is something that can be discussed".

On the issue of privatisation, he expressed his reservations: "Black people do not have the necessary resources to own shares in privatised companies".

In order to obtain a business viewpoint on how to generate the necessary wealth, BLACK ENTERPRISE consulted key business leaders and opinion formers who are active in development. Over the past year BLACK ENTERPRISE together with its readers developed a six point New Economy Plan. This was faxed to over 50 major players in the development game for their comments. The degree of consensus surprised even BLACK ENTERPRISE staff, who are by nature optimistic!

A number of additional goals and problems were identified. In essence what came through strongly was a great feeling of excitement, coupled with realism.

Job creation through entrepreneurship came out persistently as a key solution to unemployment and a sluggish economy.

The Self Employment Institute's Theo Rudman had some harsh things to say about the formal sector: "In the 80s South Africa [SA] produced around 3.5 million school leavers and the formal sector only created 100,000 job positions. I don't believe that relaxation of sanctions and even a mass inflow of foreign capital is going to stimulate the formal economy sufficiently to absorb all those people not formally employed, as well as the 350,000 school leavers that are still to come onto the job market each and every year..."

He continues: "I believe the only way this can be done is by integrating the formal economy with the informal economy."

The Rembrandt Group's J. Knoetze sees the Small Business Development Corporation as a major job creator—almost 250,000 new careers since its inception. "As proof of our confidence in the Corporation and the role it has to play in shaping South Africa's 'New Economy' we have increased our shareholding by 40 percent," he said.

Markinor's Mora David Mailoane goes along with the idea of partnership between small and big business. "Small business can best handle the manufacture of components which may actually be impeding big business' efficiency small business needs stable and regular clients, big business caters for this need; big business is better able to impart knowledge and skills much needed by small business at minimal costs to the big corporation."

James Seuloadi puts it even more forcibly and perceives a link between economic stagnation and overconcentration of economic power. "Monopoly power must go! The idea of economic partnership at all levels must be fostered. A trader must automatically expect to look around and find those with whom he can share. Only in this way can limited skills be used to full advantage".

Economic Reconciliation

Although the divide between capitalists and socialists seems enormous, Africa always has a way of producing something new. Two rather original examples stand out:-

Ian Hetherington somehow managed to privatise the Nationalisation concept! His ingenious suggestion was that, "the share capital in say SATS or ESKOM could simply be divided by the number of adults in the country—who after all owns SATS? It is the State. And who is the State? It is the citizens of the country. If white citizens could bring themselves to exclude themselves from the distribution, I would be even happier, because it would provide a clear symbol that whites wish to make some gesture to partially compensate for past collective injustices. But even if whites were not excluded, the majority of shareholders would be black."

He develops the argument: "All evidence is that nationalisation leads to economic stagnation where privatisation leads to economic dynamism, so we could achieve the ANC's goal of black economic empowerment in ways which enrich rather than impoverish the economy we all share."

The core issue is contained in the ANC's guidelines issued in August 1989 in the Harare Declaration, says Mike Maisela, and he quotes: "There shall be created a new economic order which shall promote and advance the well being of all the people of South Africa".

"If we can agree with this statement," says Maisela, "we can then begin to discuss how the new economic order is to be achieved".

Urgent Need for Action

Local big business and potential overseas investors have clearly been stunned by ANC calls for nationalisation. What is easy to forget is that whichever government represents the majority of South Africans, they will be under extreme pressure to provide more than a vote.

The urgent need for all the major players in business to get involved in negotiations on how to build the new economy is best summed up by Jabu Mabuza of the Foundation for African Business and Consumer Services (FABCOS). "The 'new economy' as you describe it can only be achieved if positive steps are taken to level the playing fields. This means that government and established business must make special efforts to ensure that the skills and knowledge are transferred to blacks so that all can benefit.

"Black South Africans are interested in power, but not merely political power. Economic power is just as necessary and just as important. [Quotation marks as published.]

"We want to be free, but we must be able to use the instruments of power to ensure that this freedom is a real one. For that, we must look to established business for a transfer of economic skills and knowledge."

What Is the New Economy?

A new dawn for Southern Africa is on the horizon. When it arrives, it will unleash enormous amounts of energy that have been shackled for too long by apartheid. If managed and channelled correctly, this energy will in turn generate great volumes of capital, expertise and economic growth. Such a new regional economy will enable everyone who is capable of acquiring skills and of working to earn a place in the sun and generate the economic growth we so desperately need.

As we at BLACK ENTERPRISE see it, there are at least six major characteristics of this new economy:-

1. The new economy is driven by innovation and entrepreneurship.
2. It encourages and rewards both individual and corporate self respect and self reliance.
3. It resolves the problem of overconcentration of opportunities and monopoly power by stimulating partnerships between big business and small business.
4. It stimulates education, training, venture capital and new business ventures through tax incentives for both in-house and external initiatives.
5. It encourages and rewards those individuals who facilitate the concept of "ownership" through work, equity participation and home ownership.
6. In essence, the new economy stands for the economic freedom of the individual to run his or her own business of profession, or develop to his or her maximum potential as an employee.

Economic Reconstruction - A Business Viewpoint

Perfect Malimela, Human Resources Consultant—"How can blacks support free enterprise when they own nothing, make no decisions? Black must play a role in the economy, and it mustn't be a hand-out, they must work for it."

Jabu Mabuza, Deputy MD, Fabcos Marketing—"There is a grave suspicion among blacks that the government is pushing privatisation just because black people are now getting close to a position of power. If the Iscor [South African Iron and Steel Corporation] privatisation is an example, all that will happen is that white business rather than white government will take over control. There will be no place for black business, and a future black government will find that everything has been sold."

James Seutloadi, Manager of Corporate Social Responsibility Programmes—"Economic freedom—yes—but within the framework of acceptable business practice."

John Kane-Berman, Director General, SA Institute of Race Relations—"The debate on material equality hasn't even begun yet. In the black persons' experience,

capitalism hasn't worked very well. An explosion of demands for economic liberation will follow closely on political liberation."

Isaac Mogahjane, Marketing Development Officer, Nissan—"The action to level the playing fields (in the economic sphere) is so important that it should be part of the constitutional negotiations.

Tokenism is more dangerous than apartheid.

It does not help to be too proud of the informal sector. It has its place, but the need now is for advances into formal business."

Mike Maisela, Entrepreneur and Marketing Consultant—"Privileged whites must be prepared to give something to disadvantaged blacks."

David John Pooe, Acting Chairman, Greater Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce—"Education is priority number one. Second big need is venture capital."

James Chapman, MD Fabcos Marketing—"While I believe the Group Areas Act must go as soon as possible, the repeal of that piece of legislation could squeeze the small black businessman out of the market as established business moves in. It is important not to remove restrictions in such a way that the small black businessman is swept away by big business.

If that happens, it will be a sad day for the free enterprise system.

If the government is serious about change, it must start carving up economic monopolies. Unless we have economic change, there is no change.

The privatisation issue should go hand in hand with the political debate. If privatisation is seen as the handing over of State assets to large business interests it should be stopped and rather negotiated in the political arena."

C. W. Bruggemans, Group Economist, First National Bank—"The government of the day would do well to position the economy for a future of free enterprise and a social democracy as reflected in an efficient public sector providing public goods on a democratic basis. To this end inflation should be brought down, the balance of payments strengthened and the tax burden stabilised." [Quotation marks as published.]

Gareth Penny, Manager of Sub-Contracting, Anglo American—"The ANC should call not so much for a redistribution of wealth as for a redistribution of opportunity."

Peter Van Ryneveld, Manager, Financial & Computer Training—"We have to give a far more human face to capitalism than it currently presents. It is the role of business, rather than government, to achieve this. Companies must really start to work for their employees to a

far greater degree than they are at present. The upliftment of the living standards of employees should be as important an objective as the growth in profits."

Isaac Mogajane, Marketing Development Officer, Nissan—"The new economy will not succeed unless there is a preliminary programme of deliberate affirmative action on the part of big business."

Mora David Mailone, Markinor—"The new economy is driven by innovation because South Africa is faced with the need to rationalise its manufacturing activities in the light of disinvestment and economic sanctions."

James Seutloadi, Caltex—"Monopoly power must go. The idea of partnership at all level must be fostered. A trader should automatically expect to look around to find those with whom he can share."

Don MacRobert, Managing Director, Get Ahead Foundation—"A new economy in South Africa, which presents opportunities for all may still be a long way off. Whilst we are certainly living in exciting times, and changes in the apartheid structures may well be in the offing, one needs to exercise a certain amount of caution in bringing about the hope for a new economy which will enable everyone to become economically active (or more active).

It is utterly fallacious to believe that we have a free enterprise system in this country. Whilst one is wholly appreciative of business people who have made a success of their lives—and who may perhaps have had disadvantaged origins—their successes cannot be ascribed to anything which government has done for them. We have a long way to go before we reach the free enterprise system.

We need to remember three major problem areas created by the National Party regime:

- Many hawkers are still being subjected to legislation or regulation which force them, for example, to move every hour or have a stack of newspapers of a particular height.
- Section 43A of the Community Development Act still prohibits blacks from obtaining licences to trade in white areas.
- Black people may not freely own or rent business or properties wherever they choose.

In the transition towards a new economy major changes are needed. In order to prepare for the new economy and the exciting opportunities which present themselves, white business must play a role in fields such as making facilities available for literacy classes, training non-employees in technical subjects and promoting blacks into middle and senior management positions.

Bernard de Jager, Assistant General Manager, SA Reserve Bank—"Nobody has any recollection of the 1970s and the 1980s as the good old days. In fact the economy's two most disruptive decades since the Great Depression have brought about a seeming contradiction

of very little real income growth and galloping inflation—so called "stagflation".

Economists, proud and self-assured during the 1960s now look like a defeated bunch. Their past prescriptions of tinkering with government deficit spending—to prop up aggregate demand; to regulate prices; to hold down inflation—have not been helpful in any way. The essence of the "new" approach to policy making is as follows:

- People respond to incentives of price and supply and that given the right incentives they are better equipped than the government to decide their own destinies.
- Unless major improvements are made in expanding the production or supply side of the economy by boosting saving, investment and work effort, the economy will strangle itself in drastically declining standards of living in the 1990s.
- We must adopt policies of monetary restraint which old back inflation and allow people to plan ahead intelligently.
- We must provide long-term incentives to encourage saving by individuals and companies.
- We must reduce government spending to provide room for the private sector.
- We must not attempt to manage or fine-tune the economy.
- Above all, we must improve personal liberties so that ordinary people can earn a living in a way they see fit and retain the bulk of their earnings for themselves.

One can understand why future governments could be concerned with social problems and the upliftment of the deprived and the underprivileged. History has proven that the best way to tackle these problems is to strengthen the economy's ability to create wealth and to broaden the tax base to fund social programmes. To this there is no real alternative.

* ANC's Economic Policy Viewed

34000549B Johannesburg BLACK ENTERPRISE
in English Mar 90 p 14

[Article by Alan Fine: "An Analysis of ANC Economic Policy"]

[Text] In its 78 years of fighting for black political rights—the past 30 years fighting that struggle underground—the ANC [African National Congress] has had little time to begin working out the detail of its vision for a post-apartheid economy.

Even the basis of its economic policy—the commitment found in the Freedom Charter to nationalising the mines, banks and other sectors of the economy—has turned out to be rather flexible.

There are good reasons for this. Firstly, in 1955 nationalisation was a far more respectable form of economic policy than it is today. Secondly, the ANC is, and has been for a long time, an organisation representing a

broad range of interests and opinions. This required the ANC to adopt policies sufficiently vague that they would not alienate any important section of its support. Hence the seeming confusion which has emerged over issues like nationalisation, with even Nelson Mandela being forced to backtrack on his initial pronouncements. At least one ANC national executive committee member has acknowledged outright that nationalisation of industry is not a feasible policy in this day and age. Others, including SA [South African] Communist Party general secretary Joe Slovo, have more cautiously conceded that such a policy would not necessarily serve the interests of their constituency.

Social Benefits

Despite the uncertainty surrounding this key question, there are certain points of universal and unshakeable agreement on economic policy in the ANC. The most important is that a future ANC government would deliberately set out to restructure the SA economy, to at least partially redress the racial inequalities of the past, and to ensure in future an equality of opportunity which the majority has not enjoyed under apartheid. This would have to include remedying as quickly as possible deficiencies in education, shortages of housing, and enhancement of peoples' skills, for example.

There is also a strong feeling that the concentration of the bulk of SA's productive wealth in a few hands—a consequence of decades of racism—is undesirable.

Implementing the nationalisation policies outlined in the Freedom Charter remains an option, as Thabo Mbeki stressed recently in an interview on SATV [South African Television]. But officials have begun mentioning other options too. One option that is strongly rejected is the line pushed by the free market puritans—those who argue that the solution is for government to withdraw from the economy and leave it all to the market. "That we cannot accept," says Mbeki.

The perceived problem of wealth concentration could be dealt with through laws similar to the United States anti-trust law, ANC officials have suggested. Higher corporate tax and higher tax on the wealthy is a favoured method for finding the resource finance for the social policies seen as so vital, although some officials have stressed they would take care not to make tax rates so onerous that they discourage investment and initiative.

The ANC also cites as laudable certain state initiatives in the fast-growing far Eastern nations—such as incentives on investment which encouraged the growth of high technology industry in places like South Korea and Japan.

The Role Of Small Business

Whatever the uncertainties faced by big business regarding ANC economic policy, it appears the position and security of property of traders, small farmers and

small businessmen is secure from even the most socialist-inclined section of the ANC.

One representative of that view is Raymond Suttner who has written an analysis of the Freedom Charter that the rights of small businessmen are guaranteed. He stresses "this is not some tactical concession or an attempt to pull wool over their eyes".

He argues this group is, as much as is the working class, squeezed by "monopoly capital" and the Charter is designed to serve their interests. Suttner also says the state would find it a huge burden to manage small enterprises which, in any event, perform types of activity most efficiently conducted independently of the state.

* Mozambique Warns ANC Against Nationalization

* Interview With Machungo

34000554 Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL
in English 16 Mar 90 p 54

[Article: "Lessons Across a Border"]

[Text] There are some who will say it is one of life's rich ironies. Others will claim the superiority of practical experience over theory. But the fact is that on the very day the ANC [African National Congress]'s ageing Walter Sisulu was threatening businessmen in Johannesburg with "creative nationalisation," the PM [Prime Minister] of Mozambique—a younger but wiser man—was saying exactly the opposite in Maputo.

"If the ANC were to ask me," Mario Machungo told the FM [FINANCIAL MAIL], "I would tell them that nationalisation is not the right way to go." Both he and Finance Minister Magid Osman made very clear that they would welcome private investment—especially in the area of financial services—and that they regard a strong, democratic and well-managed SA [South Africa] as vital to the prosperity of the southern African region.

Hardly a week goes by nowadays without some leftwing intellectual or trade union leader here proclaiming that a post-apartheid SA will need to be centrally planned into prosperity: from a low-wage high-cost economy into a high-wage, low-cost economy. Precisely what that means requires an arcane insight not vouchsafed to ordinary business folk.

The reasoning seems to be that not only will nationalisation and central planning bring prosperity, it will redistribute wealth more equitably and bring about a society somehow less harsh than capitalism. It is a proposition that has no basis either in rational theory or practical experience.

Five years ago, there were those who could have argued with greater credibility that socialism brought about less prosperous but more equitable societies than those in free enterprise countries. But even that has proven wrong. Socialist countries is eastern Europe, Asia, and

Africa have failed to produce the basic necessities of life (such as food and shelter) and has given rise to authoritarian regimes whose human conduct has made the so-called harshness of capitalism pale by comparison.

As the London FINANCIAL TIMES said last week: "The argument about the limits of communism is over." Whatever elements of it are retained in any society will not soften capitalism but reinforce tendencies towards authoritarianism and circumscribe prosperity. Socialism is not an egalitarian luxury to be enjoyed by only the prosperous nations. It is a system of providing the basics of life that has failed and will fail in any society.

Our neighbour, Mozambique, has been through it all: revolution, nationalisation, central planning, authoritarianisms (with social engineering projects far worse than apartheid), brigandage and, finally, destitution. It has come to the conclusion that it is far more socially beneficial to create wealth in a country where elections are free and private ownership is restored than to try and redistribute resources that its own socialist policies are eroding.

Osman makes it very clear that redistribution of wealth in the new, reconstituted Mozambique will be through fiscal means. "We will use the tax system to do it," he told the FM.

Mozambique, of course, did not have to nationalise very much. The threat was sufficient to cause the majority of small businessmen to abandon their assets and flee—a process that the ANC's nationalisation threats has already stated in this country. Having effectively destroyed the small business sector—the very sector with the potential to create the most jobs—Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] found itself having to allow the larger companies to continue to produce what were very quickly seen to be essential goods and services.

So the Marxists were forced to horse trade. They did special deals with those companies they felt they needed. Lonrho was one of them. And their agreements with government exclude them from the vagaries of some laws and regulations. That appears to be what Sisulu has in mind when he refers to "creative" nationalisation here. So much for equity and egalitarianism.

On Its Knees

The ANC does not have to go to eastern Europe or Asia to see the folly of what it is proposing for this country. Mozambique is only a half-hour flight away. It is a country on its knees. It lives on foreign aid; it cannot provide sufficient food for its peoples despite its rich agricultural potential; law and order is uncertain. There are strikes, shortages, corruption and disease. As the FM pointed out on March 2, it is a disaster almost entirely man-made—by Frelimo and its collectivist preoccupation.

Frelimo today has had the courage and wisdom to change its mind. The young men in key ministerial posts

now have not learnt the new policies they are implementing—with the help of the World Bank—from text books alone. They have themselves experienced the grinding poverty and degradation of collectivism.

And, despite the enormous constraints of the Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] war, they are making progress, slowly, hampered often by their own inability to shrug off entirely the sentiments of their rejected ideology. The process of reform is painfully slow. The GDP [gross domestic product] will rise by only 4 percent this year. But the new rulers are sufficiently magnanimous to negotiate with companies willing to return who want their abandoned assets back. They will welcome back, too, those who fled after the revolution provided they feel they have something to offer a sovereign country.

What the ANC, with Mozambique in mind, should be doing now is not threaten nationalisation and central planning—the harm that does is potentially as destructive as the fact—but probe ways of redistributing the country's wealth without dissipating it. It is not the issue of ownership of productive assets which will accomplish that task.

It is the wisdom of a sovereign government that has a claim on the fruits of that ownership.

* Visit to Maputo

34000554 Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English
14 Mar 90 p 6

[Article by Stephen Mulholland: "There's a Lesson To Be Learned From Maputo's Mistakes"]

[Text] Ah, the joy of vindication. There can be little more satisfying for the believer in freedom than to hear from a powerful politician who has tried collectivism, central planning and nationalisation that they just don't work. If asked, he would advise other governments to avoid them.

For many years when pleading the case for the market I have pointed to the contrasts between planned and free economies. I asked why ordinary people fled from the East to the West and not the reverse, why it was necessary for communism to build walls to keep people in, why Vietnamese fled in boats on treacherous seas to escape collectivism.

Today, as communism collapses around the world the answer is as clear as it was more than 200 years ago when Adam Smith published the Wealth of Nations. He taught us that all men have a natural urge to improve themselves and, if left alone to do so, will be led by an invisible hand to improve also the condition of society at large.

In Maputo last week I met several former central planners who have grasped Smith's message.

Mario Machungo is the only economist on Frelimo's 13-strong political bureau. He is also the prime minister, appointed by the late Samora Machel to oversee the day-to-day operations of the government. Before that he was in charge of planning.

To get to his office last week my colleagues and I had to climb five flights of steps to meet this charming, intelligent man in a darkened reception room. Most of the time large parts of Maputo are without power, the combined result of Renamo sabotage and central planning.

The climb was worth it. This is what he said: "Central planning and nationalisation do not work. They fail to produce economic growth. I can tell you. We have tried them."

This is what is known as coming from the horse's mouth. It is difficult to comprehend how some of our SA [South Africa] leaders fail to heed the words of the victims of the ruinous economic policies of collectivism.

Machungo is taking his country down the road of the market. He and his officials are keen to negotiate with capitalist with the courage and foresight to invest in his country. One can take issue with some of his policies—the rules should, for example, be unambiguous and even-handed—but that would be to quibble.

He is dead right to seek foreign investment. Mozambique is a basket case. When it was Lourenco Marques the city that is now Maputo was clean, busy and functional. Today it is a garbage-strewn mess, the roads crumbling and potholed, row upon row of tall buildings, with their fading Marxist slogans and smashed window panes, shabby monuments to years of neglect. Maputo is the Johannesburg of the social nightmare of the free marketeer, a ghastly prospect for black and white alike. Mozambique's former system of minority, colonial government had to go. It was racist, unjust and immoral. But to have replaced it with socialist central planning was a disaster. This drove off all but the remnants of white skills (there are now 100 doctors for 14-million people), caused capital flight, frightened off foreign investors and decimated local production.

Before independence Mozambique led the world in cashew nut production. Now you battle to find a cashew anywhere in Maputo. Certainly the bar at the Polana Hotel was unable to find any and there were none even in the hard currency shops.

Central planning and nationalisation also robbed ambitious blacks of the opportunities and the growth that free enterprise, and only free enterprise, can provide. Ask any Lithuanian.

Finance Minister Abdul Magid Osman is in charge of Mozambique's economic recovery programme, a euphemism for its move to the market. Backing comes from the World Bank and the IMF. Osman, like so many Mozambicans of whatever race, is unfailingly courteous,

intelligent and articulate. In our discussion he supported the commitment of the prime minister to market-related economics.

Osman told a recent seminar that the living standards of the poor can be improved only through economic growth. He echoes the sentiments of many in the ANC and its satellites. The difference is that he has tried collectivism, found it wanting, suffered its abuses and turned to the market. Our folks insist that they must touch the hot stove to find out if it really will burn. They do not seem to be interested in the evidence.

They insist on ignoring the lesson of the wounds of, among others, Eastern Europe, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania and Nicaragua (whose currency shed 99 percent of its value last year, a fate which could quite easily befall our rand should we follow the socialist route; we would then be reduced, as Mozambique now is, to a pauper of a nation, our factories derelict, our mines abandoned, our cities crumbling, our begging bowl stretched out to the international community).

Are we to be condemned, as were the Nicaraguans, to a decade of socialist despoliation before, having destroyed everything, we decide we have made a mistake? It is perhaps no coincidence that the Sandinistas are the first revolutionary movement to be voted out of office in free elections. Nicaraguans, as TIME put it, voted with their stomachs to oust the collectivists; just as East Germans voted with their feet to escape them.

It is going to take at least a generation to put Mozambique back on its feet. It has the backing of the international community but, as Osman says, this will be ineffective unless the "appropriate conditions" for growth are created.

It is served by talented and intelligent political leaders, all the more effective for having emerged chastened from the collectivist experiment. There is also a vigorous, albeit tiny, business community who have no sense of race, are also charmingly polite and who leave a very firm impression as honest dealers.

They all, both private and public sectors, want to deal with SA capitalists, entrepreneurs and businessmen. It would be a great irony and an even greater tragedy if SA goes down the socialist drain, robbing the Mozambicans a second time of the benefits of the market.

All of southern Africa depends upon a healthy, growing SA. It is the engine of the regional economy. If, through the folly of collectivism, the SA economy is damaged, millions in the subcontinent will suffer and the worthy aspirations of my new friends in Mozambique will wither and die.

*** SADF National Service Questions Answered**

34000563A Pretoria PARATUS in English
Feb 90 pp 6, 8-9

[Text] Question: Motivation for Reduced Initial Service—Was this move done under pressure from political, or anti-conscription or any other organisation? Is the SADF [South African Defense Force] happy with this reduction?

Answer: No. The Defence Force is a dynamic organisation which has undergone changes on several occasions in the past. The reduction of the initial national service system announced by the State President on 7 December 1989 was the final result of an investigation which was launched on our own initiative earlier in the year and not in any way due to pressure from the informal pressure groups.

The reduction of military service does not imply amendments to the Act. Although this concession, as well as the reduction of Citizen Force commitments, is a short term solution, the Van Loggerenberg Committee is continuing to seek solutions for the entire national service system on the long term. This investigation which implies possible amendments to the Act must be completed later this year. The reduction of the initial service period is naturally subject to: The improvement of the short service system, the retention of permanent members and increasing the quality of the people joining the Permanent Force.

Question: Further Reductions of Citizen Force [CF] Camp Commitments—What will the camp commitments for the CF be now that the 24 months has been reduced to 12 months? And what about further cuts in the CF and Commando camp commitments?

Answer: The announcement by the Minister of Defence on 20 April 1989 in Parliament that Citizen Force members may not be called up for longer than 30 days a year implies the following:

Where members previously had to do 120 days in a cycle of two years, they now effectively do only 60 days a cycle and therefore receive credit for the remaining 60 days. This is of course a concession within the context of existing legislation and may at any time be withdrawn should circumstances necessitate it. Because the CF member is already an economically productive member the 30-day system is more acceptable to the private sector than the former call-up system which normally took the form of 30-90, 30-60, or a 60-60 call-up period. This is therefore an active attempt to disrupt the economy as little as possible.

This is the minimum to which the CF commitments can be reduced because with the exception of the commando system, in most cases it is not worth the trouble to call up members for less than 30 days. Of course, it has happened that in exceptional cases, CF members were sent

home earlier, but that was because of changed circumstances the services were no longer required. It is therefore not envisaged to further shorten the commitments of CF and Commando members.

Question: Religious Objectors and Service Objectors—What is the situation with religious and service objectors? What about religious objectors, will they be affected in terms of shortened time? What about service objectors? Will their prison terms also be reduced?

Answer: On 7 December 1989 the Minister of Defence, by virtue of his powers in terms of section 72E(3) of the Defence Act, 1957, determined that the community service of members of the 1984 and 1985 year groups be shortened. The employers of these 147 members have already been informed by the Department of Manpower. A full press release will shortly be released by the office of the Minister.

Question: Secondment of Servicemen to Other Instances—What about the use of NSM [National Security Management] by other departments like the SAP [South African Police]? How will this affect other departments who may rely on a national service element, for example Internal Revenue and GST [General Sales Tax] collection and the SAP?

Answer: The provision of national servicemen to other authorities takes place in accordance with the provisions of Section 16(2) of the Defence Act and the Regulations promulgated for the application of this section. With the exception of the SA Police, National Servicemen may only be seconded after completing their basic and vocational training, and on condition that they have tertiary qualifications and that the SA Defence Force does not require their services. They can only be made available to the following authorities: State Departments. Other government services. An authority approved by the Minister. Undertakings, as defined in terms of the Arms Development and Manufacture Act, which manufacture or maintain arms, or undertakings that render service to Armscor, or an institution for research into arms.

Question: Improved Short-Service System—What are the service benefits for short service Junior Leaders—leave etc.? How many have signed short service? Does it appear that the short service system will solve the junior leader problem? How many men have been recruited so far for short service? How many will be needed? When will they begin their service? How much will the project (short-service) cost? Who is in charge of the project? Will the recruits have had any previous training? If not, how much will their training cost? What rank will the recruits hold? It has been said that they will get Permanent Force [PF] salaries. What are PF members with corresponding salaries presently getting paid? What annual pay would this constitute for a recruit? If not enough recruits are signed up, will this affect the number of conscripts called up?

If it does affect the call-ups, would it only be felt when the first national servicemen to benefit from the cut

complete their service? Will recruits serve in a training capacity only? Is this system fair to PF members?

Answer: A new improved short-service system is aimed at replacing the loss of trained junior leaders from the ranks of members doing initial national service and mainly from the ranks of lieutenant and corporal. They are thus fully trained and not raw recruits and will be employed mainly in the training and operational environments. It is expected that this system will in all probability solve the problem posed by the lack of junior leaders and the shortages in specialist mustering.

The following are some of the most important characteristics of this system:

Pay Benefits: A member receives the same pay (including the service allowances and 13th cheque) of his equal in the Permanent Force, which is the following: (1) Lieutenant (operational service)—approximately R20,000 per year. (2) Corporal (operational service)—approximately R16,000 per year.

A member receives a recruiting bonus of R5,000 per year on entry and a short-service gratuity of R5,000 on retirement. The total salary of a short-service member thus amounts to approximately R30,000 per year for a lieutenant and R26,000 for a corporal. Entry and short-service gratuities are taken into account. A member receives a reduction in Citizen Force commitments for each year of short-service he completes on the basis of 2 cycles for each year short service. After three years of short service he can thus receive a total rebate from all his Citizen Force commitments.

Needs of the SADF: The actual need of the SADF should not exceed 3,500. A total of about 250 members have already been recruited. Those who joined must have assumed their duties as from January 1990.

National service is determined by law. The SA Defence Force has no control over the numbers of an intake.

Discrimination: As far as discrimination against the Permanent Force is concerned, the single most important drawback to this system is the fact that a short-service member receives much more in financial terms than his equal in the Permanent Force. However, it must be remembered that it is only short-term advantage to the short-service member. The short-service member does not have any future career prospects compared with a Permanent Force member.

Service Benefits: Short-service members enjoy the same service benefits as Permanent Force members except they do not receive any pension benefits and are not considered for promotion and housing subsidies. They are entitled to married quarters, if available.

Question: Manpower Situation SADF—How are you going to make up the manpower shortfall? With a reduced manpower level, who will do the driving, administration etc. tasks? Will the SADF continue to call

up men of low medical categories, or will more of them now be exempt from military service?

Answer: The loss of especially junior leaders is obviated by the short-service system and, in the Permanent Force, by improved service benefits. In addition to national servicemen who are not primarily employed for this purpose, the SA Defence Force has for many years employed civilians, labourers as well as supporting service members, on a full-time basis to carry out maintenance tasks.

Question: Population Demographics—What effect will population demographics (the white population is getting smaller while the black population is growing) have on future manpower requirements?

Answer: The SA Defence Force is well aware of the impact of demographic factors on future manpower requirements, hence among others the establishment of the Van Loggerenberg Committee by the Minister of Defence on 20 April 1989—"The Committee shall specifically examine manpower requirements and employment in the SADF".

Question: National Service, Other Population Groups—Are there any plans for conscription of other groups, specifically the Coloured and Indian populations? Is the SADF considering expanding the system to include other population groups to make up the shortfall?

Answer: Section 3 of the Defence Act, 1957 only makes provision for national service for whites. A voluntary service system for brown people and Indians has been in existence since 1973 and 1975 which is based on the same principle as national service. Since they have been participating in the system in increasing numbers. Compulsory service for other population groups requires amendments to the Act by Parliament.

Question: Intake, and Clearing Out Situation—Will the call-up be moved back to the beginning of January and will the July call-up be maintained? What is the likelihood of the August intake being scrapped? Will the present leave and early clearing out dates (before Christmas each year) be maintained? When will the February 1990 intake clear out?

Answer: Until the Van Loggerenberg Committee produces an acceptable change, the intake months will remain February and August. To ensure continuity in force levels, there will always have to be two intakes per year in the SA Defence Force. The possibility of scrapping the August intake is therefore not being considered.

The reduced 12 months of national service implies 12 months of service. The clearing out process of an intake will take place over a period of about 6 days in order to deal with the clearing-out administration as effectively as possible and also to ensure that the release of too many national servicemen simultaneously will not overload the transport infra-structure. As in the past the final

clearing out dates of each intake will be announced after taking into consideration the circumstances prevailing at the particular time.

Question: Did the SADF consider the possible implications on the job market, universities etc. which could be suddenly flooded by young men who had not yet made plans for their future outside of national service? What will the influence of the rationalisation programme be on the labour market?

Answer: In order to be fair to everyone and to prevent a sudden scaling down of force levels with negative implications for the Defence Force, and also to prevent the unexpected sudden entry of too many people to the labour market, it was decided to systematically phase out the intakes that are at present doing military service on the basis of oldest intakes render the longest service. Therefore:

The August 1988 intake of approximately 6,000 members complete their military service on 30 April 1990 after 21 months service. Clearing-out dates are 25 April to 2 May 1990.

The February 1989 intake of approximately 22,000 members complete their military service on 31 July 1990 after 18 months service. Clearing-out dates will be announced later.

The August 1989 intake of approximately 6,000 members complete their military service on 31 October 1990 after 15 months service. Clearing-out dates will be announced later.

It must, however, be accepted that such a far-reaching decision, made possible by the present security situation, could contribute to unemployment. This is unavoidable and is a pity. The private sector expressed the wish that national service be reduced so that these young men could become part of the economically active population. The private sector needs them. The advantages to the country far outweigh the disadvantages. The Defence Force did however consider this matter with among others, the following results:

Staggered clearing-out dates for the present intakes.

The short-term system.

There are plans to liaise soon with the Department of Education and Training as well as with tertiary authorities in this connection in an effort to find solutions for dealing with prospective students on a basis other than the traditional one.

Question: Reduction in the Budget—Does this mean that the SADF will be able to reduce its budget accordingly?

Answer: Considerable savings have been achieved, but the improved short-service system is an additional financial burden.

Question: Replacement of Military Service—Can this pave the way for the scrapping of compulsory military service and replacing it with a volunteer service?

Answer: There is no intention to replace the new application of the existing national service system with a voluntary system.

Question: Allocation to the SA Police—Can the SADF still afford to detach hundreds of soldiers permanently to the SAP? How will this affect other departments who may rely on national service elements, for example, Internal Revenue and GST collection and the SAP?

Answer: The Defence Force can allocate national servicemen to the SA Police, which will assist the Army to withdraw from the urban areas. The allotment of servicemen to the Police on this basis is naturally totally in accordance with the stipulations of the Defence Act and has been applied for a number of years.

Question: Utilization of Professionally Qualified Servicemen—What about professional people like doctors, teachers, engineers, etc.? Can they still be deployed meaningfully by the military in their professional capacity when it takes a number of months to train them in military ways and then only be available for a limited period in which they can operate in their specialist fields? Doctors at 1 Mil Hosp are a good example of this. The Medical Service is totally dependent on national service doctors.

Answer: Professionally qualified persons are already employed as efficiently as possible in such a way that they are of the greatest benefit to the SADF in the execution of its function on the one hand, and where at all possible to the advantage of the individual on the other hand. When the reduced national service system is taken into account it is clear that even greater emphasis will be placed on employing them more productively. They are, for example, only trained for three to six months and are then employed. In the case of a surplus the excess number will be employed elsewhere, but still to the advantage of the SADF.

The basic principle for the employment of professionally qualified national servicemen in the SADF comes down to the fact that they must primarily be employed for tasks in the infrastructure during initial national service taking into account their qualifications and after that they are allotted to the citizen force or the commandos for the remainder of their period of national service.

Question: Credit for Service in the Permanent Force, SA Police and Prisons Service—How will this affect young men who joined the PF for four years to avoid later camp commitment?

Answer: Persons who serve full-time in the Permanent Force, the SA Police, the Prison Service or the Merchant Navy receive deferment of their military service for the duration of such service. Regarding credit for service in

any one of these Forces, attention is at present being given to adjusting such service as a result of the reduction of military service.

Question: Leave Situation Present and Reduced Service System—Will the present leave and early clear-out dates (before Christmas of each year) be maintained? What about leave for those still doing their national service, i.e., will they still get their seven or 14 days passes despite the reduction in service time? Will 12 month intakes in the future get any form of leave other than week-end passes?

Answer: National servicemen serving under the present system receive the same leave benefits as in the past, provided that a member forfeits his leave if he does not take it before he clears out "earlier". A member may in any case not take his leave during his last month of service. Unit officers commanding will decide to what extent it is possible to approve the leave of an individual.

Based on the SA Defence Force contribution to road safety and statistical proof of the number of fatal road accidents involving national servicemen travelling in private vehicles, as well as the result of reducing the national service system to 12 months and the standard of training which must be maintained, it has been decided to apply the existing policy of leave in which a national serviceman will still receive 7 days leave in the 12 months period. Week-end leave will, as in the past, still be left to the discretion of the unit officer commanding.

The SADF will still place a high premium on the morale of the troops but will, in the process and of necessity, have to place greater emphasis on productivity.

Question: Manpower Requirements in Training Environment—If there is any manpower shortage in the training section, would the Defence Force be considering any change in the deferment regulations?

Answer: The SADF has, through the improved short-service system, ensured that no manpower shortages occur in the training environment. The SADF does not have the authority to change any of the "exemption regulations" because none of these regulations exist. The exemption board is the only body that may institute any changes.

Question: Restructuring of Training—How will training be restructured over 12 months, i.e., what proportion will be training and what proportion will be utilisation?

Answer: A consequence of the reduction of the initial national service system is that training periods and syllabi have to be revised. This means that servicemen in the Army, as an example, will be formally trained for six months and after that will receive six months practical training. This is also valid for graduates, those with diplomas and tradesmen, but in the case of professionally qualified people, they will receive only three to six months training and will then be employed for six to

nine months. Leader group training has already been shortened to a system of nine months training and three months practical training.

Question: Deployment/Utilisation of Sophisticated Equipment—How will the cut affect training? We were always told it takes one year to train a man before you can use him and to ensure that he is not cannon fodder. How will this affect the deployment of sophisticated equipment which needs sophisticated training?

Answer: Over the years the SADF has learnt to adapt to changing circumstances. This is the first time that the National Service System has been "reduced" and although the implications are far more far-reaching than in a reversed situation, the adapting process has already been set in motion. The new approach to training will to a large extent solve the problem.

During the previous 24-month system, combat troops were trained in conventional warfare and counter-insurgency operations. In future servicemen will be trained mainly in their Citizen Force deployment direction. Therefore those who were conventionally trained will, after their 12 month period, be allotted to conventional Citizen Force units. Those trained in border protection and rural counter-insurgency operations will be allotted to the counter-insurgency units of the Citizen Force.

Other Questions

Question: Effect of the Reduction as Result of Rationalization—Is there a change in the retirement date? (i.e., 45?). How will this affect the pension scheme? What is the extent of the cuts to the SADF, specifically the PF? Will people be fired and how will it affect career planning, the rank structure and the period served between ranks?

Answer: As a result of the scaling down a reduction of personnel numbers will inevitably take place. Less than 10 percent of the personnel in the Permanent Force will be affected by the scaling down and the accompanying cuts, and the effect on career management will therefore be minimal. No changes in the rank structure are expected and the Permanent Force will continue to offer challenging career opportunities.

There will be no change in the retirement age as prescribed in the regulations on pension funds. (The retirement age is not 45 but 60 years.) However, the present pension scheme makes provision for compensation of personnel who, because of circumstances beyond their control, are obliged to retire at an earlier age. In the light of the previous paragraph the effect on the pension scheme will be minimal.

Question: Voluntary Service System—How will ethnic units and the voluntary service system for other population groups be affected? (e.g., Moltano and SAS Jalsena).

Answer: The voluntary service system continues within the predetermined financial restrictions and based on the requirements of the SA Defence Force for this manpower.

Question: Alternative Forms of Service—Is the SADF considering alternative forms of service?

Answer: Alternative forms of military service have existed for several years in the SA Defence Force, and although it was never made known, the general public was thoroughly aware of the fact. The following are examples of this:

Service in terms of Section 16 (2) of the Defence Act (service with other government departments in terms of Section 16 (2) of the Defence Act takes place on the authority of the Minister of Defence).

Service in terms of Section 72E of the Defence Act (community service by religious objectors).

Service in terms of Section 67 (2) of the Defence Act (service rendered in the SA Police by members who are called up by the Registering Official of the SADF).

The Van Loggerenberg Committee may make a further recommendation in this regard.

Question: Sport Policy—Is there going to be a change in the sport policy, for example will the Wednesday sport parade be scrapped?

Answer: It will probably not be changed, but certain adjustments may be introduced.

Angola**Foreign Minister Rejects Peace Talks Proposal**

MB2404191390 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 1900 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Angolan Foreign Minister Pedro de Castro van Dunem Loy in New York yesterday rejected a U.S. proposal whereby peace talks with UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] should be held in Geneva.

The Angolan minister disclosed this during a meeting with Herman Cohen, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs.

The U.S. proposal states the Geneva talks would be mediated by Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, with U.S. and Soviet technical support.

'Has No Message' for U.S.

MB2504072990 (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa 0520 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Text] MPLA-PT [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party] Foreign Minister van Dunem Loy has no message for the United States.

International observers believe Van Dunem Loy has nothing to say to the American people because his suitcase only carries warmongering and genocidal plans against UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola].

The MPLA foreign minister tried to attract the reporters' interest. However, whatever he has to say has already been overtaken by day-to-day events in Angola and the neighboring countries.

The situation has become even more serious in the face of MPLA-PT air force raids against recently independent Namibia. In fact, the MPLA-PT air force has used phosphorous bombs and other chemical weapons to bomb Namibia on more than five occasions. The national and international communities must not remain indifferent to the MPLA-PT's warmongering operations.

KUP Cites FRG Reporter on Mavinga Control

MB2204062590 (Clandestine) KUP in English to Southern and Central Africa 0610 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Jamba, Saturday, April 21...[dateline as received]—The least western newsman to visit the strategic UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] stronghold town of Mavinga says that he has proved that UNITA is the firm control of the situation in the area.

Speaking in an interview with local newsman shortly after a visit to the town of Mavinga, which has been the

target of the now four-month old Soviet-backed military offensive, Richard Hoffman, a West German journalist who writes for the DIE WELT newspaper and correspondent for the Cologne-based Deuts-Chlandfunk radio Network, said that he was highly impressed with what he had seen.

He noted that among all the anti-Soviet guerrilla resistance movements he has so far visited in different parts of the world, UNITA undoubtedly possesses the best organized force capable of winning.

During his visit to Mavinga, Hoffman was able to interview several MPLA soldiers who had either been captured or surrendered to UNITA. The German newsman is among half a dozen foreign journalists who have visited Mavinga over the past three months. On the contrary, the Luanda regime has not been able to bring a single independent reporter to prove its often repeated claim that it controls Mavinga.

Labor Minister Supports Administrative Reform

MB2504062090 Luanda ANGOP in French 1935 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Luanda, 24 Apr (ANGOP)—Diogo de Jesus, Angolan labor and social security minister, spoke in Luanda on Monday in favor of urgent public administration reforms in the country.

In his opening address at the first seminar on public administration in Angola, Labor and Social Security Minister Diogo de Jesus affirmed this meeting is the starting point for a series of actions planned by an interministerial group to implement a two-year reform project.

Minister de Jesus said that project will begin with the creation of conditions for introducing a system capable of responding to SEF [Economic and Financial Reorganization Program] demands. The SEF began in Angola in 1987.

The minister also cited the need for defining a new salary policy and drawing up plans to restructure the administrative tribunal.

The goal of the seminar is to identify the principles guiding that reform project as well as to study and assess various international experiences in the field. It also seeks to identify international organizations and plan aid requests in order to ensure the development of reform work.

Representatives from various state organizations, the UN Development Program, UNDP, and other international organizations are attending the seminar. Delegates from Mozambique, Portugal, Cape Verde and Brazil have also been invited and are attending the seminar proceedings scheduled to end on 28 April.

Reports of MPLA Stealing 'Huge Amount' of Corn

MB2404063690 (Clandestine) KUP in English
to Southern and Central Africa 0615 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Jamba, Monday, April 23..... [dateline as received]—A huge amount of maize recently loaded in train wagons at the Angolan sea-port of Lobito has been stolen.

Informed economic sources told KUP Monday that director of MPLA's [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] state-owned company of Moi Jose Santos, April 21 accused senior local railway officers of collaborating with MPLA troops FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] and frontier forces—the TGFA [Angolan Border Guard Troops] for being responsible for the disappearance of large amounts of maize which had filled several wagons.

According to the sources, Jose Santos was addressing a rally attended by C.F.B. [Benguela Railroad] employees and residents of the town. He said the troops had been guarding the cereals to hunger-stricken population at Ganda, Cubal, Chongoroi, Canjala and Hanha Norte districts.

Earlier, MPLA's provincial political commissioner Paulo Texeira Jorge, during the April 16 rally at Balombo expressed his regret at what he called the general state of demobilizing of the youth in the province which he said was getting out of hand.

Reports say the last few weeks have seen large numbers of youth abandoning classes for having been turned into recruiting grounds by MPLA army drafting teams.

Also, widespread drug taking by the youth is reported to have led to rumour mongering and agitations of imminent attacks by unknown persons which often put people in unnecessary panic.

In another development large quantities of relief aid donated by the International Committee of Red Cross is reported to have been deviated jointly by customs officers and provincial leaders.

UNITA Reports 23 April Military Situation

MB2404054190 (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa 0512 GMT 24 Apr 90

["Political and Military Situation Report" for 1200 GMT on 23 April—read by announcer]

[Text] 1. Our forces took the enemy barracks at Bongo village at 0600 [0500 GMT] on 22 April. After clashing for an hour, the enemy fled its base, leaving eight dead FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] soldiers on the battlefield. Our forces also captured one FAPLA soldier.

2. The UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] armed forces' attack on Bailundo city had the following results: 28 FAPLA soldiers killed and one captured. Our forces also destroyed one BRDM-2 armed car, one BM-21, five military vehicles, including Ural and Engesa trucks, and five buildings, including the local Political Commissariat and Minse [Ministry of State Security] branch.

Our forces captured, among other war materiel, 46 AK rifles, five RGP-7 rocket launchers, two RPD automatic rifles, three 60 mm mortars, two 82 mm mortars, and two two-way radios with all the necessary equipment.

3. In an attempt to destroy our hospital at (Cacuchi), two MiG-23 aircraft flew from Cuito Cuanavale and bombed the (Badane) area, in Namibian territory, at 1120 on 22 April.

4. We recall it is the fifth time in less than two months that MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] aircraft have bombed Namibian territory, and that it is the second time they have caused Namibian civilian casualties.

5. There can be no talk of peace as long as the MPLA continues to attack UNITA by land and air. The FALA [Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] forces believe there must be direct talks [words indistinct] for the complete liberation of our land and people.

[Issued] Office of the chief of general staff, on 23 April 1990
[Signed] Brigadier Zacarias Mundombe, deputy military intelligence chief

Reports 24 Apr Situation

MB2504055590 (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa 0514 GMT 25 Apr 90

["Political and Military Situation Report" for 1200 GMT on 24 April—read by announcer]

[Text] 1. At 1600 [1500 GMT] on 23 April, the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] armed forces resumed their attack on Cuito Cuanavale, the starting point of the enemy actions against the UNITA-controlled areas.

2. In Mavinga Area at 1630 on 23 April, our armed forces ambushed an enemy battalion trying to reach the Cavungo River to get water. The enemy lost 12 vehicles and one BMP-1 armored car. The UNITA armed forces captured Alberto Joaquim, a soldier serving in the 4th Tactical Group of FAPLA's [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] 4th Group.

Lack of water and food as well as constant UNITA attacks make life unbearable for the enemy, and yet another FAPLA soldier has surrendered to our forces. He is Afonso Pilartes. He belonged to the 3rd Company

of the 1st Tactical Group of the MPLA's [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] 4th Group.

3. At 1100 on 23 April, the UNITA armed forces put to flight the 3rd Battalion of FAPLA's 32nd Brigade, backed by two territorial battalions 23 km south of Luacano, in Mexico Province. It is hereby confirmed that enemy suffered 23 FAPLA soldiers killed.

Our forces captured FAPLA soldier Sabino Mucavela, 31, who was born in Caconda, Huila Province. Twenty-one AK weapons, three RPG-7 rocket launchers, one RPK submachine gun and other assorted war materiel were also captured.

4. No one has the right to prolong the Angolan people's suffering by resorting to short-lived ploys.

If the MPLA continues to avoid direct contacts with UNITA, it will be forced to negotiate on the terms of the people represented by the patriotic and revolutionary FALA [Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] forces.

[Issued] Office of the chief of general staff on 24 April 1990

[Signed] Brigadier Zacarias Mundombe, deputy military intelligence chief

UNITA Commentary on First Congress of Cadres

MB2504083590 (Clandestine) *Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa 0508 GMT 25 Apr 90*

[Commentary: "The First Congress for Angolan Cadres: What Is Their Political Color?"]

[Text] Much expectation has been built up around the first congress of Angolan cadres, because it takes place at a critical stage for our country. Our people and the international community expect a valid contribution to peace, national unity, and reconciliation.

UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and the MPLA-PT [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party], the two warring factions in Angola, (?have been politically cautious). At the preparatory stage, the congress organizers said it was a neutral meeting open to all national political currents.

It was on this basis that various countries, governments, and international organizations took an interest in the aforesaid congress. If it were known simply as a meeting of former members and supporters of the MPLA-PT now attempting to return to Luanda to try and rescue the corrupt incompetent, and bloodthirsty MPLA-PT regime's seat, many democratic countries would not have given it support or publicity. The world has had enough of supporters of one-party systems, totalitarianism, and political and religious intolerance, and such choices are now relegated to the trash can of history.

The first congress of Angolan cadres enjoyed some international publicity only because it allowed UNITA and the MPLA to compete on an equal footing. It would allow public addresses explaining the political, social, and economic goals of UNITA and of the MPLA. It would have been a major opportunity for Angolan cadres to listen openly and directly to what the warring sides believe the country's program of action should be. Only in that way would the Angolan cadres be able to analyze the Angolan situation objectively.

Obviously, we cannot change ways of thinking. Angola's national reconstruction can only realistically be undertaken with the restoration of real peace and national reconciliation.

Let us examine this issue: The MPLA-PT regime does not even talk about national reconstruction. Its calls on cadres inside and outside the country have been limited to that theme. [sentence as heard] The MPLA-PT forgets that any national reconstruction effort must occur within a political system. If its reconstruction plans are to be implemented within the framework of the current totalitarian and corrupt one-party system, such reconstruction is an illusion.

There can only be extensive national reconstruction once Angola's current political system has been changed. Democracy must be established, allowing free participation by various political parties and a responsible government with representative organs elected by the people.

That will be acceptable. Then the country will have a system permitting nationwide reconstruction. We believe that only then will the Angolan cadres freely express their ideas, work in peace, and join the programs they want. Anything other than that is a fraud and an attempt to mislead our people.

The first congress of Angolan cadres is to be held at a stage favoring political debate. An alternative to the current Luanda regime is viable thanks to the glorious national resistance conducted by UNITA, wisely led by Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, our beloved president. Without that resistance, the Angolan cadres would not have had any alternatives to Luanda's present social, political, and economic system. The current openness to discussions is the logical result of UNITA's national liberation struggle.

Lisbon, the Portuguese capital, will host the first congress of Angolan cadres abroad on 26, 27, and 28 April. What will the political color of that congress be? What political forces will officially and openly participate in that congress?

If the MPLA-PT ministers are the only ones to attend that congress as guests of honor, to speak, and to participate in discussions, then that congress will only amount to an MPLA-PT internal reform attempt. If that is the situation, the congress will merely be a vain attempt to rescue the Luanda government from its

complete failure. Let us not forget the possibilities raised by certain international observers, who said the congress could be transformed into an opportunity for some greedy people to return to Luanda, including former ministers of the incompetent and corrupt MPLA-PT regime. Other observers have called for measures to prevent that greedy lot from transforming that first congress of cadres into a political organization seeking an alliance with the MPLA-PT. If that is the case, the congress will only be a meeting of former MPLA-PT members and supporters.

Angola's situation is very serious. No Angolan cadre can afford to view it irresponsibly or lightly. The country will have a multiparty system and be really free, independent, and democratic. UNITA's contribution to Angola's freedom and democracy causes is a determining factor, today and tomorrow, for the real growth, prosperity, and security of Angola, our beloved fatherland, and all our people. The UNITA cadres will fulfill their duties toward the fatherland, whether it be for liberation or national reconstruction.

Long live freedom!
Long live multiparty democracy!
Down with Luanda's totalitarian regime!

FAPLA Reportedly Prepares for Huila Offensive

MB2204071690 (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa 0515 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] forces in Huila Province are preparing a new offensive to massacre the people and steal their possessions under the command of Captain Ambrosio.

The 100th Brigade, in Huila Province, has given military equipment, including 76mm cannons and BM-21's, to FAPLA forces in Capuanga, a company in Capala, and two companies in Caluquembe with a forward command post at Chicoma village.

Namibia

Geingob Rejects Full Diplomatic Ties With RSA

MB2404212090 Windhoek Domestic Service in Afrikaans 1900 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Prime Minister Hage Geingob said Namibia will continue its trade relations with South Africa but will not establish full diplomatic relations with it. Referring to apartheid, he said that as soon as the situation in South Africa stabilizes, normal relations would then be established. He said apartheid is an obstacle and must be abolished.

Patriotic Front Criticizes SWAPO Forces

MB2004134090 Windhoek Domestic Service in Afrikaans 0600 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] NPF [National Patriotic Front] President Mr. Moses Katjiuongua says freedom and stability in Namibia are being threatened by the armed forces of SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization], who have recently entered Namibia.

Speaking at a news conference in Windhoek, he said the fact that these forces are being brought into the country goes against the stipulations of Resolution 435 and the Constitution which was accepted by all the parties.

He said parliamentary approval is important in determining ways of dealing with the country's security situation and in preparing legislation concerning this.

Mr. Katjiuongua said he believed that the nation's security situation is not (?threatened) by an attack from outside but rather by the drastic increase in the crime rate.

As for national reconciliation, he said that it is important for the government to issue a policy statement outlining its policies. He said at this stage the concept has not been specifically defined and certain groups and individuals have been excluded by the manner in which national reconciliation has been applied by the majority parties.

Mr. Katjiuongua also said he had held talks with Captain Hans Diergaardt after which the matter was discussed with President Sam Nujoma, who will discuss it further with his Cabinet.

Defense Department Denies Northern Shootings

MB2404212490 Windhoek Domestic Service in Afrikaans 1900 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] The Defense Department says it is prepared to help with northern Namibia's security situation.

The department denied allegations that 687 PLAN [People's Liberation Army of Namibia] members who entered Namibia earlier from Angola with SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] weapons were involved in any shooting incidents in the north. The department said these members were in transit and were under Defense Department control while at the former 101 battalion bases at Ondangwa.

Mining Minister Confirms Nationalization Goals

MB2104180390 Johannesburg International Service in English 1500 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] The Namibian minister of mines and energy affairs, Mr. Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, says the nationalization of the country's mines remains the long-term objective of the Namibian government.

Mr. ya Toivo was speaking after discussions with senior management of a tin mine owned by the South African Iron and Steel Corporation in southern Namibia, and the Namibian Mineworkers' Union. Mr. ya Toivo said the Namibian government realized that the nationalization of mines could not be achieved immediately because of a lack of expertise, but that the training of workers in the industry was achieving priority.

Police Note 'Considerable Number' of Weapons

MB2204072590 Windhoek Domestic Service in English
1900 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] A police spokesman says a considerable number of weapons is in circulation in the north which are being used to rob innocent people and to commit other atrocities. Brigadier Siggie Eimbeck, the spokesman of the police Division of Public Relations and Liaison, says police regularly receive complaints of people armed with AK-47 rifles who threaten and rob inhabitants of this area. Brig. Eimbeck says there is a slow response to the minister's appeal on the public to hand in unlicensed firearms.

Front Seeks SWAPO Arms Sale To Cover Debt

MB2404201290 Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN
in English 20 Apr 90 p 5

[Text] Armaments—said to be worth R [rand]8 billion—donated by SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] to the new government should be sold as a means of paying off Namibia's national debt, says NPF [National Patriotic Front] chairperson Moses Katjuongua.

"Since these weapons are of no use...and since the president is so 'deeply worried' about this country's R500 million national debt, we should sell all this stuff (weapons) before it is too old and useless," Katjuongua said yesterday.

Money left over could be used to create jobs and rehabilitation schemes for former combatants rather than enlisting the latter into a standing army, he said.

The NPF leader also took issue with the way in which the weapons—including armoured cars, rocket launchers and troop carriers—came into the country last week, accompanied by 646 PLAN [People's Liberation Army of Namibia] combatants. As with the decision to set up and train a Namibian defence force, the weapons had been brought into the country before the National Assembly had a chance to discuss the move, Katjuongua said.

"To bring all this stuff here at this stage...is to present a fait accompli to the government. An Act (of Parliament) must come first and the army later, and not the other way around."

The risk to Namibia's security came not from outside the country but from within, said Katjuongua, highlighting the soaring crime rate as one of the country's key current security concerns.

At a Windhoek press conference yesterday, Katjuongua also spoke about the NPF's approach to the deepening Rehoboth crisis, urging both the government and Hans Diergaardt and his dissidents to sit down together and talk the problem through.

Many bitter disputes worldwide started as small disagreements but developed into "monsters". "If the Rehoboth issue is not properly handled it could become infectious," Katjuongua warned.

About the NPF's own discussions with the Rehoboth rebels, Katjuongua said Diergaardt had pledged to postpone plans to call a referendum on the district's future and had said he was prepared to talk with the government.

The NPF believed the Rehoboth dispute raised the issue of land reform and ownership throughout the country and Katjuongua proposed that a national conference on this topic be called as soon as possible.

Turning to what he saw as the "serious trouble" the government's policy of national reconciliation was running into, the NPF leader said SWAPO had to "clearup" this policy by clearly defining its aims and methods.

However, as far as the NPF was concerned, national reconciliation was about "burying the hatchet" of the past. "There is a need to strike a balance between reconciliation and family factions, to combine change with continuity."

SWAPO's Garoeb Addresses Anniversary Crowds

MB2404225790 Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN
in English 23 Apr 90 p 1, 3

[By David Lush]

[Text] "We in SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] believe that national reconciliation has gone too far." This was the message from SWAPO party chief Moses Garoeb in a no-holds-barred speech delivered at the weekend.

While urging Namibians hungry for change to be patient, Garoeb also gave a stark warning to members of the colonial regime who still find themselves in top government jobs.

"Within the context of this so-called reconciliation, whatever is being done people think we are doing it out of weakness," Garoeb told a packed audience at Katutura's Shifidi Secondary School on Saturday [21 April].

"We don't accept that. We are not going to be part and parcel of that process anymore."

Garoeb gave examples of Zimbabwe and Zambia. In the former, one of the first decisions taken by President Robert Mugabe was to appoint the head of the Rhodesian security forces as commander of the new Zimbabwe army. Zimbabweans were outraged at the appointment, but within six months the military man had been replaced, the SWAPO chief co-ordinator said.

And when Zambia became independent, he continued, Kenneth Kaunda signed away his country's mining rights to Britain on a 99-year lease, but within five years Zambia had these rights back again.

"It would be a criminal offence to maintain the status quo," said Garoeb. "OK, let them (servants of the old regime) be there today. They can be there six months, I'm not worried. But I will be worried if they are there 30 years from now."

The party leader acknowledged that many were unhappy with the way the government and ruling party SWAPO had acted since being voted into power, in particular with the policy of national reconciliation.

But the country had been independent for only one month and, recalling the words of Chief Nguvaiva Munjuku, Garoeb said a sound house could not be built in a day. "A house which goes up in one day has something wrong with it; it is going to collapse."

"Nations live for hundreds and hundreds of years without achieving what they set out to do."

Therefore, Garoeb said, the Namibian people must be patient as SWAPO had not abandoned the promises if made when the party was founded three decades ago. "We buried comrades because of that commitment. Those brilliant fighters who were killed between April 1 and 9 last year died because of that commitment."

"Be patient, work hard, and as sure as the sun rises in the east and sets in the west, I can assure you we will achieve all that we have set out to achieve, in the same way that we brought down the South African flag on March 21."

Nonetheless, SWAPO believed national reconciliation had "gone too far" as people now thought the party was "crawling up" to supporters of the old regime "like a dog".

"We did not fight to maintain the status quo. We will fight it in other ways. We will fight it to get things done. Let us just wait and see... This is another struggle at another level."

Miners Union To Hold Congress 28-30 Apr

MB2404200890 Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN
in English 20 Apr 90 p 8

[Text] The Mineworker's Union of Namibia (MUN) is set to have its fourth congress from April 28 to 30, the union's general secretary, Ben Ulenga, announced yesterday. The conference, Ulenga said, marked a new era

in both the mineworkers' struggle and Namibia. "This happens after a very eventful year, one of profound significance to MUN, the Namibian mining industry and indeed the whole nation and country."

He said the congress would be attended by nearly 200 mineworker delegates from 20 branches and units around the country, as well as delegates and observers from friendly organisations within Namibia and abroad. The congress would review and reflect on the past activities of the union and discuss its failures and successes.

The agenda includes:

—The challenging topic of the future role and strategies of MUN, and

—a new union leadership for the next 12 months.

Interested members of the public are invited to the open session of the congress.

After the congress, delegates will join other workers in May Day celebrations in Katutura.

Hamutenya Delivers Broadcasting Policy Statement

MB2104143590 Windhoek TIMES OF NAMIBIA
in English 19 Apr 90 p 4

[Text] The National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) is a channel for delivery of government policy and projects to the people of Namibia.

The direction the government is taking needs to be communicated through the NBC to Namibians, Mr. Hidipo Hamutenya, Minister of Information and Broadcasting, said yesterday.

"The main factor now is the government, so naturally the NBC will report about the government."

Mr. Hamutenya said there would be no undue interference with the day to day running of the NBC.

"The NBC is wholly state owned and it operates autonomously. The Cabinet is the ultimate authority, but the NBC board has the mandate to provide deadlines and run the corporation."

According to Mr. Hamutenya the question of independence of the NBC is a relative one.

"Obviously one cannot expect the Director of the NBC to defend the corporation's budget in Parliament. The Minister will do that."

Mr. Hamutenya stressed the fact that the NBC can "say what they want".

"The NBC can criticise the government and I will not interfere. A while back the NBC broadcast an interview with a prominent politician who criticised the Government on the detainee issue. We don't mind."

Ivory Coast

Houphouet-Boigny Interviewed on Unrest

PM2304144890 Paris LE FIGARO in French
20 Apr 90 p 6

[Interview with President Felix Houphouet-Boigny by Jean-Louis Remilleux; date, place not given]

[Text] [Remilleux] Mr. President, this is the first time your name has been booed in 30 years of power. The Ivory Coast is passing through a serious crisis, as is the whole of Africa. What do you say to those who chant: "Houphouet, out!"

[Houphouet-Boigny] I am certainly sad. I cannot hide it. I will not dwell on the ingratitude of people. I will just say this: There is a great deal of hatred in everything I have read in the foreign press over the past few days. I am being treated as a dictator and everybody knows that I am the opposite—a man of peace and dialogue—that I have never caused bloodshed or fired on the crowd. What upsets me most is that the young people and students have been set against me—those who have always had all my affection. I am hurt by that, yes, hurt. Look at the Ivory Coast objectively, look at the great leap forward it has made in 30 years and where we started from.

Look at the infrastructure we now have—the roads, hospitals, and schools. There is no country south of the Sahara in which people are better paid than in the Ivory Coast. There are destabilizing elements who want to call all that into question. I know why. They have never agreed that the Africans should take control of their destiny. They want to colonize us in a different way. They are sowing chaos everywhere—in Gabon, Zaire, the Ivory Coast—and this storm is no accident. They are sadly mistaken. Having said that, I am calm. You can see that. There are no tanks outside my house. God is my only protection.

[Remilleux] Are you not living through your May 1968?

[Houphouet-Boigny] Yes, this is truly 1968. People are trying to make a political crisis out of minor economic or student problems. Do you know how the student protests started? They started because of electricity cuts in Abidjan university, because butter had been replaced by margarine in the student restaurants, and other derisory things! On that basis, an attempt was made to set the young people against the regime. And the teachers followed the protests, and they are not the people who are worst off in Ivorian society. Anger against me was stirred up. I have become the target, the cause of all evils. Well, if I have to go, I will go! I am 85 years old, I am not a life president. I am not a king, I have no heir to set on the throne.... It is a matter for the party and its congress. I will not cling to power. I think I will have to go.

The debate on a multiparty system is a pretext. It does not correspond to our African traditions. Every time it

has existed, it has led to confrontations, divisions, electoral fraud, and political paralysis. I reject permanent confrontation for my country. I will fight for peace, especially in my country, in the Ivory Coast. I will not leave amid chaos. Have patience. Allow me to leave with my head high and with a flourish....

[Remilleux] But will you be a candidate for president of the Republic at the forthcoming party congress in May and June?

[Houphouet-Boigny] I will not say any more to you about this.... There is a serious economic crisis in the Ivory Coast. We have taken stringent measures imposed by the situation and which are bound to be unpopular. These measures are misunderstood and are leading to discontent which is being used by others and turned into a political struggle. I could not resign in the middle of a social crisis, amid agitation in the streets! What would people say about a head of state who abandoned his ship in a storm? Have patience, the bad weather will blow over. I have told you that I will not cling to power....

[Remilleux] What is difficult to understand is that wages have to be cut between 17 and 40 percent, according to the category, when the country has great potential resources. The research workers trade union and the students are talking of corruption, maladministration, and so forth. What is your reaction to that?

[Houphouet-Boigny] Yes, we have resources, but we receive a low price for them, well below their value! Rare wood, cotton, and cocoa are not sold at their true value. The Europeans have learned to act together. The Africans should also unite to face Europe! For four years, the Ivory Coast, my country, has suffered an outright loss of 1,400 billion [currency not specified] because the price of cocoa, decided in London and elsewhere, has fallen to 300 CFA francs per kilogram. There is the same problem for coffee: They refuse to pay us 1,000 CFA francs per kilogram.... However, 1 kilogram of coffee produces 50 cups each sold at 600 CFA francs.... That means a return of 30,000 CFA francs. And our coffee planters are refused 1,000 CFA francs!

Give-away prices are being paid for cocoa. Timber, rubber, and other raw materials are suffering terrible reductions. Nobody fixes your raw material prices in the developed world in such an arbitrary way. How can people still talk about a new economic order based on justice?

Corruption is the disease of the century, it is everywhere. It even exists in the Soviet Union, where Gorbachev has condemned it. But, you know, I am 85 years old. I am the doyen of African heads of state and even the doyen of world heads of state. I have seen everything! Let those who are making accusations, who talk of fortunes and corruption, look more closely at what is happening in their country. If corruption is to exist, you have to have a corrupt person but also somebody who corrupts. That is the truth. Corruption often has two faces, and people

only see the Africans who have been weak enough to be led astray. They never see the face of the corrupter....

Speaker Bedie Says Multiparty System Possible

AB2504140990 Paris AFP in French 1249 GMT
25 Apr 90

[All ellipses as received]

[Text] Abidjan, 25 Apr (AFP)—Ivorian National Assembly Speaker Henri Konan Bedie stated here today that the multiparty system could fit the Ivorian political scene. He is thus the first Ivorian official to allude to this possibility. "If the multiparty system is viewed as a political order fostering the wellbeing of all (...), then it should be possible to work patiently and intelligently for it to fit into the Ivorian political scene. This should be done democratically and on the basis of the promises enshrined in our Constitution and in the bylaws of the National Assembly," the 45-year-old Mr. Konan Bedie stated at the first session of the Assembly for 1990.

Just recently President Felix Houphouet-Boigny described the multiparty system as a "figment of the imagination" and a "threat to national unity." Constitutionally, Konan Bedie, seen as the No. two man in the regime, would become head of state in the event of vacancy in power and would act as interim president during the transition period; he would then call presidential elections in 45 to 60 days, but he would not be able to reshuffle the cabinet or dissolve the National Assembly.

"The new generations do not necessarily have the same vision of the world as past generations (...). For this reason, we should move along with the youth in order to maintain (...) harmony between the generations," Mr. Bedie stated. "The youth want more freedom (...) more justice (...) and changes (...). Our Constitution (...) contains every promise for the future (...). Everything can change in Ivory Coast provided this is done orderly and peacefully. Such a broad prospect for our political life heralds an era for stronger unity among Ivorians and patriotic mobilization for nation building with the effective participation of every citizen and every political inclination," the speaker further said.

Article 7 of the Ivorian Constitution explicitly authorizes the multiparty system, but currently only the ruling Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (PDCI) has been authorized since independence. Three political parties have already submitted their statutes for official recognition. They are: the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) headed by historian Laurent Gbagbo; the Ivorian Workers' Party (PIT) led by Francis Wodie, a former dean of Abidjan Law Faculty; and Robert Gbai Tagro's Republican Party of Ivory Coast. Other political movements could soon be proclaimed, it was learned from a very reliable source.

* Survival of One-Party System Questioned

90AF0062A Paris LE MONDE in French
14 Apr 90 p 6

[Article by Robert Minangoy: "The Minister of Defense Asserts: 'The Survival of Our Regime Is Being Questioned'"; first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] Despite the fact that local authorities requested the postponement to a future date of the meeting of the great French-Ivorian joint commission, Minister of Cooperation Jacques Pelletier arrived in Abidjan on Thursday, 12 April, for a 24-hour working visit during which he was to meet with President Felix Houphouet-Boigny.

Addressing the mayors of various communes, Minister of Defense Jean Konan Banny pleaded strongly with the PDCI-RDA [Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally] to pull itself together. The PDCI-RDA is the single party that has been in office for the past 30 years. Two and a half months after the beginning of the events shaking up the Ivory Coast, the authorities have acknowledged, for the first time, that the crisis being experienced by the country is truly political; Konan Banny stated forcefully: "It is not the seven-, 10-, and 14-percent wage reductions that are being questioned, but the survival of the regime and of our party."

After the wave of students' unrest, wage earners have been organizing to defend their buying power. Beyond the sectorial demands, discontent is now being communicated through total rejection of the authorities in office. The slogans chanted by the young students during the street demonstrations were clear: they were aimed directly at President Houphouet-Boigny whose resignation they demanded. The 5 April attempt to harness the "silent majority" in support of the chief of state's action met with failure. The fact that the minister of defense is joining the fray—he accuses the international press of wanting "to impose upon us models of national conferences like those of Gabon and Benin"—proves how threatened the regime dignitaries feel.

The government has denied the news that the traditional Baoule chiefs—the same ethnic group as the chief of state—would have "enthroned" his political heir, Henri Konan Bedie, the president of the National Assembly and Houphouet-Boigny's constitutional successor in case of abeyance. Less than two months away from the meeting of the party congress, which must appoint the single candidate for a five-year presidential mandate, personalities are making their appearance on the political scene; while they remain faithful to the "Old Man," they are trying to position themselves. France hopes that the transition will be done legally and, within that context, therefore it is betting on Konan Bedie, with the possibility of falling back on another candidate, for the president of the National Assembly is far from being the unanimous choice of the public.

Insufficient Austerity Measures

In fact, one cannot ignore the ambitions of the minister of defense, who is one of the president's intimates. Konan Banny, with Minister of Internal Security & Fight Against Drugs General Issouf Kone, is handling the crisis and trying to contain the social unrest. He is the one who, day and night, makes sure that order is maintained by preventing, for example, the unions from meeting in order to call for work stoppages.

Meanwhile, experts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank pursue their mission in Abidjan. They do not seem overly convinced of the effectiveness of the austerity measures approved by the government. If the Ivory Coast wants to obtain an economic recovery loan of 1,250 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs, it must find 130 billion this year. According to Charles Banny, the local director of the BCEAO [Central Bank of the West African States], wage reductions in the private and public sectors should bring in 44 billion, a far cry, therefore, from the amount requested by the moneylenders, the more so as no serious measures have been taken for the recovery of taxes and customs duties.

The African Union for Research and Higher Education (SYNARES), an union independent of the government, has pointed out for several months that the economic crisis is inseparable from the political one. Using statistics published by the World Bank, SYNARES criticized the poor management of state affairs (waste, fraud, declining tax revenues, debt increase, and capital flight) in a document entitled "Autopsy of the Ivorian Economy." The conclusions of that report are clearly political: "The founding of democracy without delay will, alone, serve as a remedy to laxism and corruption." Some members of the PDCI-RDA political bureau are beginning to break away discreetly from the policy being currently carried out and they too wish for a real debate. A former minister is already speaking of a "change for continuity...."

Liberia

Rebels Control Nimba; Moving Toward Coast

AB2404181390 London BBC World Service in English
1709 GMT 24 Apr 90

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Liberian rebels who took to the bush four months ago in the northeastern county of Nimba are said to have advanced to within 50 miles of the coast. They are virtually in full control of Nimba, and now reports say Charles Taylor's Patriotic Front rebels are moving on the strategic port of Buchanan. Our West Africa correspondent, Elizabeth Blunt, reports:

[Begin recording] Having chased the Liberian Army and civil administration out of virtually the whole of Nimba County, the rebels seem to be making a determined

attempt to cut Liberia in half by pushing down to the sea at or near the port of Buchanan, the terminus of the railway which runs down from the Nimba mines.

At first, the move out of Nimba was gradual by the infiltration of small groups of rebels into the countryside in the north of Grand Bassa County. But since the weekend, it seems to have gathered momentum. On Saturday [21 April] and Sunday, travelers in the area saw numbers of government soldiers leaving the battle zone weary and dispirited, complaining that they had no food and no more ammunition.

Then, in the early hours of Monday [23 April] morning, residents in the area of the rubber plantation known as LAC, belonging to the American-owned Liberian Agricultural Company, said that a substantial body of rebels passed by on the main road going south toward Buchanan and apparently unopposed by the Liberian Army. The rebels told staff at the plantation that they did not want to destroy operations and that it should keep working. LAC is the second biggest rubber plantation in Liberia, producing nearly 20,000 tons of rubber a year and employing 4,600 workers. The plantation lies about 25 miles north of Buchanan, the port which handles a large part of Liberia's iron ore exports. Although the mine in Nimba stopped producing after a train on its line was ambushed just over two weeks ago, iron ore is still being exported from the stockpile at Buchanan. [end recording]

Government Accounts for Soldiers

AB2404213690 Monrovia Radio ELWA in English
2000 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] The Ministry of National Defense has announced that soldiers assigned to rebel troubled areas in Grand Bassa and Nimba Counties are all accounted for. In an interview with the LIBERIAN NEWS AGENCY [LINA] today, a reliable source at the ministry said the soldiers assigned in these areas had not laid down their arms, as reported by the British Broadcasting Corporation's Focus on Africa program yesterday. The ministry source told LINA that it was a great shock to have heard such broadcasts on the BBC, when in fact soldiers posted in these areas to contain the rebels were in active service.

The ministry has, meanwhile, called on all local and foreign journalists to report factually and stop misinforming the world.

Government Approves Talks With Libya, Burkina

AB2404220290 Monrovia Radio ELWA in English
2000 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] The Libyan and Burkina Faso delegations based at the United Nations in New York have requested an urgent meeting with Liberia's permanent delegation to that world body. According to the Ministry of Information, the Liberian Government has given approval for the Liberian Mission to meet and hold discussions with the two countries' delegations.

The ministry did not give details for the meeting, but recalled that since the 24 December rebel incursion, Libya and Burkina Faso have been accused of supporting rebel activities against the country. The ministry also recalled that since that time, pressure in international circles has been brought to bear on the two countries for counterveiling the spirit of cooperation among nations.

Nigeria

Radio Nigeria Equipment 'Damaged' in Coup Attempt

AB2304130090 Paris AFP in French 1207 GMT
23 Apr 90

[Text] Lagos, 23 Apr (AFP)—Radio Nigeria cannot be monitored outside Lagos because of the extensive damage caused to its equipment during yesterday morning's coup attempt, it was learned today from a source close to the station. All the equipment used to link up the capital with the rest of the country has been out of order since yesterday afternoon as a result of the "huge" damage caused to the buildings and equipment of the Lagos central studio during the fighting between dissident and loyal troops, the same source said. Journalists resident in Lagos noted that the station did not carry its regular national network newscast this morning.

Meanwhile, armored vehicles and regular troops were still guarding the radio building this morning at 1030 GMT, it was noted at the scene. Last night, President Babangida stated that his government was in full control of the situation and that the coupists would be promptly tried by military tribunals.

Official Says Coup Attempt 'Bloodiest Ever'

AB2404132090 Dakar PANA in English 1300 GMT
24 Apr 90

[Text] Lagos, 24 April (NAN/PANA)—Indications that many officers and soldiers of the Nigerian Army were killed on Sunday by the executors of the abortive coup was confirmed on Monday in Lagos by the director of Army public relations, Col. Fred Chijuka, who described the foiled coup as "the bloodiest" ever experienced by the nation.

The Army spokesman, who was answering questions from newsmen at his Bonny Camp office on the foiled coup, said that not even the first coup experienced by the country in 1966 in which many civilians and military officers were killed was as bloody.

Chijuka told newsmen that the pattern of the execution of the coup was callous but said that the Army could not, at this point, give an accurate figure of those killed by the coup plotters because the casualties were still being collated.

He, however, said that it had been confirmed that two officers, whose rank, he did not give, and about six soldiers were killed at the Army military cantonment in Ikeja, a suburb in Lagos.

Chijuka said that internal reports of the Army showed that the casualties and shootings were limited to Lagos.

He said that the execution of the coup and "holding out" by the rebels for about nine hours was "not an indictment" of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the State Security Service (SSS) adding that the security agencies, did not emphasise the policy of policing every officer to avoid making them jittery and unable to function well.

He disclosed that most of the officers involved in the coup were lured into it and converged in Lagos from different parts of the country but dismissed the suggestion that the coup had religious undertone, pointing out that the officers who foiled the coup were also Christians.

Chijuka said it was "mischief making" for anyone to bring religion into the coup attempt and disclosed that investigation was continuing into the coup to discover whether there were any high-ranking officer or civilians involved.

Army To Continue 'To Prune' Strength

AB2304213890 Dakar PANA in English 1412 GMT
23 Apr 90

[Text] Lagos, 23 April (NAN/PANA)—The Nigerian Army will continue to prune its present strength in view of the relative peace between Nigeria and most of its neighbouring countries, the [words indistinct].

Chijuka told the NEWS AGENCY OF NIGERIA (NAN) on Friday that the present strength of the Army which he put at about 100,000 had been achieved through deliberate pruning of army personnel from about 250,000 which was the Supreme Headquarter (SHQ) number shortly after the country's civil war.

He said that the Army had been continuously pruning its size through the current revitalisation programme under which a certain number of Army personnel were discharged yearly.

Chijuka said that the Army had been very conscious of the need to cut down its size to a manageable level.

He described the recent closure of the defence wing of the Nigerian Embassy in Cairo as a step aimed at cutting down the running expenses of the Embassy and dismissed the speculation that the current manpower auditing of the Armed Forces, being conducted by the ministry of defence, was advised by the World Bank.

Chijuka said that the auditing was not the business of the bank.

Air Force Committed to Successful Transition*AB2304201090 Lagos International Service
in English 1530 GMT 23 Apr 90*

[Text] The chief of air staff, Air Vice Marshal Nuraini Yusuf, has reaffirmed the commitment of the Nigerian Air Force to a successful transition from military to civil rule. Air Vice Marshal Yusuf, who was speaking in Lagos on the 26th anniversary of the Air Force, said that as uniformed men, all officers and men of the force are part of the present administration who should be alive to their responsibilities during this transition period.

He said that the decision of the Federal Government to hand over power to a democratically elected government in 1992 was very clear and urged Air Force personnel not to allow themselves to be misled into showing tendencies that were at variance with the government's transition program. The chief of air staff said the Air Force was ready to play any role the Federal Government might assign to it during the transition period.

Senegal*** Official Press Reporting of CNTS Congress***** CNTS Leaders View Congress***34190101A Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
10-11 Mar 90 pp 2-3*

[Interview of leaders of the CNTS, National Confederation of Senegalese Workers, on the eve of the confederation's Sixth Regular Conference, by Sidy Mohamed Ndiaye: "Decisive Turning Point"; date, place not given]

[Text] On the eve of the Sixth Congress of the CNTS, we met with a calm and collected executive board staff at the headquarters of the National Worker Education and Training Institute (INEFO).

But last-minute preparations required constant attention from all these officials, who had come to give the secretary general a briefing on organizational details and problems that needed to be resolved.

Taking the pulse of the CNTS on these occasions is a tall order, because each of these officials has been working feverishly to ensure the success of the deliberations to be held today and tomorrow on critical economic and political issues.

But incumbent Secretary General Madia Diop and his associates are all talking on the same wavelength: mobilization of militants, closing ranks, deeper analysis of all the issues, and expansion of the trade union's base.

All of which means that the Sixth Congress will undoubtedly show that the trade union movement in this country is ready to demonstrate once again the workers' commitment to development, through its well-considered contribution to the national dialogue.

In addition, the Sixth Congress intends to take decisive action to support the Socialist Party [PS] and to demonstrate the party's enormous capacity to mobilize workers still loyal to its ideals.

Madia Diop, Secretary General: Putting Factionalism Aside

[LE SOLEIL] On the eve of the Sixth Congress, what is your general feeling about the congress and the future of the CNTS?

[Diop] I do not believe there has ever been a CNTS congress so carefully prepared, in terms of the selection of new officials at the base who have a wealth of experience, as well as the implementation of democratic procedures, which has predictably generated many enriching reactions. All of this shows us that the demands of democracy can sometimes be painful to implement.

On the eve of this congress, committees have been working very hard on the problem of the confederation's future, its structures, its operating style, the financial question, the vertical concept of the confederation from the base to the top, its future direction, and the confederation's role in our day and age.

That is why, without second-guessing the results of our deliberations, I must note that the CNTS has undergone a change in its approach to the trade union's future role.

[LE SOLEIL] Are there disagreements that could spill over into the congress?

[Diop] In that regard, I must say that there are certainly a few delegates on the fringes who want to prevent trade unionism from maintaining its opposition to the policy demands of the international financial institutions, the World Bank, and the IMF.

[LE SOLEIL] Does that mean the congress will concern itself more with economic than political issues?

[Diop] Both. There will be both political and economic implications, insofar as the current leaders of the CNTS spurn and reject the labor law reforms demanded by the IMF and World Bank.

That is why this Sixth Congress is obviously of such intense interest to the working class and all its allies. That is why the theme of the annual report is "Labor's Struggle To Build Society and the Nation."

[LE SOLEIL] In conclusion, will this be a congress dominated by the examination of real issues, rather than personality conflicts?

[Diop] We will try to put aside the factionalism so often seen in mass organizations. This congress should rise above that.

Doudou Issa Niasse, Deputy Secretary General

[LE SOLEIL] How do things stand at confederation headquarters on the eve of this Sixth Congress?

[Niasse] When it was elected, the confederation's executive board consisted of 47 people. Since then there have been defections on the part of some trade unionists who tried to use their position to milk the confederation and sought only to advance their own interests.

With the new direction of the trade union movement, those people have dropped off to create pseudo-unions of their own. The rest, supported by their constituents, have preferred to devote themselves to work along the lines prescribed by the trade union's renewal program, that is to put trade union activism back in the hands of the workers themselves, through defense of their legitimate interests.

From this point of view the executive board, under the direction of Secretary General Madia Diop—whom the board considers one of the great trade union leaders of our era—has worked collegially and harmoniously with the workers, who in turn have placed their trust in it.

This is an objective assessment, no idle flattery, because Madia Diop has an international reputation as one of the star performers on the trade union scene today.

We, his peers on the executive board, have every right to be proud of this democratic leader, whose dealings are always open and transparent. He clings steadfastly to our vision of modern trade unionism, modeled on the constructive role played by such great trade unions as the Histadrut in Israel and the NTIC [expansion unknown] in Singapore, which monopolizes several sectors of the nation's economic life.

Oumar Sane, First Deputy Secretary General

[LE SOLEIL] As deputy secretary general on the confederation executive board as well as secretary general of the Dakar regional union, you are the man in charge of putting this congress together. How are the preparations going?

[Sane] One must say, first of all, that the Sixth Congress is going to give the secretaries of the various trade unions a strong incentive to mobilize the militants early Saturday morning and get them over to PS headquarters. They will turn out to show their commitment to and support for the secretary general, Comrade Madia Diop, who has always fought alongside the leaders of the trade unions to protect the gains that the World Bank and IMF are desperately trying to dismantle.

So, as first deputy secretary general and as secretary general of the regional union of the CNTS trade unions of Dakar—which represents 70 percent of the confederation's militants—I call on all working men and women to take part in this great mobilization to show the nation

and the world that the CNTS and its secretary general are still ready to struggle to safeguard their material and moral interests.

At the same time, it is my hope that this appeal will be understood as a call for very disciplined participation throughout the unfolding of the deliberations of the Sixth Congress.

Oumar Tall, Director of INEFO

[LE SOLEIL] The congress is the forum where trade union activists can really show their mettle. As the head of education and training, tell us what militants can expect from this congress.

[Tall] The Sixth Congress does provide an ideal opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the educational campaigns of CNTS and to outline prospects for the trade union activist of the 90's.

After making systematic efforts to educate and train militants over a considerable number of years (1982-1985 and 1985-1989), the CNTS has now started to take its orientation from the militants themselves. That applies to their participation in politics as well as the process of economic and social development.

These are militants who have a clear vision of their rights and responsibilities, and whose praxis is enriched by theory, through workshops and seminars where they are exposed to the factors conditioning their environment so as to improve their understanding and the quality of their activism.

They are battle-tempered workers, who are able to harmonize the most pressing demands with the requirements for development at the individual as well as national level. In other words, it will be a congress of workers who have a clear vision of the problems that face labor, the industrial plant, and the nation, and who, therefore, can propose alternatives that will protect their interests.

This Sixth Congress made up of seasoned workers will need to draw up an outline of a new strategy of education and training, geared toward getting a handle on both their own and the nation's development.

Ibrahima Sarr, Secretary for Administration and Staffing

[LE SOLEIL] As the official in charge of the confederation's day-to-day administrative affairs, what expectations do you have for this congress?

[Sarr] Like all the other departments at confederation headquarters, we are expecting this congress to come up with the requisite innovations to consolidate the gains of the workers. This will allow us to move forward in our efforts to provide the confederation with flexible and effective executive organs that measure up to the scope and range of the CNTS and the serious problems workers face in their daily lives.

It is of course difficult, as a member of an organization like the CNTS, and especially as an official, to see the relationship between the resolution of day-to-day problems and the overall struggle for workers' rights. One must be on the scene wherever there are problems that need to be resolved and commit oneself to constant re-examination and reflection...

As for the Sixth Congress, we do not expect major problems, because the difficulties are really those facing the workers themselves, the working class members of our confederation, which is the most representative labor organization in the country.

Thus we must become more cohesive, more united, as we face challenges such as the increasing number of factory shutdowns, the worker layoffs, and the increasingly energetic efforts of the bourgeois class to deprive us of job security. We have faith in the ability of our trade unions to mobilize the militants, and we are confident their militants will rise to the challenges.

Oumar Sy, Secretary General for Youth

"For young people, who represent about 60 percent of the confederation's militants, this is a congress full of hope, in terms of dealing more effectively with their employment problems. It will be a chance for them to show maturity in the solutions they propose, by taking a broad-based view of youth employment problems.

Given rising unemployment and the realities of the economic crisis, we also hope to strengthen the involvement of CNTS in international cooperation, in order to find new opportunities for increased production.

Daouda Seck, Secretary for Congressional Oversight

[LE SOLEIL] On the eve of the Sixth Congress, can you tell us about the recent selection of new officers in the trade unions that make up the confederation?

[Seck] It is very much to be expected that within the 60 professional organizations that make up the CNTS there would be different points of view. Thus, problems were encountered in about 10 of the trade unions. It was not at all easy, but we insisted on transparency and representation of all the various tendencies.

Thus the selection process, which was entirely under CNTS supervision, ensured democratic representation at the base level. As of now, only two trade unions have been unable to complete the process within the prescribed deadlines. There are the OPCE [expansion unknown] and the Schools and Universities [trade union]. One other affiliate, the union of railway workers, has had its selection process suspended.

In short, I must say it has not all been easy, for even after some people lost, some gnashing of teeth and other reactions occurred. The congresses were democratically organized, taking both majorities and minorities into account, and experience has shown that our methods have improved since the committee was established.

As for the Sixth Congress, it will consist of delegates properly chosen at the base level.

Alioune Ndiaye, Secretary for Organizational Affairs

"No fairy tales. The CNTS committee has taken all the necessary steps to ensure a successful Sixth Congress, a congress of consolidation.

"In addition to the delegates, observers will also be on hand from the OATUU [Organization of African Trade Union Unity], international confederations such as the ICFTU [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions], the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations], the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions, the Canadian Workers' Congress, etc."

*** Opening Remarks**

34190101B Dakar LE SOLEIL in French

12 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by Pape Boubacar Samb: "Renewal of Responsible Participation"]

[Text] "The responsible participation forcibly called into action by the new realities should also enable Senegalese workers to produce more and better, manage their social environment in peace, and safeguard the minimal foundations for growth." These words were spoken by Mr. Abdoul Aziz Ndaw, president of the National Assembly, and a member of the executive bureau of the Socialist Party. Opening the deliberations of the Sixth Congress of the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers], he urged the confederation to take into greater account, in its round of activities, "our pluralistic democratic reality, which by itself can modify the fundamental conditions of industry as well as the relations between capitalists and workers."

"The success of the vanguard struggle of the CNTS in responding to worker aspirations is due to its pursuit of a line of action that meshes perfectly with the process of renewal and opening initiated over a year ago now by the Socialist Party," said Mr. Ndaw.

He went on to say that President Abdou Diouf, Minister of State Jerôme Collin, and the entire ministerial team will spare no effort to "protect and create jobs, even in an environment of crisis and economic domination by the big nations." Commenting on the importance of the congress, Mr. Ndaw pointed to the great interest it has generated within the PS [Socialist Party], since it is taking place "at the onset of the last decade of this century, which will see humanity struggling to produce as much as possible, while at the same time increasing its survivability as a species and conquering new technological and scientific domains that are completely changing the world." Moreover, "the ramifications of this great change and modifications in the international division of labor are already creating new relations and conditions of production in industry that link productivity with flexibility, competitiveness, and reduced work time." It

was in the context of those changes that Mr. Ndaw, delivering the president's message of support to the delegates, cited the need to make responsible participation a reality.

*** Secretary General's Report**

34190101C Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
12 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by Sidy Mohamed Ndiaye: "Activity Report by Madia Diop: The Struggle Continues"]

[Text] When a trade unionist of the stature of Madia Diop looks at future prospects and past achievements on the threshold of the last decade of the 20th century, he sees the big picture: the lessons of contemporary history, the bonds holding society together, trade unionism's deep penetration into national life, as well as all the economic concerns of the day.

The report presented by the incumbent secretary general, titled "Labor's Struggle To Build Society and the Nation," is a serious and lucid examination of the state of trade unionism in Senegal 30 years after independence. It is not a passive analysis. The instigator of the renewal movement brings his political, economic, and social diagnosis to bear on the entire international economic crisis.

In the first part of his report Diop describes the situation as it was during the worst period of the crisis: 1982-1985 and 1986-1990. The CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers], following the difficult onset of renewal, suffered all sorts of adversities.

"Nothing was spared us in all these vicissitudes, from the most utopian analyses to the most deranged and pessimistic visions, not to mention a press campaign that was a tissue of calumnies, intoxication, and disinformation..."

The militant tone of the report continued as Diop discussed the incessant opposition, which has beset the trade union movement everywhere and that has singled out the CNTS as its target in Senegal.

"The expectations and the nationwide interest that this congress has aroused demonstrate once again that the CNTS continues to be of critical importance to the people of Senegal."

Diop said the struggles and activities of the CNTS are deeply tied to—and convergent with—the life and daily activity of the nation as a whole.

As the most broad-based of the trade union confederations, the CNTS is the primary heir of the great labor organizations, which have bequeathed many advances to posterity. The report then discusses the various areas in which these advances have been made.

*** Diop on Responsible Participation**

34190101D Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
12 Mar 90 p 2-3

[Article by Sidy Mohamed Ndiaye: "Democracy and the Development of Trade Unionism"]

[Text] The first chapter of the report that set the stage for this congress discusses the recent selection of new officers in the organization. The committee in charge of the delicate task of verification, supervision, organization, conciliation, and resolution of trade union disputes carried out its mission successfully. According to Diop, the process was democratic and open throughout every stage of the selection of new leaders for the statutory bodies. "Democracy is not an easy thing, for some leaders do not think they should be accountable to constituents. That attitude is completely opposed to our Senegalese policy of political and trade union pluralism, especially in this period of wild promises and frantic efforts to destabilize the situation."

The secretary general said reactionary attitudes have surfaced in opposition to a major innovation whereby the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers] itself now assumes full responsibility for supervising the leadership selection process.

He attributed the disputes to which this has sometimes led to the size of the confederation, the diversity of the professional groups it embraces, and the complexity of the problems now being openly discussed, as well as the emergence of a new generation of young trade unionists determined to make their voices heard.

In his lengthy presentation based on rigorous analysis, the CNTS secretary general expressed his satisfaction with the cooperative attitude evinced by most of the organization's militants during this trying period.

Management of trade union financial affairs during the leadership selection process was the subject of a new resolution that called on all the trade unions to discuss the basic financial document.

Next came reflections on trade union institutional structures, the need to recast them, the regrouping of professional organizations into stronger and more representative federations, and the assertion that "in the face of socio-political and technological changes in our developing society, the trade union movement must be modernized."

It is no coincidence that labor's social partners are demanding changes in the trade union movement, said Diop in discussing labor's relations with the employers and the PS [Socialist Party].

On the subject of relations with the first partner—which is also an adversary—the CNTS called for permanent dialogue mechanisms to protect the independence of the trade unions vis-a-vis employers.

As for the PS, which has already given the confederation considerable authority to manage its own activities, it seems to be seeking a fundamental restructuring of relations. It was in this context that Madia Diop recalled the decision taken at the last extraordinary congress of the PS to establish between the party and the CNTS a "social charter capable of profoundly renovating the orientation of responsible participation, which has been so sorely tested by recent social events."

Mr. Diop said the criticisms raised against the policy of social participation and the necessity of its revision have led the CNTS to propose a redefinition of the proper relationship of the confederation to the party and the government. What is needed, he said, are permanent structures for dialogue among the social partners to broaden the tripartite dimension of labor's orientation.

"Responsible participation has never prevented the trade unions from engaging in victorious labor struggles in the defense of the workers' interests."

Diop insisted on this point, in order to emphasize the extensive democratic liberties granted to the trade unions, as illustrated by the unions' unequalled record of action and struggle in the arenas of industry, commerce, and even state-owned enterprise, in the period between the Fifth and Sixth Congresses.

"The workers have mobilized to demand acceptance of their demands, to protest violations of the labor law, to improve their living and working conditions, to oppose unjustified layoffs and personnel reductions, to demand payment of back wages, to protest poor industrial management, and so on."

In thus reviewing the actions labor has fought on many different fronts during the crisis, Diop said that never have there been such memorable and important struggles to protect the interests of the workers.

"The leaders and officials of the CNTS have respected the commitments made to their constituents. They have proclaimed loud and long their determination to preserve the gains already made. They have truly defended the right to work..."

This commitment to the workers does not, however, compromise the confederation's overriding allegiance to the Socialist Party, about which Diop said he has never had the shadow of a doubt.

* Union's Achievements Vaunted

34190101E Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
12 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Sidy Mohamed Ndiaye: "Positive Record on Worker Demands"]

[Text] "Year after year, the conditions under which labor struggles to advance its agenda become more and more difficult."

In reviewing the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers] record of accomplishment, Madia Diop began by noting that the economic crisis is weighing heavily on Africa's development efforts, making it more difficult to deal with beleaguered employers and reducing the government's freedom of action as a result of various adjustment programs.

In these complex circumstances, during which the most controversial theories have been elaborated concerning job flexibility, competitiveness, and productivity, the CNTS secretary general said it is necessary to explain trade unionism's strategy, which since 1982 has been based on crisis management and the defense of workers' gains.

"Despite exacerbating factors in the economic environment and obstacles of every kind, the executive board has maintained its vanguard role of defending labor's demands in every professional sector with the various ministerial departments concerned."

According to Diop, the struggle for these demands, which focus on the need to raise worker living standards, has met with considerable success: 1985, a degressive 10-percent increase in wages; 1986, an increase of 3,000 [African Financial Community] francs in the private sector, later extended to all wage earners; 1988, a reduction in the price of basic staples; 1989, an increase in the interoccupational guaranteed minimum wage.

This last decision, resulting from the head of state's arbitration between CNTS and the employers, and not yet applied to "categorical" wages, is still the subject of negotiations among the social partners. But the most important demands, which have increasingly absorbed the attention of the executive board, have to do with the National Health Fund (CSS) and the Health Insurance Institutes (IPMs).

Concerning the CSS, the necessity of autonomous management was proposed as an alternative capable of improving the coverage of this welfare mechanism.

Diop said the Senegalese Government has agreed to have a tripartite working group study and discuss a proposed restructuring of the CSS that would introduce the process of democratic management into the Senegalese national health system.

With regard to the IPMs, Diop said the CNTS has consistently given a high priority to its "imperative" demand "to merge the IPMs into a single national institution."

The urgency of this demand derives from inadequacies and gaps in existing coverage and the management of the IPMs, which the CNTS spokesman proceeded to enumerate.

The retirement insurance system [IPRES?] as currently managed by the welfare institutions was also challenged. According to Diop, IPRES is in grave difficulty, despite its decades of experience. Like all the other institutions,

he continued, IPRES is having problems of growth and management due to declining resources.

Workers, confronted with privatization and its social consequences, now have new concerns, which the secretary general reviewed sector by sector. The private sector, the main victim of the new adjustment policies, was given a probing and detailed examination in the report, which noted the grim statistics on enterprises hit hard by the recession and sketched out future prospects.

In the public and parastatal sectors, several institutional agreements and accords have been negotiated, Diop said. These have involved SODEFITEX [Society for the Development of Textile Fibers], SOTRAC [Dakar Transportation Company], and the CSS; collective bargaining is still under way with ORTS [Senegalese Radio and Television Office], SONATEL [National Telecommunications Company] and the Price Equalization and Stabilization Fund.

* International Labor Solidarity

34190101F Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
12 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Sidy Mohamed Ndiaye: "Trade Unionism and International Relations"]

[Text] International cooperation is gaining ground in the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers].

According to the report of the Sixth Congress, the attitude and effective actions of the leadership have done much for the Senegalese labor confederation's relations in the international arena, where the CNTS has earned worldwide recognition and growing credibility with international worker organizations.

There have been several donations of equipment, which the CNTS spokesman enumerated, expressing the confederation's thanks for the generosity of its partners in attendance at the congress.

These included, first of all, the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions, which provided 1,000 tons of cement, the sale of which made possible the construction or renovation of several regional labor exchanges. The Chinese Federation of Trade Unions provided 100 tons of wheat converted to rice, which helped tide over workers who had been laid off. The ICFTU [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions], the Afro-American Labor Center and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation have also worked closely with the CNTS, enabling the latter to make organizational improvements, strengthen its base and maintain a more visible presence on the trade union scene.

Diop also noted that the CNTS also engages in many forms of cooperation with the Socialist Party, its objective ally.

In addition, the Senegales-Mauritanian crisis elicited demonstrations of spontaneous international solidarity,

including contributions from the ICFTU, the Afro-American Labor Center and other organizations. The CNTS responded in several ways to the crisis: putting repatriated drivers back to work, instituting social and economic reintegration programs, and lodging a complaint against the Mauritanian Government with the International Labor Office.

"Workers, aware of the dangers that threaten the safety of the people living on the banks of the Senegal River, must support the efforts of the government and the Senegalese Army to defend the security and integrity of the right bank of the river, which belongs to Senegal."

* Debt's Impact on Workers

34190101G Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
12 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Sidy Mohamed Ndiaye: "Trade Unionism and Debt"]

[Text] "For the working classes, debt has become an equation with incommensurable terms, of unprecedented scope, whose manifestations in the form of crises are remorselessly crushing the peoples of the underdeveloped countries."

Thus the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers] secretary general described, in the concluding part of his report, how the debt burden has mortgaged labor's future. The tragic situation in which the underdeveloped countries find themselves is attributable to usury and to credit imperialism, which from the standpoint of our own traditional values we must condemn. It is the workers who are suffering the direct consequences of this deplorable situation.

In that regard, Diop denounced the proposed legislative bill to revise (directly and indirectly) the positive features of the labor code and the effort to destabilize existing labor relations.

"Trade union organizations deeply resent the continuing and increasingly exacerbated pressures being applied to workers and their families, as well as the growing and imperious influence of debt and debt service."

This observation led the secretary general to point out that it is no longer possible to negotiate for workers' demands in any occupational sector without running into opposition from the IMF and the World Bank, which have become permanent obstacles to free labor negotiations.

"These new forms of exploitation are telling nations they can and must tighten their belts at a time when their stomachs are wasting away from malnutrition," he added.

According to Mr. Diop, the new theories of economic growth that have emerged during this difficult period urge revision of the labor laws, the reduction of subsidies, and higher prices to sustain capital fluidity.

In his address to the congressional delegates, the CNTS secretary severely criticized the idea that indebted countries should use the lion's share of their GDP [gross domestic product] to make loan repayments, leaving them only a bare fraction of their own resources with which to satisfy basic needs such as food, health, and education.

"This Sixth Congress of the CNTS should propose a more searching examination of the debt and debt service problem, which imperils the workers' prospects for future advancement."

Diop said this proposal is consistent with the OATUU [Organization of African Trade Union Unity] charter, which gives trade unions the right to speak out on questions that affect the life and activity of the workers.

* Union Not Afraid of Plurality

34190101H Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
12 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Pape Boubacar Samb: "Oumar Sane: Gains To Consolidate"]

[Text] The signing of the national collective interoccupational convention in 1982, the abrogation of Law 80-01 and the revision of Articles 47 and 188 of the labor code, the demonstration mounted at the National Assembly by employee representatives to protest the revision of Article 35 of the labor code, the united opposition of the trade unions and CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers] deputies to Law 29-89 revising Articles 22 and 23 of the investment code: all of these, according to Oumar Sane, head of Dakar's CNTS regional union, are so many "victories to the credit of the confederation's policy of renewal, which has marked the end of a long period of hibernation for the Senegalese trade union movement." These victories were won "in a difficult economic situation, in an environment hostile to all labor agitation."

In a speech welcoming the congressional delegates and guests, Mr. Sane described the confederation's renewal as "the expression of a revolutionary conception of trade unionism based on active solidarity rather than individualism, and on constant defense of worker interests through a clear-headed approach in which the members of the working class become active partners instead of passive spectators." And Mr. Sane denounced "periodic and cynical efforts at destabilization," after paying ardent homage to Madia Diop, President Diouf, and Minister of State Collin, who realize that "the defense of trade union freedoms is one of the imperatives of democracy." In the same vein, the CNTS deputy secretary general said "the CNTS does not reject and does not fear trade union pluralism. Just as it has hailed and participated in the advent of political pluralism and the democratic opening, so it now awaits with serene confidence the frenzied multiplication of trade unions, assured as it is that with every passing day the working class places more of its trust and confidence in it." But he added that

"the CNTS rejects and will unceasingly combat efforts to fragment the confederation made by those who are upset by its loyalty to the working class and who are driven by blind ambition to get the workers under their thumb."

* Women: More Responsibility

34190101I Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
12 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Mamadou Traore: "Toward Qualitative Participation for Women Workers"]

[Text] Women, as an essential component of the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers] trade union struggle, showed the effectiveness of their participation by making a major contribution to the congress.

With the aim of responsible participation in the ideals of CNTS, women demanded more positions of responsibility in the confederation. Thus they called for greater representation at the base level and the establishment of a national women's movement council.

In addition, conscious of the important role of training in broadening militants' horizons, they are demanding their own training program, including seminars, workshops, colloquia, and other events to increase female militancy, with an eye to more effectively defending the legitimate aspirations of working women.

The CNTS women's movement also presented the congress an action program with a detailed request for resources. Implementation should make the women's movement financially self-supporting, at least in part. The women of the CNTS believe they should eventually hold 25 percent of the leadership positions in the confederation, in order to improve the quantity and quality of their representation.

The women said they were pleased with their movement's leadership team. Along the same lines, they paid glowing homage to their leader, Fatou Ndongo Dieng and reaffirmed their full support for Fatou Ndongo Dieng and Madia Diop as well as the CNTS itself.

The women's movement also pledged its unshakable support for President Abdou Diouf and Minister of State Jean Collin, his faithful associate.

* Youth Urge Employment Effort

34190101J Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
12 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Mamadou Traore: "Young Workers: Minimize Effects of Unemployment"]

[Text] Young workers, the spear-bearers of the trade union movement, reaffirmed their commitment to the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers]. In their exhaustive and detailed presentation, they put the accent on worker education and training.

The youth believe that "a country's development is measured by the educational level of its young people." One of their concerns was the number of young shop representatives from industry. The youth delegates believe "the CNTS should do everything possible to implement a better worker education policy, which would facilitate the emergence of new-style militants, able to understand the problems of the day." In that connection, the young people expressed their desire to see more training centers.

The working youths also focused on the problem of unemployment, which has become a national issue because of the serious economic recession at home and abroad. In their presentation, they not only analyzed the causes but also proposed certain steps to minimize the effects of unemployment. Among other things, they called on the government to ratify the accord on the National Unemployment Solidarity Fund. In addition they called for the revision of the frequency with which government appropriations to enterprises are reviewed, identification of new frontiers in job creation, amalgamation of the IPMs [Health Insurance Institutes], co-management through integration of workers into the decisionmaking process, etc.

The young people, who started off by recounting the history of their movement, gave a very satisfactory account of their accomplishments. Firmly supportive of the doctrine and directions defined by the statutes and internal bylaws of the CNTS, they pledged their unshakable adherence to the confederation and to Madia Diop. The young people reiterated their support for responsible participation, the Socialist Party, and its secretary general, President Abdou Diouf.

We note that after the opening of the congress it was the young people who moved to invite the delegates to re-elect Madia Diop as secretary general of the CNTS.

* 'Uproar' During Board's Election

34190101K Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
12 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Sidy M. Ndiaye: "Triumph of Democracy"]

[Text] The election of the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers] executive board, the last act of the confederation's Sixth Congress, was interrupted Sunday evening by an outbreak of confusion that reached its peak when Madia Diop, re-elected secretary general by unanimous vote, came to the rostrum to announce the names of the 47 members chosen. The uproar began with the reading of the first names and soon began to spread. The scene was chaotic. Delegates left the audience and swarmed to the speakers' platform. The chairman's table was surrounded by an ocean of people.

The procedures committee evacuated the hall and met elsewhere to draw up a list on which all the delegates could agree. At 2030 hours the meeting hall was filled up

again, and the "malcontents" clamored once more to be heard. People calculated and disputed passionately. One side saw the issue as the establishment of a delicate balance on the executive board, so as to make it as representative as possible. The other side saw this as simply an effort to sabotage the congress.

But occupying the center stage in this unruly scene were the leaders of the occupational trade unions, abandoned now to their own devices. The group included leaders of the marine fisheries seamen's union, road transport workers, SYNTES [Senegalese National Electrical Workers Trade Union], and employees at the sugar company and SOTRAC [Dakar Transportation Company].

At 2140 hours, a basis for understanding was apparently found, with the return of the procedures committee led by Abdou Aziz Ndaw and Lamine Diack. The brouhaha began to subside and calm was gradually restored in the hall. Then Madia Diop was invited to engage in a democratic debate. The delegates would decide whether the arguments of the "malcontents" were valid.

The first, Dame Lo, the head of the road transport trade union, apologized to the congressional delegates and blamed all the confusion on simple misunderstandings that were now rectified. He affirmed his support for Madia Diop. The second speaker in this clarification exercise was Ibrahima Diouf of the marine fisheries seamen's union. What had happened, he said, was a commonplace occurrence in trade unionism. Madia Diop was re-elected and no one challenged that, but the problem was how to make the rest of the board representative of the base. His speech broke the impasse. A few persons here and there tried in vain to raise tensions again, but the momentum was gone.

Madia, calm and smiling back on the speakers' platform, started off by regretting the abovementioned incidents. We should draw some lessons from it, he said: militants should now understand how with vigilance, cool heads, and discipline they can defeat attempts at destabilization and keep their eye on the really important issues.

The secretary general ended by reading the names of the new board, now composed of 51 instead of 47 members. On that happy note, President Abdou Aziz Ndaw concluded the Sixth Congress, which marks the beginning of a new era for the CNTS.

* Diop Notes Congressional Unity

34190101L Dakar LE SOLEIL in French
12 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Mamadou Traore: "Madia Diop: A New Stage"]

[Text] At the conclusion of the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers] Sixth Congress late yesterday afternoon, Madia Diop gave voice to his impressions and concerns after being unanimously re-elected secretary general of the confederation.

"Despite all the orchestrated sabotage, we managed to conclude the congress in unity and cohesiveness. It must be understood that some individuals were put up by certain institutions to prevent the confederation's congress from succeeding. We knew this all along, and we predicted this sabotage. They failed, of course, because the executive board and secretary general were elected by unanimous vote of the delegates."

"We remain firm in our determination to defend the gains of the working class. That is what upsets certain institutions. They apparently think that so long as Madia is at the head of the CNTS, they will not be able to impose reforms on the backs of the working people. For us, the Sixth Congress represents a new stage in the struggle of the working class to win new victories."

*** Students Reaffirm Independence From Parties**

34190104B Dakar SUD HEBDO in French
22 Mar 90 p 9

[Article by Simon Meledje: "University: Disclaimers"]

[Text] Everything is going badly between the university students of Dakar and the government. At least this impression was derived from the meeting held last week at the University of Dakar. This meeting, sponsored by the Dakar Students Coordination Committee (CED) and that brought together representatives of several opposition parties, the teachers' trade union, the CES [Coordination Committee of Senegalese Students], and parents of students also clarified certain positions of the CED regarding political parties and the "fifth column," which has been infiltrated into schools and universities.

All of the existing problems between the students and the government were raised during the meeting, both by the CED itself as well as by the other groups. The discovery of a notebook containing comments on meetings of the "Movement of Socialist Students," calling for "work to sabotage the Students' Social Service Committee and to denounce members of the CED through the use of leaflets," provided an opportunity for students to criticize these actions as tending to divide the different elements of the Senegalese school system.

To support their arguments, they presented notes on meetings held on the following subjects: "Meeting of the Rector With Khalifa Sall (deputy of the PS [Socialist Party]) and Diegane Sene for the Distribution of Instructions to Students Belonging to the Socialist Party"; "Delivery of a List of the Names of 10 Students of Economics Who Are Members of the Socialist Party to Arame Ndoeye, Director of the Students' Social Service Committee (COUD) by Youssou Bodian"; "Meeting of a Delegation of Socialist Students With Aloyse Ndiaye, Dean for Student Exemptions."

The representative of UDEN [Teachers' Democratic Union] reportedly stated: "None of the parties attending this meeting can resolve the crisis of the schools by itself.

It is necessary for all of the parties involved to find ways and means to resolve the crisis."

Regarding Mamadou Diop Decroix de And Jef, the UDEN representative said: "The University of Dakar has always been a bastion of the Senegalese political struggle, and this struggle includes the aspirations of the Senegalese people."

In the view of Pathe Semou Gueye du Pit, "The present Senegalese school policy has a short-term outlook. That is why the school system has broken down. If we look to the East we will know that the prospects for the next millennium are to be found in the schools."

In the view of other people attending the meeting (representatives of the RND [Democratic National Rally], the PAI [African Independence Party], and the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party]) "the struggle in the schools involves the national interest. If changes are not made, the future of our young people will be unfavorably affected."

The second part of the meeting will be essentially based on the relationships between the CED and CES and the political parties. There was even discussion of collusion between "strike breakers" and students and of the manipulation of the students by the political parties. The CED and CES defended themselves. They stated: "Our struggle is in no way directly linked to the revolt of the people. We have never accepted the view that our movements are determined by any political party. However, we have a right to review the policies of the Senegalese Government, because we are the people who will take over the government in the future."

*** Unrest Provokes Flight to Private Schools**

34190104C Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
23-29 Mar 90 p 6

[Article by Ousseynou Gueye: "National Education: Threat to the Public"]

[Excerpt] The years go by but they resemble each other in our public schools. Hardly a year passes without several more or less long strikes that place in question the operations of our public schools. Often it is a race against the clock, undertaken at the last minute, to try to save the school year after extensive negotiations. In fact, the public schools have become a closed field, marked by instability and interruptions in the training of our students. The year goes on with programs that never finish. This situation, which is far from encouraging, casts a shadow over public education. Once highly thought of for its efficiency and its success, the reputation of the public schools is now seriously damaged.

The future of public education does not look very bright. This is the least that one can say, because the ingredients of a crisis are still there. The large number of students: more than 60 students per class in secondary school and more than 80 per class at the elementary level, as well as

the shortages of teaching materials and school equipment, constitute conditions offering a fertile field for strike activity. Not to mention the absence of job openings that results in the situation that the schools are training the unemployed.

These are aspects of the problem that make Professor Iba Der Thiam fear the worst. In his view there is also the political context, which provides no assurance of stability. He stated: "As the electoral system is deteriorating, with challenges facing it, it is not impossible that the trade union movement will be used for a general strike to destabilize the regime. There is a strong possibility that the schools will become the locale where political rivalries threaten to become implanted." This is all the more true because youth is a powerful force that can, by its actions, provoke decisive changes.

Iba Ndiaye Djadji, secretary general of SUDES [United Democratic Trade Union Federation of Senegalese Teachers], also sees among the causes of the crisis in the system of public education the failure of the parents of the students and of democratic organizations to participate in the debate on the schools. He said: "Everything is happening as if the problems should only be discussed by students and teachers."

However, there are more serious aspects. There are no programs for the schools. It is just as if people are prepared to limit themselves to manage daily affairs. Thus, Thiam states that, "One remark that one could make is that there is an absence of political will, supported by a dauntless faith. That is, the existence of a sufficiently motivating, attractive, and stimulating educational program that could generate the nucleus of self-defense and make it possible for the schools to protect themselves in advance against all political attractions." This amounts to a program which, under present circumstances, could not be implemented, in the words of Iba Der Thiam, "except by a broadly based government of national union."

Meanwhile, it is the government that is running away from the problem. Faced with a cruel shortage of resources, the government often resorts to efforts to make things look more attractive. The authorities make promises and urge school principals to do everything to avoid making the students unhappy. The students, aware of their power, keep the teachers under control, demanding on the one hand the dismissal of this or that teacher and, on the other hand, lavishing praise on some other teacher. Iba Ndiaye Djadji admitted: "It happens that school principals ask certain teachers to reconsider a decision taken against the students to avoid an uprising by their classmates."

The major concern seems to be keeping the peace in the various schools, without becoming overly concerned about the proper implementation of programs to let students become familiar with new techniques on the eve of the next century. Ndiaye has serious apprehensions

about the ability of students, "to attend classes in the major institutions of higher education because of inadequate preparation."

As a consequence we are seeing the flight of students toward the private sector. It appears to an increasing extent that all of those who have sufficient means to take their children out of the uncertainties of tomorrow in the public schools, in fact, are sending them to the private schools. According to Iba Der Thiam, a knowledge elite is being created which, when it faces better working conditions, will then become an elite group whose training and level of expertise will inevitably impose itself on the Senegal of the 21st century. He said: "However, that is contrary to the general position of parliament, which has recommended cutting back private education to permit the emergence of a national, democratic, and popular national schools system."

However, the economic crisis is forcing this movement toward the private sector, and it seems to be approved of by the state.

* Religious Head Praised for Talks With Students

34190104D Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
9-15 Mar 90 p 5

[Column by Abdou Sow: "The Beacon"]

[Text] After the courageous initiative taken by Serigne Abdoul Aziz Sy to end the school strike and to resume courses in the lycees and colleges, some people have not hesitated to state that the khalif general of Tidianes would be the best minister of national education that one could hope for in Senegal. Of course, it would be impossible for him to serve in this capacity, and, in any case, this is not a serious proposal.

However, all of that explains at some length the deep scepticism felt by some of our fellow citizens regarding the way in which public affairs are being handled. Among the examples that may be mentioned are the endless and sterile meetings between leaders of the student movement and the minister of national education. The only tangible result of these meetings has been to convince everyone that they were completely useless and even ridiculous, after all.

The students went to Tivaouane to meet Serigne Abdoul Aziz Sy, whose honesty filled them with confidence. They heard him out and were almost entirely convinced by his arguments. It is all the more striking that this religious leader had absolutely nothing to offer them in terms of guarantees for the satisfaction of their material demands. However, he had more going for him in ensuring that the leaders of the student movement would listen to him: his loyalty and his moral integrity.

The meeting and, above all, the fruitful dialogue that was held between the 80-year-old religious leader and the young students eloquently demonstrate that the difficulties between the government, on the one hand, and the

school and university students, on the other hand, were in no way the result of a "revolt" by young people who allegedly reject all authority.

The problem raised did not reflect either a conflict between generations or anarchy. Rather, the problem is above all linked to the credibility and the regard that those who participated in it displayed toward one another. For as long as the government, through its political party, thinks that the students are being manipulated by the opposition, it will never agree to work toward rebuilding an educational system now in tatters—even though this is an absurd attitude. And, according to the same logic of suspicion, the students will make no concessions to a government that they consider is only interested in deceiving them to gain a respite and make it possible for it to enjoy its self-centered privileges.

This communications problem is further exacerbated by the new position of the government—which considers it a truthful stance—amounting to a statement that there are no more job openings for those holding degrees nor other employment available for other young people. Apart, of course, for "Tip" and "Tuc" programs (community service work inspired by the example of the system of work to help out local communities set up by the French Government at the beginning of the 1980's). The scandalous process of enrichment on the part of the bureaucratic and business-oriented bourgeoisie can only frustrate the young people, who feel that they have been exploited and excluded from a division of the spoils.

Evidently, none of these considerations encumbered the dialogue with Serigne Abdoul Aziz Sy, who has no interest in holding power or even in enriching himself. That is why his views appeared to be just, particularly as this spiritual guide is known for his great sincerity. Furthermore, this man could have continued to peacefully enjoy his excellent reputation and the respect that the latter inspires among all of the Senegalese people without becoming involved in a situation considered insoluble by all those obliged to participate in the search for a way out. And that is why the religious leader has provided a masterful lesson in political ethics. He accepted the risk of involving his authority under conditions that did not provide him with all of the advantages. A categorical rejection of his views by the young

people with whom he spoke would have been a harsh blow to his personal prestige. However, that did not happen.

This courage, which one must call "political"—involving participation in the affairs of the university—should make many professional politicians think a bit. Especially beginning with those who are in the government and who seem to think that a "strong and respected state" is symbolized by police officers and gendarmes ready to fight against demonstrators in defense of "law and order." A "strong and respected state" is, first of all, a state committed to respect for principles and honesty, a state that judges and punishes, certainly, particularly when this concerns thieves who robbed the Senegalese Red Cross. However, a "strong and respected state" also agrees to discuss matters and to work with those who do not share its point of view. This position is also valid for the leaders of the opposition who send their members to fight while they remain on the sidelines. The capacity to take risks is one of the great virtues of a public figure, as Serigne Abdoul Aziz Sy has proved.

Of course, this attitude cannot be displayed by a new arrival on the public scene. You must have behind you the irreproachable past of a man of integrity to dare to become engaged in such an effort. Moreover, this is why the students did not hesitate in rejecting the mediation of a certain marabout [religious leader] who is too well-known as a political supporter of the government to be able to adopt a position of neutrality.

In light of the experience with the students, we can even better appreciate the opportunity that Senegalese politicians allowed to slip through their hands by refusing the proposal of the khalif general of Tidianes to preside over a national round table to discuss the numerous issues, which have locked the government and the opposition in a struggle with each other for the past decade. This meeting, if it is held, would certainly not have ended in demonstrations of affection and handshakes. However, it would have made it possible, at least, to resolve a certain number of subjective obstacles, which have changed Senegalese domestic politics and created dangerous misunderstandings for all of society. Certainly, politicians are not required to be beacons of light like Serigne Abdoul Aziz Sy. However, nothing forces them to be stupid.

Today, when the course of politics involve street fighting, it is necessary to reexamine the possibility of meeting around a virtuous man.

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26 April 1990

